Understanding societies beyond economics: Wind energy development on the Greek island of Amorgos in times of neoliberalism

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Berlin, September 2015 Maria Proestou

Summary

Locals of the Greek island of Amorgos refuse wind energy proposals, while contemporary politics regards wind farms as a crucial means of pursuing a sustainable future. On the basis of an interdisciplinary theoretical approach, I develop a new analytical framework called Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework to explain the way Amorgians judge the option of wind energy development on their island. The data collection relies on qualitative research methods, that is, face-to-face interviews and participant observations, which enable me to delve into the particular Amorgian context.

The research results show that the synergy of locals' calculation (cost-benefit analysis), reflection and intuitive action influences their deliberation on the wind energy issue. The option of wind energy development shocks the ordinary run of things on the island, which is characterised by off-the-record interactions that shape both the tourism economy and the municipal administration. The combination of local pre-formal institutions, entrenched habits and intuitive responses causes Amorgian society to resist wind farms.

Analysing the Amorgian case through applying approaches derived from social psychology and institutional economics, I aim at bringing the readers of this book to reflect on the discourse on sustainability and narrowing the gap between the discipline of economics and the real world. My analysis questions the utilitarian assumption that man is a priori an investor, and goes beyond the case of Amorgos, which constitutes a microcosm of Greece, which currently experiences a deep socio-economic crisis. I draw attention to the fact that locals of Amorgos act and interact within the context of this crisis, which is related to the political economic thinking attributed to neoliberalism. Finally, I claim that increasing bureaucratisation of social life clashes with local ethics, thereby affecting responses to politics of climate change mitigation.

Keywords: pragmatism, neoliberalism, institutions, habits, wind energy, Greek crisis

Zusammenfassung

Die gegenwärtige Politik betrachtet Windenergieanlagen als ein entscheidendes Mittel für die Gestaltung einer nachhaltigen Zukunft. Dennoch lehnen die BewohnerInnen der griechischen Insel Amorgos Anträge zum Bau von Windenergieanlagen ab. In der vorliegenden Untersuchung analysiere ich, wie die InselbewohnerInnen die Option der Windenergie beurteilen. Die Analyse basiert auf einem interdisziplinären theoretischen Ansatz und einem neu entwickelten analytischen Rahmenwerk, dem Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework. Qualitative Forschungsmethoden, insbesondere persönliche Befragungen und teilnehmende Beobachtungen, sind wesentliche Elemente der Datenerhebung und erlauben mir, mich umfassend in den amorgianischen Kontext zu vertiefen.

Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass der Beurteilungsprozess auf dem Zusammenwirken von Kosten-Nutzen Kalkulationen, der Infragestellung der Thematik der Windenergie und intuitivem Handeln basiert. Die Option der Windenergie erschüttert die herkömmlichen Interaktionen der InselbewohnerInnen, die die lokale Tourismuswirtschaft und Gemeindeverwaltung bestimmen. Die Kombination pre-formeller Institutionen, eingefahrener Gepflogenheiten und intuitives Agierens aufgrund bisheriger Erfahrungen bringt die amorgianische Gesellschaft dazu, Windenergieprojekte abzulehnen.

Die Analyse beruht auf der Anwendung von Ansätzen der Sozialpsychologie und der Institutionenökonomik. Damit wird u.a. die gängige Annahme, der Mensch sei a priori ein Investor hinterfragt und die Absicht verfolgt, die Kluft zwischen Wirtschaftswissenschaften und ‘realer Welt’ zu verringern. Die Insel von Amorgos ist ein beispielhafter Mikrokosmos in und für Griechenland als Ganzes. Energiepolitische Strategien und die lokalen und nationalen Beurteilungsprozesse dieser sind dabei nur zu verstehen, wenn die mit dem Neoliberalismus zusammenhängende, tiefgreifende sozio-ökonomische Krise Griechenlands in den Blick genommen wird.

Schlagwörter: Pragmatismus, Neoliberalismus, Institutionen, Neigungen, Windenergie, griechische Krise

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List of abbreviations

EC	European Commission
ECB	European Central Bank
ECC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
ETA	Environmental Terms Approval
GAREP	Greek Association of RES Electricity Producers
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
GOC	Greek Orthodox Church
GWEC	Global Wind Energy Council
ha	hectares
HEDNO	Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator
IEA	International Energy Agency
IHI	Institutions – Habits – Intuitions
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
IPTO	Independent Power Transmission Operator
kV	kilovolts
kW	kilowatts
MEECC	Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, Greece
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATURA	Network of Nature Protected Areas
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NIMBY	Not-In-My-Backyard
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OTE	Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation
PPC	Public Power Corporation
PPCR	Public Power Corporation Renewables
RAE	Regulatory Authority of Energy
RES	Renewable Energy Sources
SDOE	Special Secretary of the Greek Financial and Economic Crime Unit
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
US	United States

1 Introduction

1.1 Problem statement

Growing concern over climate change has intensified the discourse on sustainability. Contemporary politics is concerned with the creation of a sustainable future that involves the utilisation of renewable energy sources (RES) with the aim of mitigating climate change. Wind energy development has increasingly become a significant topic in debates on energy sourcing and sustainable development, and wind farms have turned into an affirmation of belief in a cleaner future (Szarka 2007: 1). At the same time, wind energy development raises controversies as a result of its impact on landscapes, local communities and electricity markets (e.g. Woods 2003, Szarka 2007: 119, Dimitropoulos and Kontoleon 2009: 1843).

The European Union (EU) has committed to raising the share of its energy consumption produced by renewable sources in order to combat climate change and increase its energy security (EU Directive 2009/28/EC, L140/17). To accomplish these goals, the EU supports renewable energy investments capable of reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels and increasing the use of new energy technologies (EU Directive 2009/28/EC, L140/17). Within the scope of the EU energy policy, Greece has committed to enhancing penetration of RES technologies in electricity production and prioritising development of wind-power plants in areas with high wind potential (MEECC 2010: 9).

Despite these commitments, wind energy development has failed to gain a foothold in Greece. In the early 2000s, wind energy companies ceased investing in Greece because of social opposition at the local level, bureaucratic constraints, time-consuming licensing procedures, and deficiencies in spatial planning (Dimitropoulos and Kontoleon 2009: 1844). In 2010, the Greek state passed legislation (Official Gazette 85/2010, Law 3851/2010), which simplifies bureaucratic and licensing procedures to accelerate wind energy development in order to comply with the EU Directive 2009/28/EC. Local opposition has remained a significant barrier, with local communities rejecting wind farms in their vicinity or appealing to the Supreme Administrative Court against previously licensed wind energy projects (Tsakiris 2010: 19, Kaldellis et al. 2012: 40, Moysiadis et al. 2015).

The present study focuses on the option of wind energy development on the Greek island of Amorgos, which is located in the south Aegean Sea. Amorgians have not invested in wind farms on their own initiative so far. Furthermore, the municipality of Amorgos has refused wind energy proposals made by external wind energy companies in the last ten years and

resists the construction of wind farms on the island up to the present. In particular, in 2007, the municipality refused a proposal for the construction of one wind-power plant in view of anticipated environmental impacts that the investor failed to incorporate into the proposal (municipal meeting minutes 18/235/2007). The council recommended that the municipality installs wind-power plants itself, considering the expected economic benefits. In 2008, the municipality refused a proposal for the construction of 57 wind-power plants (municipal meeting minutes 16/146/2008). The minutes of the municipal council meeting refer to the environmental impacts and to the considerable revenues to be derived from wind farms, but note that the council refused the proposal without giving a reason (municipal meeting minutes 15/134/2008). In 2009, Amorgians rejected a plan for the construction of 116 wind-power plants on Amorgos (Energy News 2009). In 2010, during the Greek municipal elections, local political campaigns fiercely criticised this plan. In 2012, the municipality hindered the construction of one wind-power plant that was approved by the municipal council in 2000 (municipal meeting minutes 6/45/2000 and 12/105/2012). The case of Amorgos has not yet attracted scholarly interest, even though several scholars acknowledge the importance of studying the acceptability of wind energy development on the Aegean islands, as mentioned below.

1.2 Research gaps

Existing scholarly literature refers to some extent to the social aspects of wind energy development. For example, Wolsink (2007), Ellis et al. (2007) and Kaldellis et al. (2012) analyse public attitudes towards wind energy implementation. Moreover, Wolsink (2000) and Toke et al. (2008) address the role of energy and spatial planning policies, decision-making processes and local ownership of wind farms in wind energy deployment. Scholars such as Devine-Right (2005) and Wolsink (2000, 2007, 2012) study Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) motives and argue that such motives are inadequate to explain opposition to wind energy development, although in most academic and public discourse and policy making, it is assumed that NIMBY motives are sufficient to explain any opposition. Furthermore, Kaldellis (2005), Oikonomou et al. (2009) and Dimitropoulos and Kontoleon (2009) study the social acceptability of wind farms on Aegean islands.

The vast majority of the aforementioned literature provides significant insights into the local acceptability of wind farms, but is based on normative assumptions[1] and leaves research gaps. Aitken (2010: 1840) argues that the literature is dedicated to securing greater acceptance of wind farms. Scholars such as Oikonomou et al. (2009), Wolsink (2007, 2012) and Kaldellis et al. (2012) assume that public support of wind farms is the normal attitude. Such an assumption posits opposition to wind energy development as deviant and supporters of wind farms as more legitimate than opponents so that they can feed into policy (Aitken 2010: 1836). Ellis et al. (2007: 536) argue that the unreflectively pro-wind bias has led to poor explanatory findings that in turn have resulted in ineffective policy. Public attitudes and responses to wind energy development are examined in order to mitigate potential future opposition without engaging with the possibility that opponents of wind farms are not always out of touch with reality (Aitken 2010: 1840).

The literature provides examples of the local acceptability of wind farms without delving into the local context, with very few exceptions, such as Woods (2003). Kaldellis (2005) measures the degree of acceptability on four Aegean islands considering local physical characteristics and existing wind farms. Oikonomou et al. (2009) focus on barriers to wind energy projects on the Dodecanese islands in a general sense. Dimitropoulos and Kontoleon (2009) study acceptability on two Aegean islands, leaving aside local characteristics such as insular socio-economic backgrounds. In addition, they emphasise the need for further research on institutional factors affecting the realisation of wind energy projects at the local level. All these authors stress that the case of the Aegean islands is of particular importance for scientific research, because these islands exhibit excellent wind potential and currently meet their electricity demand through diesel power stations.

Most studies in wind energy acceptability are based on literature review and quantitative research methods such as opinion polls that, according to Ellis et al. (2007), correspond to the above-mentioned normative assumptions. Devine-Wright (2005: 135) and Aitken (2010: 1835) point out that qualitative research methods are better suited for investigating local perceptions of and responses to wind farms. In other words, qualitative analyses are essential to understand how the local context influences the attitudes of local populations towards wind energy development (Aitken 2010).

[1] However, scholars including myself 'are deceiving themselves when they believe that they do not aim opportunistically for conclusions that fit prejudices markedly similar to those of other people in our society' (Myrdal 1969: 43).

1.3 Research questions and objectives

Against this background, I aim to understand resistance to wind energy development on the island of Amorgos on the assumption that such a development provides an opportunity that local communities may take, depending on a variety of factors at the local, national and international level. On this basis, the research question is: *How do locals*[2] *of Amorgos judge the option of wind energy development on their island?*

My research is based on the philosophy of pragmatism and the approach of institutionalism, which claim that human action is context-dependent, and that both institutions and habits are crucial to understanding human conduct. In the light of this theoretical background, the research question consists of the following two sub-questions: Firstly, *how do locals of Amorgos judge the option of wind energy development based on their institutions?* Secondly, *how do locals of Amorgos judge the option of wind energy development influenced by their habits?*

The overall aim of my research is to bring the readers of this book to reflect on the discourse on sustainability and the role of contemporary politics in so-called sustainable development. On that account, the objectives of my research are:

- to contribute to the understanding of wind energy development in Greece,
- to extend scientific knowledge of local responses to wind farms,
- to include institutional analysis in the literature on wind energy development, and
- to incorporate the concept of habit into the understanding of economies and societies.

1.4 Research roadmap

The research question shapes the research roadmap that elucidates the methodological steps taken in the course of the present study. As a first step, I reflect on the subjectivity of social science. I proceed on the assumption that there is no universal reality and that my reality influences the way I collect and analyse data, and present research results. I adopt the strategy of case study because of my intrinsic interest in understanding the particular case of the island of Amorgos. This strategy enables researchers to delve into the unique context of the particular case to investigate a complex social phenomenon in its natural setting. In this

[2] I define locals as people who live on the island most of the time, consider Amorgos as their home, and are regarded as members of the Amorgian society by other locals. They or their relatives may or may not come originally from Amorgos. Nevertheless, locals who come originally from Amorgos are usually treated as the "real locals", while locals who do not come originally from Amorgos are restricted concerning their intervention in local affairs.

regard, I use qualitative methods that allow me to take account of contextual characteristics such as historical and psychological elements to form a holistic view of the Amorgian case.

In view of these initial steps, my research applies a two-phase empirical approach. The first empirical phase includes an exploratory stay on Amorgos, literature review, private conversations with scholars and energy experts, and reflection on my role as a qualitative researcher on Amorgos. During this phase, I came across frustrated locals who complained about a wind energy proposal and received first impressions of the case. The second empirical phase includes one preparatory visit to and three fieldwork periods on the island. During this phase, I collected data mainly through semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with locals and participant observations. The second empirical phase is accompanied by data analysis and discussion of preliminary results. In a final step, I reflect on the theoretical and empirical insights in relation to the research question in order to revise and complete the present monograph. Figure 1-1 gives an overview of the research roadmap.



Figure 1-1: Overview of the research roadmap

Source: own composition

1.5 Structure of the book

This book is organised in seven chapters, starting with the present chapter, which introduces the reader to the case and to the content of the study.

The second chapter presents the theoretical framework, which comprises three parts. The first part indicates that people act and interact according to their institutions, habits and intuitions, which are shaped by their experience acquired within their environment of action. The second and third parts deal with the theoretical approaches to bureaucracy and to neoliberalism respectively, which are both essential to understanding the case of Amorgos in particular in the current Greek socio-economic crisis. I close the chapter by presenting a new analytical framework called Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework, which derives from the applied theoretical approaches and serves as the basis for the data analysis.

The third chapter deals with the research methodology. At the beginning of the chapter, I present the research design and my knowledge claims, and continue by addressing the case study strategy, the qualitative research approach and the empirical phases in depth. At the end of the chapter, I illustrate the data coding and present my ethical considerations during the fieldwork.

The fourth chapter deals with the environment of action, and is divided into two subchapters with the intention of making the reader familiar with the Amorgian environment insofar as it depends on the wider Greek context. The first subchapter outlines the Greek context by focusing on Greek bureaucracy and the relationship between the Greek economy and neoliberalism. The second subchapter deals with the island of Amorgos, and more particularly with its economy and administration.

In the fifth chapter, I present the main research results. In particular, I analyse the way institutions (cf. Subchapter 5.1), habits (cf. Subchapter 5.2) and intuitions (cf. Subchapter 5.3 and 7.1) bring locals to resist wind farms on Amorgos. Overall, the analysis shows that institutions, habits and intuitions are incompatible with large-scale development promoted by external investors.

In the sixth chapter, I discuss the research results further. Firstly, I extend the definition of institutions by incorporating pre-formal institutions into the literature on institutional economics. Secondly, I reflect on the relationship between the fabric of pre-formal institutions and the current reform politics, in the light of the Greek socio-economic crisis.

Thirdly, I show the adequacy of the IHI framework for research analysis, and, fourthly, I emphasise the importance of habits in understanding economies and societies.

The seventh chapter recapitulates the present study by synthesising the research results. This final chapter outlines key insights gained from the research analysis, and includes contributions and limitations of my research as well as recommendations for further research.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Prologue

In this chapter, I address theories that provide the basis for the analytical framework. I apply a scientific theory based on Whitford's (2002: 326) proposition that a theory is better than another theory insofar as it can usefully solve the problems of the day. I use those theoretical approaches that help me provide a convincing explanation for the case of wind energy development on the island of Amorgos. I present a theoretical framework that originates from social sciences and is divided into three parts.

The first part deals with the linkage between pragmatism and institutionalism that rests on the theoretical approaches of John Dewey, Geoffrey Hodgson, and Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus. In particular, I apply Dewey's philosophy of pragmatism, Hodgson's approach to institutional economics and the Dreyfuses' phenomenological approach to human experience. These approaches stress that both social and psychological factors determine human action, and criticise utilitarianism for assuming that human action is solely dominated by calculation of profits and losses. In the second part, the theoretical framework is based on Max Weber's approach to bureaucracy, in which legal formalism informs human action and depersonalises social interactions. In the third part, I present David Harvey's theoretical approach to neoliberalism which, like Weberian bureaucracy, gives weight to the legal formalism that transforms human relations into contractual relations. Both approaches to bureaucracy and neoliberalism are crucial to understanding the particular environment of action, that is to say, the Amorgian social environment considered to some extent as a microcosm of the current Greek situation.

At the end of this chapter, I develop a new analytical framework based mainly on the linkage between pragmatism and institutionalism. This framework incorporates socio-psychological factors into the analysis of institutions and provides the basis for the research methodology.

2.2 Pragmatism meets institutionalism

The philosophy of pragmatism claims that human action is context-dependent (Whitford 2002: 347) and that people's actions are based on their habits in accordance with the natural and social environment they live in (Gronow 2012: 41). According to pragmatism, habits are shared. People who repeatedly encounter the same sort of situation share habits by grasping intuitively the common ground in each situation (Gronow 2012: 35-36). Habits constitute

adaptations in relation to the environment that in turn is a manifestation of institutions (Gronow 2012: 31, 34). The philosophy of pragmatism points out that the relation between action and institutions comes about through habitual action (Gronow 2012: 27).

Dewey experienced the changing circumstances of the United States (US) in the late 1800s. In his day, the US changed from an agricultural to an industrial economy and from a rural to an urban society (Anderson 2014: 1). Dewey (1922: 81) was concerned with how people use and are used by industrial and technological development. The increasingly entrepreneurial spirit of the day gave more weight to pecuniary profit (Dewey 1922: 218). The separation of production and consumption accounted for the class struggle between productive labour and privileged consumers (Dewey 1922: 272). Dewey (1922: 272, 317) criticised the power of money to enslave all classes by keeping economic growth going at an increasing rate. These new circumstances made society more self-seeking, which raised ethical issues (Dewey 1922: 317-318).

Dewey emphasised the need for some kind of ethics capable of coping with the problems caused by these new circumstances (Anderson 2014: 1). Economic growth entailed a utilitarian way of thinking (Dewey 1922: 50). Dewey (1922: 199-219) criticised utilitarianism for postulating that calculation of future profits and losses guides reflection upon action. He delved into the field of social psychology to show that reflection upon action is not based on prediction of future happenings. People rather reflect upon their actions based on their habits, which embody the ethics that characterise their social environment (Dewey 1922). Habits incompatible with the ethics of earlier economic conditions developed with the new ones.

Dewey's works reflect not only the US' conditions towards the end of the 19th century. Currently, neoliberalism is bringing about changes such as the shift from the state to the market and the public to the private in many parts of the world (Santos 2005: 34). Similar to the effects of industrialisation in Dewey's day, the current increasing importance of pecuniary profit and the widening gap between rich and poor characterise the new circumstances brought about by neoliberalism. Dewey's works also reflect the circumstances of today.

The pragmatic Deweyan approach had an impact on social science and particularly on institutional economics (Whitford 2002: 343), which deals with the influence of institutions on social and economic life. Institutional economics represents a school of economic thought called institutionalism that criticises the rationalist conception of action established by

mainstream economics (Hodgson 1988: 98-116). Institutionalism originates in the works of Veblen, who stressed that habits adjust themselves to new circumstances through the formation of new institutions (Veblen 1899: 157). Based on the assumption that institutions are tied up with habits (Hodgson 2004: 652), institutional economics studies the way institutions shape social and economic life and are themselves shaped by social, political and economic factors (Rutherford 2001: 190).

Veblen (1899) and Dewey (1922) have influenced Hodgson's approach to institutional economics. Hodgson (2010: 6) stresses that reflection upon action relies on habits and institutions. Habit is the necessary foundation of deliberation (Hodgson 2013: 162). Habits act both as filters of experience and as the foundations of intuition, and institutions have to become ingrained in habits in order to be deployed (Hodgson 2010: 6). Hodgson (1988: 103, 2010: 10) argues that we do not always act according to reason. He (1988: 98, 111) criticises the assumption that rational calculation guides action by arguing that we may act in a particular way whilst knowing that it is not in our best interests. People behave habitually according to the ethics of their social environment (Hodgson 2013: 81, 211). Hodgson (1988: 161) points out that calculation of profits and losses cannot capture the nature and function of commitments associated with ethical life. Finally, he (2007: 20) recommends that economics has a great deal to learn from social psychology, as was advocated by both Veblen (1899) and Dewey (1922, 1934, 1939).

Dewey (1922: 66, 1939: 35) and Hodgson (1988: 109, 2004: 654, 2010: 5) underline the role of experience in human action by stressing that habits are not biologically inherited but acquired by experience gained in a particular institutional context. According to Dewey (1922: 177), action arises from the delicate combination of habits and intuitions that are acquired by experience. In other words, people act intuitively as a result of their habits that are learned by experience (Dewey 1922: 66, 177).

Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1991, 2004, 2005) analyse in depth the concept of experience from a phenomenological point of view. Phenomenology studies the structure of experience such as emotion, action and thought (Smith 2013: 2). Basing their work on Dewey's view of experience, Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (2004: 253) explain how experience prompts people to act intuitively (i.e. spontaneously). The Dreyfuses (1991: 238, 2005: 788) argue that expertise (know-how) is acquired by experience and that the expert acts by intuition without reflecting upon possible courses of action and without calculating future profits and losses.

Similarly, an ethical expert does intuitively what counts as good in her or his culture based on experience of the ethics of this culture (Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg 1991: 103).

Dewey, Hodgson and the Dreyfuses argue that people do not act only on the basis of future profits and losses. People also act on the basis of their habits and intuitions, which they acquire by experiencing the environment of action, which is, in turn, shaped by institutional arrangements. Finally, Hodgson and the Dreyfuses stress that contemporary society's calculative way of thinking in fact dominates human action.

2.2.1 The interdependence of habits and institutions

Human conduct includes unreflective as well as reflective action, both directed by institutions, habits and intuitions (Anderson 2014: 2). Dewey and Hodgson stress that we cannot understand human conduct if we do not study habits and institutions. Dewey emphasises the importance of habits, while Hodgson focuses rather on the role of institutions. Dewey (1922: 108) and Hodgson (2007: 109) point out that we cannot study institutions in isolation from habits, because habits are means by which institutions are formed and preserved. The interdependence of habits and institutions influences human conduct, which is defined as interaction between elements of human nature (feeling, acting and thinking) and both the natural and the social environment (Dewey 1922: 17).[3]

The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition or tendency to act in a specific fashion in response to certain classes of stimuli or whenever an opportunity is presented (Dewey 1922: 41-42). Like Dewey, Hodgson (2004: 652) defines habit as the propensity to behave in a particular way in a particular class of situations. Habits are socially transmitted dispositions necessarily underlying thoughts, beliefs, and deliberations (Hodgson 2013: 105). We do not necessarily use our acquired habits all the time (Hodgson 2004: 652). However, habits direct always activity even when they do not obviously characterise activity (Dewey 1922: 41). The fact that a certain habit needs a certain stimulus to find expression does not mean that stimuli create habits. For instance, a person may acquire the habit of ignoring legal provisions, regarded as institutions, such as those represented, for example, by traffic lights. A red traffic light at a crossroads with hardly any traffic stimulates the person to run the red light. The person's habit pre-exists the red light stimulus that, in turn, constitutes a

[3] Although Dewey disapproves of dualisms, he distinguishes between the natural and social environment. I understand the social as part of the natural environment, but I adopt Dewey's dualism to fall into line with the scientific community that advocates this dualism in order to study separately nature and humans.

manifestation of this habit. Habits do not refer to action as such, because this would lead one to think that habits cease to exist when the related action is stopped (Gronow 2008: 362).

Hodgson (2004: 655, 2013: 161) defines institutions as systems of established and embedded social rules that structure interactions. Institutions constitute the stuff of social life (Hodgson 2013: 161). Every single human being is born into a pre-existing institutional world that confronts her or him with its rules (Dewey 1922: 61, Hodgson 2006:7). According to Dewey (1922: 61), definite modes of human interaction form institutions such as family life and legal forms.

Institutions bring rules with their development, but are more than just rules (Dewey 1922: 70). Defining institutions through rules draws too uniform, rule-like a picture of action, where institutions take the lead and we just follow (Gronow 2012: 39). Rules are usually imposed from above and dictate the way the ruled lead their lives by predetermining what is good or bad. For example, the Catholic as well as the Protestant Church has devised an instructive system of concessions, mitigations and reprieves (Dewey 1922: 5). Good people have been those who did what they were told, and lack of eager compliance was seen as a sign of something wrong in their nature (Dewey 1922: 2). Good citizens comply with bureaucratic regulations imposed by the state. People habituated to being ruled, like to be ruled, and thus subordinate themselves readily to hierarchies (Dewey 1934: 300). Rules have an authoritative character that gives the illusion of certainty, serves as the refuge of the timid and allows the bold to prey upon the timid (Dewey 1922: 237).

Based on Dewey's and Hodgson's conceptions of institutions, I define institutions as systems of established codes of conduct that structure social action and interaction. We act in accordance with institutions even when we do not interact. In other words, institutions also structure action when other actors are not present (Gronow 2008: 367). Institutions frame the environment of action, that is, the natural and social environment.

Dewey (1922: 20-22, 125) acknowledges the inertness of established habits when he argues that we can only change habits indirectly, by modifying institutions. Changes in the environment of action modify institutions by deranging habits (Veblen 1899: 126, Gronow 2008: 363). However, humans are creatures of habit and not of institution (Dewey 1922: 125). We go through life as creatures of habit until we encounter an indeterminate situation that we experience as problematic, because it unsettles the existing environment of action (Whitford 2002: 340). Established habits persist until the environment of action obstinately

rejects them (Dewey 1922: 125). Environmental cues may alter institutions, but the habits behind these institutions are not so easily modified (Dewey 1922: 108).

2.2.2 The role of deliberation in human conduct

Dewey (1922: 199) criticises utilitarianism for assuming that people calculate courses of action on the basis of the profit and loss to which they may lead. Otherwise put, utilitarianism assumes that people think by calculating the amount of pleasure or pain involved in the consequences of their action (Dewey 1922: 50). The utilitarian perception of action takes for granted that maximisation of profit is the definite end (i.e. aim) of all people, who, in turn, seek the best means to accomplish this end. As a result, people assess the future costs and benefits of definite ends regardless of the qualitative nature of these ends. On these grounds, utilitarianism is concerned not with extracting the honey of the passing moment, but with breeding improved bees and constructing hives (Dewey 1922: 205).

The contemporary discourse on sustainability elucidates the utilitarian perception of action as follows. The discussion of climate change mitigation has promoted the business sector of low-carbon energy (nuclear and renewable energy) and vice versa. Wind energy investors are primarily concerned with calculating the profitability of wind energy investments. The wind energy sector promotes wind energy as a future benefit. Wind energy development becomes a definite end for everyone, since we live in the age of globalisation. In this respect, a better future is not considered as a result, but as a definite end, thereby making people neglect the present situation (Dewey 1922: 266); and wind energy investments become the means of pursuing a better future. Consequently, we do not assess the kind of action required for climate change mitigation, but we assess future costs and benefits the way wind energy investors do. We become investors ourselves by calculating the profitability of installing solar panels on the roofs of our own houses. We pay more for a flight ticket, if the airline company contributes to emissions reduction by financing wind energy projects. In this way, we offset our share of the carbon dioxide emitted from our flight. Thus, we strive to develop a clear conscience by participating in the calculation of costs and benefits made by others such as airline companies. Emissions' trading promises a painless way towards climate change mitigation, because it leaves us unaffected in our pursuit of happiness through materialism (Spash 2010: 192).

Dewey's criticism of utilitarianism goes hand in hand with his analysis of the concept of deliberation. Some trouble in the existing environment of action triggers deliberation,

defined as a judgment process regarding what it is best or wisest to do (Dewey 1922: 190, 1939: 33). Deliberating means not only judging in imagination possible courses of action in the light of their consequences but also, experiencing present delights and miseries (Dewey 1922: 199). On the contrary, utilitarianism suggests that people judge by calculating future delights and miseries to ensure certain future outcomes (Dewey 1922: 199, 206). However, people do not calculate, but experience, and their estimation of future pleasures and pains is only a projection of what now satisfies and annoys them (Dewey 1922: 199, 204).

People deliberate when changes in the environment of action transform an existing situation into a problematic situation. When things go smoothly there is no need to investigate what it would be better to have happen in the future (Dewey 1939: 33). A problematic situation presents us with new circumstances that disrupt our habits (Whitford 2002: 340). Disruption of our habits evokes emotions, since we experience this disruption as unease, anxiety, confusion, offence or even outrage (Dewey 1922: 76, Anderson 2014: 5). Hence, we deliberate on the problematic situation by hypothesising possible solutions (Whitford 2002: 340). Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action (Dewey 1922: 190). Deliberation ceases as soon as we make a choice of what we really want (Dewey 1922: 193) and what we should do to get what we want (Caldas et al. 2009: 6). We want things that are incompatible with one another and therefore, we have to make a choice of the kind of action that straightens the problematic situation out (Dewey 1922: 193, 199).

Dewey (1922: 215-216) illustrates his distinction between deliberation and the business calculation embedded in utilitarianism with the following example: A person has made the final decision to take a walk and reflects only on what walk to take. She or he has a fixed end and is concerned only with the comparative advantages of different paths. Thus, her or his reflection is not free, but occurs within the limits of a final decision. This case resembles business calculation and contrasts with the following case: A person is not concerned with which path to walk upon, but whether to walk or to stay with a friend whom continued confinement has rendered peevish and uninteresting as a companion. This person has two alternatives that differ in quality. Reflecting on this qualitative difference means deliberating. On the other hand, utilitarianism assumes that the two alternatives differ only in quantity, namely in the amount of pleasure or pain that is involved in each alternative.

Quantitative (business) calculation takes for granted that a person is to be an investor, because it involves judgment regarding whether to invest money in this bond or that stock

(Dewey 1922: 217). Deliberation involves judgment regarding what kind of activity is to be engaged in, and does not suggest that a person is a priori an investor (Dewey 1922: 217). In this sense, deliberation contrasts with utilitarianism, which reduces all cases of judgment regarding action to the simple calculation of quantities (Dewey 1922: 218). To be able to measure quantities gives support to further judgments, but it is not itself a mode of judgment (Dewey 1934: 307). Utilitarianism thinks of people maximising utilities by presupposing that people are investors.

Dewey stresses that deliberation has an ethical dimension, because when we deliberate we scrutinise the quality of possible kinds of action according to their consequences. We think of our action as good or bad based on its reference to specific things that are desirable or obnoxious (Dewey 1922: 121). When we judge alternative actions we make our choice of action with respect to its better-or-worse quality (Dewey 1922: 278) based on the knowledge that our choices and actions affect not only ourselves, but also our fellows (Costa and Caldas 2011: 677). Deliberation involves reflection about what kind of a world is in the making or what kind of person one is to become (Dewey 1922: 217). Therefore, Dewey (1922: 278-279) considers that deliberation is concerned with ethics, which is embedded in every kind of action that involves alternative options.

Cost-benefit analysis, which I regard as a manifestation of quantitative calculation, is contradicted by the ethical dimension of deliberation. Nussbaum (2000: 1028) defines cost-benefit analysis as a strategy for choice, in which weightings are allocated to the available alternatives, arriving at some kind of aggregate figure for each major option. Cost-benefit analysis asks us to figure out, among the alternatives open to us, which one contains the largest net measure of welfare (Nussbaum 2000: 1032). However, the content of welfare is not fixed (Anderson 2014: 19). Cost-benefit analysis does not encourage us to discover the ethical quality of the alternatives offered, because it does not pose the question of whether any of the alternatives offered are free from ethical wrongdoing (Nussbaum 2000: 1014, 1032). Nussbaum (2000: 1005) defines this question as the tragic question, because recognising ethical wrongdoing in the alternatives offered raises inner conflict. She (2000: 1014-1015) exemplifies the tragic question by describing her experience as follows:

> *When I began teaching as an assistant professor at Harvard, philosophy department colloquia always began at 5 p.m., exactly when child care centres closed. Those of us who had child care obligations, consequently, faced many difficult choices. One problem we had was deciding what to do on each occasion. But I felt that we had another problem as well: for, often, neither of the*

> *alternatives looked morally acceptable. Either we would be deserting our duty to our colleagues or we would be deserting our duty to and love of our young children. The tragic question kept rearing its head, and frequently its answer was "no".*

Posing the tragic question may raise inner conflict that prompts us to deliberate on institutions (Nussbaum 1997: 1203). According to the aforementioned example, Nussbaum (2000: 1015-1016) realises that both alternatives involve ethical wrongdoing and so she gets into an inner conflict. Being a good primary caretaking parent comes into conflict with being a good colleague. Conflict triggers deliberation, because conflict stirs us to observation and makes us take action by shocking us out of passivity (Dewey 1922: 300). Nussbaum reflects on the causes of and solutions to the conflict. She notices that institutions account for the ethical wrongdoing and reflects on whether institutional change prevents or resolves the conflict. With respect to her experience at Harvard, institutional change refers to the established institutions of Harvard that determine colloquia conditions as well as to policy regulations concerning parental leave and public support for child care. In general, the recognition of ethical wrongdoing in the alternatives offered leads us to ask how the tragic question could have been avoided in another institutional context (Nussbaum 2000: 1017).

Quantitative calculation attributes commensurability to all ends that are involved in possible lines of action. Cost-benefit analysis assumes the commensurability of values that are involved in the alternatives offered. Dreyfus stresses that value is treated as an instrumental term to objectify moral action (Flyvbjerg 1991: 106, 112). Based on Dreyfus, I regard value as representation of belief that involves people's commitments and ideals, which, in turn, preserve their human dignity. Values are not objective, but differ among environments of action (Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg 1991: 106). The commensurability of values is based on the assumption that values can be treated as commodities. Commodities are defined as objects produced for sale on the market, and markets are defined as actual contacts between buyers and sellers (Polanyi 2001: 75). The contemporary market economy postulates that anything that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale (Polanyi 2001: 75). Cost-benefit analysis requires commensurable values in order to incorporate values into the market mechanism with the aim of capitalising on them. However, Dewey's view of deliberation does not impose the commensurability of values as a precondition for making a choice among alternatives (Costa and Caldas 2011: 677). Finally, making all ends commensurable, when there are good reasons for thinking them distinct in quality, is a reaction against the complexity of life (Nussbaum 1997: 1202).

The commensurability of values implies that values can be traded off against each other (Caldas et al. 2009: 6). This can be exemplified in the alternative of wind energy development. The natural environment is not a commodity, because it is not produced by man and therefore, it is not produced for sale on the market (Polanyi 2001: 75). However, the wind energy sector treats the natural environment as a commodity by setting a price on it. Wind energy business compensates people in monetary form in order to promote erection of wind farms in their natural environment. In this sense, monetary values trade off ethical values since the natural environment consists of objects of ethical concern (O'Neill and Spash 2011[4], Gee 2010: 188). Nevertheless, the financial compensation causes a kind of material surplus that cannot make good for ethical losses (Goodin 1989: 133). To include the natural environment in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market (Polanyi 2001: 75).

Tangible incentives in the form of financial compensation or investment subsidies seek to promote not only wind energy business, but business in the most general sense. The concept of incentives rests on the proposition that people require an incentive (motive) to induce them to act (Dewey 1922: 118). Tangible incentives put emphasis on pecuniary profit as an inducement to conduct business. Pecuniary profit turns out to be the ultimate aim, thereby making people give priority to business claims. Consequently, business claims may outrank other claims, such as fellowship in the form of family or friendship (Dewey 1922: 219).

The following example shows that tangible incentives can damage ethical values such as honesty and trust. Many countries have sought to increase the supply of blood by offering money payments in order to solve the problem of blood shortages (Hodgson 1988: 162). Titmuss (1970) studied the US private market in blood and showed that under the system of tangible incentives donated blood was more likely to be infected. Compared with voluntary donors, paid donors were more reluctant and less likely to reveal a full medical history and to provide information about recent contacts with infectious disease and about their diets, drinking and drug habits that might disqualify them as donors (Hodgson 1988: 162). The operation of tangible incentives lowered the average quality of the blood and increased risks of infection as well as the danger of unethical behaviour (Hodgson 1988: 162). Consequently, the system of exchange of blood for money proved to be less efficient than a system where blood is donated as a gift (Hodgson 1988: 162).

[4] This argument is based on their speech at the 2nd CES Critical Economics Summer School 'Environmental Values and Public Policies', which took place in July 2011 in Lousã, Portugal.

To recap, changes in the environment of action shock the existing action situation, thereby irritating and disrupting habits and triggering deliberation to deal with the shock. Changes in the environment of action — caused by external invasions and internal innovations — shock institutions (Dewey and Tufts 1908: 198). This happens because deliberation takes place in a given institutional context that is part of the action situation. In other words, people deliberate on the basis of their habits taking account of the institutions which frame their environment of action.

Deliberation means judgment on alternative kinds of action to clear up the irritation of habits. Deliberation is not exhausted by calculating utilities based on fixed ends (Gronow 2008: 369). Dewey emphasises the difference between deliberation and business (quantitative) calculation without arguing that people either deliberate or calculate. The calculated estimate of future costs and benefits is accompanied by the commensurability of everything that erodes ethical values. Finally, estimating amounts of pleasure is an attempt to forecast the future to avoid uncertainty.

2.2.3 The role of intuition in human conduct

Pragmatism indicates that action arises not only from deliberation, but also from intuition, and that intuitive action, like deliberation, is based on habits (Dewey 1922: 177, Dewey and Tufts 1908: 303). Intuition is the ability to draw directly on one's own experience and to recognise similarities between these experiences and new situations (Flyvbjerg 2001: 21). People often know how to act without thinking (Hodgson 1988: 127, Gronow 2008: 368), that is, without giving their choices discursive expression (Polanyi 1966: 4-20). People act by both habit and intuition, and intuition depends on experience, which involves the operation of habits (Hodgson 1988: 158, 166, Dewey 1922: 32, 177).

Dewey (1922: 178) (italics in original) distinguishes between knowing-how and knowing-that to explain intuition: We *know how* to do a thousand things without thinking of them; that is to say we know how to act by intuition. This knowledge differs from knowledge *of* and *about* things, knowledge *that* things are thus and so, and knowledge that involves deliberation. To act solely by intuition means to respond spontaneously to a problematic situation without deliberation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991: 238). However, intuitive action and deliberation are not mutually exclusive and may occur at the same time (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 779). I draw a distinction between deliberation and intuition based on the following example from Whitford (2002: 340):

> *A man walking thoughtlessly down the street does not ask himself whether it is good to do so, he simply does it. But if it starts to rain, he asks himself whether it is better to seek shelter and wait, to look for a cab and get wet until it arrives, to continue to walk and get wet, or any of myriad other options.*

In the rain situation the man deliberates since he questions what he wants, and judges the alternative options with respect to their ability to get him where he is going, and as dry as possible (Whitford 2002: 340). The rain situation constitutes a problematic situation that becomes familiar to the man when it reoccurs from time to time. When the rain situation is familiar the man does not judge alternative options. He rather knows intuitively how to get where he is going as dry as possible, based on his experience.

Intuitive action rests upon expertise (know-how) acquired by experience and the greater the experience the rarer the need for deliberation (Hodgson 1988: 127, Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991: 238). The more familiar the rain situation becomes to the man the more he deepens his expertise as to the situation. People may gain so much experience of a problematic situation that they become experts on coping with it. An expert spontaneously does what usually works without calculating or thinking (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 788).

Experts do not usually need to follow rules (Dreyfus 2006: 46). In contrast, a beginner calculates, using rules imposed by an instructor to help the beginner to act on the basis of recognisable features (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 782). For example, a student automobile driver learns to recognise features such as speed indicated by the speedometer, and is given rules such as shift to second when the speedometer needle points to ten (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 782). With a great deal of experience the beginner develops into an expert, who intuitively knows how to act without applying rules and making judgments at all (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 253). For example, the expert driver not only senses when speed is the issue, but knows how to perform the appropriate action without calculating or reflecting on alternatives (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 253). On the off-ramp, her or his foot simply lifts off the accelerator and applies the appropriate pressure to the brake (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 788). Experts usually consider neither rules for acting nor reasons for choosing actions (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 789).

In the same vein, an inexperienced ethical expert learns some of the ethics of her or his community by following rules and with increasing experience she or he develops more and more refined spontaneous ethical responses (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 254). To become an ethical expert, one has to fulfil two criteria (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 254): Firstly, one has

to be able to respond to the same ethical situations in a similar way as those who are already ethical experts. Secondly, one has to have the sensibility to experience the socially appropriate sense of satisfaction or regret at the outcome of one's action. Without a shared ethical sensibility to what is laudable and what condemnable, one goes on doing what the ethical experts in one's community find inappropriate (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991: 249). Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991: 237) give the following example of intuitive action based on ethical expertise:

> *A child at some point might learn the rule: never lie. When meeting an avowed killer asking the whereabouts of the child's friend, the child might tell the truth. After experiencing regret and guilt over the death of the friend the child would move toward the realisation that the rule "never lie" needs to be contextualised and would seek maxims to turn to in different typical situations. Such a maxim might be, "Never lie except when someone might be seriously hurt by telling the truth". Under some circumstances, this maxim will lead to regret as well. Finally, with enough experience the ethical expert would learn to tell the truth or lie, depending upon the situation, without appeal to rules and maxims.*

Ethics is based on involvement in a community tradition that defines what is good, not on universal principles that tell us what is right (Dreyfus and Dreyfus1991: 229). Dreyfus stresses that in ethics to be good is to do what counts as good in your culture (Flyvbjerg 1991: 103). Hodgson (2013: 81) underlines the cultural specificity of ethics by stressing that what may be an ethical code for one culture may not be so for another. An ethical expert responds intuitively to a concrete problematic situation based on her or his experience of the ethics of her or his community.

The intuitive ethical response depends on the uniqueness of each concrete situation as well as on the particular social context (Dewey 1922: 243, Dreyfus 2004: 257). Ethical experts do not justify their actions in terms of universal moral principles that judge abstractly the rightness of action (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991: 230, 261). Universal moral principles presuppose that two situations have the same ethical relevance and treat each situation in the same way (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 259). We are supposed to judge and to be judged according to what is right and fair. We seek universal principles that guarantee rightness and fairness as the basis of our social and political decisions, although universal morality is not superior to the ethics of any community lacking universality (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 259, 1991: 243).

Dreyfus (2006: 46-47) does not argue that intuitive response is the only way of choosing a kind of action. Deliberation and reflection guide our decisions, but do not replace intuitive action (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 791). Some problematic situations do not require or do not leave room for intuitive response (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991: 247, 2005: 791) and others cause some sort of perplexity that deranges the intuitive response (Dreyfus 2006: 47). An expert does not act intuitively in all problematic situations, but deliberates in the Deweyan sense and/or makes a list of options and their utilities to calculate which option is optimal (Dreyfus 2006: 47).

To recap, intuitions act upon habits, and, therefore, habits comprise intuitions (Dewey 1922: 86). A problematic situation disrupts habits. When a problematic situation is familiar to us it means that we have gained experience in facing the situation. In a familiar problematic situation disrupted habits give rise to an intuitive response (Dewey 1922: 87). Intuitive response is based on expertise (know-how) that is acquired by experience that, in turn, depends on the situation. Intuitive response neither replaces judgment upon what is best or wise to do nor precludes calculative way of thinking (Dreyfus 2006: 47). Whether people act by intuition depends on the situation. Each unique situation is framed by the correspondingly unique social context. Experts who share a common socialisation as well as common experiences with regard to a familiar problematic situation respond in a similar intuitive way, based on their habits.

Intuitive action arises out of experience and not out of calculation based on rules (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 253). An ethical expert responds intuitively to a concrete problematic situation based on her or his experience of the ethics of her or his community. Ethical experts act by intuition, relying on what their social environment deems good, while still being aware of universal moral principles. According to Einstein, the intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant, and the modern society worships the servant and dishonours the gift (Samples 1976: 26).

2.3 Bureaucracy

Weber (1968) argues that bureaucracy is the most efficient and formally rational way in which human activity can be organised (Swedberg 2005: 18). Bureaucratic administration is technically superior to any other form of rational organisation of human action (Weber 1968: 973). Weber (1968: 223) stresses that the bureaucratic type of administrative organisation is, from a technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is, in

this sense, formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. Finally, bureaucracy is the purest type of exercise of legal authority (Weber 1968: 220).

The spirit of bureaucracy is characterised by legal formalism that enables the legal system to operate like a technically rational machine (Weber 1968: 226, 657, 811). Legal formalism implies the tendency to view things through the lens of legal provisions (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 415). The legal-formalistic character of bureaucracy implants the widespread idea that social problems are juridical problems which can be solved by the law (Papakostas 2001: 42). Thus, bureaucracy brings about the juridification of social life by transforming social action into rationally organised action, that is, action regulated by legal rules (Weber 1968: 987, Santos 2005: 37).

The juridification of social life relinquishes social action and interaction to bureaucrats. Weber (1968: 975, 988) regards bureaucrats as personally detached and strictly objective experts, who are chained to their official task in their entire ideological existence. The official expert functions in obedience to legal rules (Swedberg 2005: 19) and is not to be confused with the Dreyfusian expert who acts on the basis of intuition. Bureaucrats constitute small cogs in the ceaselessly moving bureaucratic machinery that prescribes them a fixed route of march (Weber 1968: 988). On this basis, bureaucracy is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes by treating personal cases without regard for persons (Weber 1968: 959, 975). The administrative organisation is an impersonal business that demands the calculability of results (Weber 1968: 975, 1108). Therefore, the more perfectly bureaucracy develops, the more it is dehumanised, and the more perfectly it succeeds in diverging from the personal, irrational and emotional elements that escape calculation (Weber 1968: 975).

The domination of bureaucracy goes along with formalistic and impersonal social interactions (Weber 1968: 225). Weber is afraid that the rationalisation which dominates bureaucratic life is a threat to individual liberty (Ritzer 1992: 233). The mania for bureaucracy can drive society to despair, because the rational calculation within the bureaucratic machinery reduces workers to cogs, who, seeing themselves in this light, will merely ask how to transform themselves into somewhat bigger cogs (Weber 1968: LIX). Efficient bureaucratic machinery depends on officials, who function without bringing their task into question. Officials are supposed to fulfil their task without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm, thereby treating everyone under the objectivity of law

(Weber 1968: 225). The impersonal and functional character of the Weberian bureaucracy brings about depersonalisation of social interactions exemplified as follows:

Two train passengers are in tacit (unverbalised) conflict. One of them asks a railway official to intervene in the conflict and solve the problem, expecting the official to appeal to the appropriate legal order (railway administrative order). In this way, the train passengers avoid personal contact and leave the problem in the hands of legal formalism. This means that the passengers rely on the mediating role of the railway official, who is supposed to function according to the railway administrative order without regard for the passengers, that is, without considering the unique character of each personal case.[5]

The bureaucratic nature of contemporary society gradually renders expertise redundant (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 790). Dewey (1922: 234) argues that bureaucrats frame ends and arrange means to achieve ends in a bid to extract personal advantages from the world, which they accept as it is. Bureaucratic decision-making is based on legislation which is constrained to think in terms of universality, since one cannot legislate about every particular case (Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg 1991: 111). The bureaucratisation of human conduct refers to the process of increasing bureaucracy (in the Weberian sense) in all facets of life. The bureaucratisation of human conduct rests on the success of science and the availability of computers, which favour calculative thinking based on universal rules and principles (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 790). Expertise gets lost through over-reliance on calculative thinking that comes along with the increasing attempt to lead life bureaucratically (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005: 790).

Bureaucratic management of human life ranges from state bureaucracy (public administration) to private bureaucracy, which includes the bureaucratic organisation of private business (Weber 1968: XCI, 222, 959). State bureaucracy aims at exerting power over private business bureaucracy, such as bookkeeping. Small private businesses require less bureaucracy than ‘large private businesses that constitute unequalled models of strict bureaucratic organisation’ (Weber 1968: 974). The less bureaucracy characterises a private business, the more difficult it is for the state bureaucracy to control the business performance.

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5 This example is based on the speech of Prof. Daniel Bromley at the so-called ‘Brown Bag Seminar’ that took place in June 2013 at the Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

Wilson (1975: 99) points out that small private businesses lack the capacity to comply with regulations that state bureaucracy lays down in a bid to bureaucratise the private sector. Large private businesses can extend their bureaucracy by developing a specialised bureaucracy to adjust effectively to the interventions of state bureaucracy (Wilson 1975: 99). In other words, large private businesses can afford to develop particular departments and adaptive mechanisms and acquire additional expertise to meet the costs of conforming to regulations and formalities imposed, for example, by tax reforms. State bureaucracy controls large private businesses by monitoring their specialised bureaucracy, which is itself required to deal with state bureaucracy. In contrast, small private businesses are generally unwilling to invest in specialised bureaucracies, because such investments counter or weaken their already limited capital availability. Consequently, small private businesses often have to choose between unacceptably high overhead costs, breaking the law or going out of business (Wilson 1975: 99).[6]

To recap, legal formalism characterises bureaucracy, which has to function without regard for persons in order to be efficient. Efficient bureaucracy is precise, speedy, unambiguous, discrete, emotionless; strictly subordinate to the authorities that control the bureaucratic machinery; frictionless; and optimally organised in terms of reduction of material costs (Weber 1968: 973). In this way, bureaucracy relies on impersonal, rule-bound relations that favour the calculability of results that promotes business development and increases the risk of neglecting expertise in future.

2.4 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that suggests that human wellbeing can best be advanced when private business operates within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey 2005: 2). The absence of clear property rights is regarded as an important institutional barrier to economic development and to the improvement of human welfare (Harvey 2005: 65). Moreover, the state has to establish and maintain a legal order that preserves the freedom of private businesses and corporations to operate within free markets and free trade (Harvey 2005: 64). The spirit of neoliberalism has evolved since the 1970s and is now associated with competition between individuals, between firms and between territories (national,

[6] Wilson (1975: 99) explains the bureaucratic discrepancy between large and small firms as follows: ‘A small bakery producing limited runs of high-quality bread may not be able to meet the safety and health standards for equipment. If the bakery is unwilling to break the law, then it has to sell out to a big bakery that can afford to meet these standards, but may not tend to make and sell good bread’.

regional and local) that aim at capital accumulation and economic development (Harvey 2005: 65). Hence, neoliberalism prioritises economic development by viewing all public and private matters from an entrepreneurial perspective (Harvey 2005: 68).

Neoliberalism stipulates that the state sets the stage for market functions, while it is expected to create a good business climate (Harvey 2005: 79). This means that the state intervenes only to guarantee the proper function of markets by creating and preserving the institutional framework that facilitates neoliberal practices (Harvey 2005: 2) such as privatisation and commodification. Neoliberalism prohibits the state from intervening further in existing markets, because interest groups such as trades unions and environmental organisations may distort and bias state interventions for their own benefit (Harvey 2005: 2, 21). Finally, neoliberalism prevents the state from venturing into the market, while it uses the state (legal system, military and police forces) to secure profitable accumulation of capital in private and corporate hands such as transnational corporations, hedge funds and investment banks.

Harvey (2005: 162) points out that investment banks accumulate capital, for instance, by creating and managing financial crises that, currently, end up redistributing wealth from poor countries to rich. In this sense, financial crises may be engineered to facilitate what Harvey (2005: 116) calls 'accumulation by dispossession' to the benefit of investment banks and credit rating agencies. For example, the credit rating agency Fitch exacerbated the Greek financial crisis by downgrading Greece's credit rating, thus highlighting Greece as being in danger of defaulting on its foreign borrowing (Featherstone 2011: 200). Defaulting on the Greek debt[7] would have put the German and French banks at risk (Harvey 2011: 267, Featherstone 2011: 203). Thus, to pay off the banks, the Troika[8] bailed out Greece and drove it to implement severe austerity measures that resulted in a palpable decline in the standard of living of the Greek population (Harvey 2011: 266-267, Mann 2012: 184-186). The Greek state was supposed to intervene to control the crisis, for example, by passing new legislation that permits accumulation by dispossession (e.g. privatisation of public assets) without stimulating a general collapse or a popular revolt (Harvey 2005: 163).

Neoliberalism is based on competition between firms that often results in monopoly or oligopoly as stronger firms drive out weaker (Harvey 2002: 96, 2005: 65-67). Competition between firms turns out to be a rivalry between large enterprises to gain monopoly power

7 Lazzarato (2011) argues that the neoliberal ethic relies on the moral obligation between creditors and debtors.

8 The Troika is a tripartite alliance of the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission that aims to help Greece to deal with the current debt crisis.

since ‘small firms such as neighbourhood stores and family farms make way for large enterprises such as supermarket chains and agroindustry’ (Harvey 2011: 50). The larger firms become, the more difficult it is for small firms to survive (Korten 2001: 82). Therefore, competition between firms leads to the consolidation of monopolistic or oligopolistic power within a few transnational corporations (Harvey 2005: 80). For example, a few media groups control world news, and the energy industry is reduced to five huge transnational corporations (Harvey 2005: 80). In addition, the larger the corporation, the greater its ability (political power) to demand government concessions that, in turn, allow the corporation to externalise its costs, borne eventually by the natural environment and broader society (Korten 2001: 82). For instance, the wind energy industry is dominated by seven transnational corporations, some of which cause environmental degradation, such as the General Electric Corporation, accused of massive dumping of waste into the Hudson River in New York (Harris 2011: 46-48).

Monopoly power sits often uneasily with the preservation of nature. The drive of competition for new products and new production methods fosters technological change (Harvey 2005: 68). New technologies and new lifestyles intensify the demand for materials that may be rare and highly localised, such as the rare earth materials required for the electronic technology of wind turbines (Harvey 2011: 188). The wind energy sector uses the language of environmental awareness and sustainable lifestyle to promote new technology products. Demand for the rare earth materials required for wind energy technology has increased rapidly, accompanied by a consumer culture that encourages high energy consumption (Harvey 2005: 173, 2011: 188). China currently preserves a quasi-monopoly over supply of these materials by producing nearly 95 percent of the global supply without regard for devastating environmental impacts (Harvey 2011: 188).

The neoliberal practice of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ arouses opposition that can be at odds with local particularities and daily practices, because it appeals to universal principles (Harvey 2005: 177-178) explained as follows. Dispossession is fragmented and particular — a privatisation here, an environmental degradation there, a financial crisis of indebtedness somewhere else — and entails the loss of rights (Harvey 2005: 178). Therefore, opposition to the particularity of dispossession has a universalistic character reflected in the universalistic rhetoric of human rights, sustainable ecological practices and environmental rights (Harvey 2005: 178). For example, the scale of the environmental crisis calls for a global response (Harris 2011: 42) that permits environmental organisations ‘to call

universally for protection of environmental rights such as the right to have access to fresh water and food supplies' (Cullet 1995: 26). Consequently, several entities such as non-government organisations (NGOs), courts and advocacy groups dedicated to universal principles decide on local issues regardless of detrimental effects on local populations (Harvey 2005: 177) as the following example shows:

> *When organisations agitate successfully to ban child labour in production as a matter of universal human rights, they may undermine economies where that labour is fundamental to family survival. Without any viable economic alternative the children may be sold into prostitution instead (leaving yet another advocacy group to pursue the eradication of prostitution).*

The neoliberal ethic seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market (Harvey 2005: 3) by shaping human relations based on preferably short-term contracts that are regulated and monitored by the legal system. Short-term legal contracts manage labour relations as well as private affairs. For example, workers are hired on short-term contracts in order to maximise labour market flexibility, and marriage is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than a sacred and unbreakable bond (Harvey 2005: 166-168). Neoliberalism treats market exchange as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action and of substituting previously held ethical values, thereby emphasising the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace (Harvey 2005: 3).

Exploitation of natural resources rests on short-term contractual relations that put pressure on all producers to extract everything they can while the contract lasts, regardless negative impacts on the environment and economy (Harvey 2005: 173-174). For example, wind energy development depends on a series of short-term contracts between the competent authorities and wind farm operators. These contracts may go along with environmental degradation, although wind energy development is supposed to serve sustainable ecological practices. The ephemerality of contractual relations causes uncertainty, even though contracts may be renewed (Harvey 2005: 174). As a result of uncertainty, wind farm operators may aim for the speedy realisation of large-scale wind energy projects to maximise their revenues within the contract period without regard for landscape issues and adverse effects on local economies.

The neoliberal ethic transforms social action into legal action by emphasising the rule of law in all aspects of human life. Privatisation of public utilities and social welfare provision diminishes the role of the state in areas such as health care, public education and social

services (Harvey 2005: 76, 160). As the state withdraws from social provision, it favours a system that emphasises personal responsibility (Harvey 2005: 76, 2011: 132). Thus, the state is restricted to safeguarding the rule of law, while 'it transfers responsibility for well-being to the individual' (Harvey 2005: 76). In this respect, individual failure is interpreted as personal failing, such as failing to invest significantly enough in one's own human capital through education rather than being attributed to any systemic conditions, such as the class exclusions usually attributed to capitalism (Harvey 2005: 65). The centrality of the rule of law associated with the transfer of responsibility to the individual implies that individuals have to solve and remedy problems through the legal system by appealing to the judiciary (Harvey 2005: 67). Conflict and opposition must be mediated through the court (Harvey 2005: 66), but taking legal steps is costly and time-consuming, not to mention the fact that the judiciary may be biased towards the neoliberal ethic (Harvey 2005: 176). Finally, neoliberalism (similar to the Weberian bureaucracy) is characterised by legal formalism that brings about the juridification of social life.

To recap, the spirit of neoliberalism involves political and economic thinking devoted to a capitalistic logic of power that arises from the consolidation of wealth in private and corporate hands searching for endless development through profit-making (Harvey 2011: 204, Primrose 2013: 7). For this purpose, the neoliberal state is restricted to creating and preserving an institutional framework that favours clear property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey 2005: 2, 64). The neoliberal ethic transforms human relations into contractual relations regulated by the legal system which alone undertakes to remedy individual problems as the neoliberal state withdraws from social and economic regulation, as these are subjected to the rule of the market (Harvey 2005, Santos 2005: 34). Consequently, the neoliberal ethic leaves civil society organisations to fulfil human needs that the market cannot fulfil and the state is no longer in a condition to fulfil (Santos 2005: 34).

2.5 Analytical framework

The aim of the present study is to understand locals' resistance to wind energy development on the island of Amorgos. In particular, the research question is how Amorgians judge the option of wind energy development on the island. To answer this question I analyse the institutions and habits that shape the judgment process. The analytical framework I develop

to answer the research question and achieve the aim of this study is based on the theoretical approaches presented above and is illustrated in Figure 2-1.

The option of wind energy development causes a problematic situation that shocks Amorgian society that is asked to judge this option. Most locals judge according to their institutions, habits and intuitions, which are affected both by their environment of action and their experience. The environment of action includes the Amorgian social, political and economic situation that is characterised by the general Greek situation. Experience rests on past events that are associated with the historical circumstances of the island of Amorgos. Judging includes calculating, reflecting and acting spontaneously in relation to the option of wind energy development.



Figure 2-1: Institutions-Habits-Intuitions framework

Source: own composition

Institutions, habits and intuitions constitute the pillars of my analytical framework that is partially inspired by Hagedorn's (2008: 359-361) conception of institutional analysis. Hagedorn (2008: 358) assumes that both the physical and social world influence institutional performance. People find themselves in the environment of action that frames the particular action situation that, in turn, interacts with institutions (Hagedorn 2008: 360). According to the newly developed Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework, institutions and habits are mutually dependent and characterised by the environment of action, which comprises both the natural and the social environment and the changes these undergo. The social environment includes people whose experience lays the foundations for the formation

of both habits and intuitions, which are inextricably linked. The synergy of institutions, habits and intuitions influences deliberation that enables people to undertake the judgment process regarding a problematic situation. The judgment process combines three ways of choosing how to act, namely calculation, reflection and intuitive response. Calculation refers to cost-benefit analysis induced by the problematic situation, reflection refers to questioning the problematic situation per se and intuitive response means reacting spontaneously based on experience. Deliberation enables people to judge anew every problematic situation by incorporating all three ways of choosing into the judgement process.

2.6 Epilogue

According to pragmatism and institutionalism, to understand human conduct we study institutions that are ingrained in habits acquired by experience. A problematic situation shocks the institutions of our world by deranging our habits, which are linked to our intuitions. Disruption of habits stimulates deliberation, which directs our judgment toward calculation and/or reflection and/or intuitive response, depending on the shock we get. To understand judgment processes, I take into account bureaucracy and neoliberalism that I regard as determinants of human conduct, not only on the island of Amorgos, but in almost every contemporary society. We judge based on our experience, which is characterised by the ethics of the particular context we have lived and live in, thereby steering the synergy of our institutions, habits and intuitions.

3 Methodology

The present chapter describes the research methodology I adopt to answer the research question and addresses methodological considerations, ranging from the way I conduct social science to my role as a researcher. Social science is subjective, because it is concerned with the interpretive understanding of social action (Weber 1968: 4, Burawoy 1998). Therefore, I use methodology without seeking for objectivity in my research. I regard methodology as an ongoing process for constructing, reconstructing, and scrutinising knowledge. Crotty (1998: 3) argues that methodology is the strategy or design lying behind the choice and use of methods to answer the research question.

3.1 Research design

Research design is a logical sequence that connects analysed data to the research question and ultimately to the conclusions of the study (Yin 1994: 19). My methodology rests on the research design illustrated in Figure 3-1 and adapted from Creswell (2003: 5).

Figure 3-1 shows that researchers start a project by asking themselves what they want to figure out. They pose the research question on the basis of certain assumptions about how and what they will learn during the research. These assumptions shape the knowledge claims of researchers (Creswell 2003: 6). At the same time, researchers choose the research strategy that suits the situation under study and provides specific direction for the subsequent methodological steps (Creswell 2003: 13). They proceed with the project by refining the research question and reflecting on theories that help them to answer the research question. The knowledge claims together with the chosen strategy direct researchers towards particular methods for approaching the research. On the basis of these methods, researchers decide on the appropriate methods of data collection and data analysis. In a final step, they interpret research results provided by the analysed data.



Figure 3-1: Research design

Source: adapted from Creswell (2003: 5)

3.2 Constructivist and pragmatist knowledge claims

I conduct scientific research and share scientific knowledge based on the assertion that the researcher and the people under study have different realities. In this sense, I do research with the intention of understanding locals' reality, which does not and should not correspond to my reality.

Social constructivism underlines that we seek to understand the world in which we live by developing subjective meanings for our experiences (Creswell 2003: 8) and for our cognitions beyond our experiences. This subjective meaning involves our knowledge of reality, that is, what we have come to believe as well as what we have verified outside our experience (Stake 1995: 100). In this regard, we all have different versions of the world, meaning that we have different realities (Stake 1995: 101). We tend to shape our different realities to fit each other's, because we believe in a universal reality, that which, however,

does not exist, given that we do not populate the same world as everyone else (Stake 1995: 101).

Stake (1995: 102) stresses that the aim of research is not to discover universal reality, but to both reconstruct the subjective knowledge of reality and construct a more sophisticated reality that bears up under scrutiny and challenge. In the same vein, pragmatism emphasises the futility of asking questions about reality and the laws of nature, while it focuses on understanding the particular situation under study (Creswell 2003: 12). Pragmatism does not consider the world as an absolute unit and claims that research always occurs in a specific historical, social and political context (Creswell 2003: 12). In this respect, the researcher relies as much as possible on the views of the people who are engaged in the particular situation under study, considering the specific context in which they live (Creswell 2003: 8).

Realities are local, specific and constructed; they are socially and experientially based, and depend on the individuals or groups holding them (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 111). On this basis, I aim to understand how Amorgians make sense of their life based on their socialisation, shaped by the history and culture of their world. Finally, I do research aware that my reality shapes the processes in research design as well as the interpretation of research findings.

3.3 The strategy of case study

A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary complex social phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context (e.g. natural setting), especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Punch 1998: 144, Yin 1994: 13). The case study aims to preserve and understand the wholeness and unity of the case (Punch 1998: 144), thereby allowing the inquiry to retain the holistic characteristics of the real-life phenomenon (Yin 1994: 3).[9]

Case study researchers may use a particular case in order to answer general questions (Stake 1995: 3) posed usually by others. I am more interested in understanding a particular case in its real-life context in order to answer questions posed by myself in relation to the context.

[9] I adopt the strategy of case study being inspired by the metaphorical way Wittgenstein describes his use of the case study approach in philosophy (Gasking and Jackson 1967: 51): 'In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way round London. I have to take you through the city from north to south, from east to west, from Euston to the embankment and from Piccadilly to the Marble Arch. After I have taken you many journeys through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through any given street a number of times – each time traversing the street as part of a different journey. At the end of this you will know London; you will be able to find your way about like a Londoner. Of course, a good guide will take you through the more important streets more often than he takes you down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In philosophy I'm a rather bad guide'.

For example, by the time I was finishing my doctoral dissertation the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ) approached me with the intention of discovering ways to increase the social acceptance of wind energy projects on the Greek islands. The GIZ posed the general question of what might increase social acceptance of wind energy projects on the Greek islands. The participation of a particular island population that resists wind farms in the realisation of wind energy projects might be a case study instrumentalised to answer the GIZ's general question. I am not interested in such a question posed by the GIZ or any other public or private cooperation. I have rather an intrinsic interest in understanding the particular case of the island of Amorgos. This interest made me pose the research question and was awakened as follows:

In September 2008, I visited the island of Amorgos to take a vacation. During my three-week stay on the island I found myself hitch-hiking, because public buses used to run at infrequent intervals. In September the low tourist season begins, which means that drivers were mainly locals. Each driver had a different story to tell, and I evolved into an expedient listener, since I am not from Amorgos, so locals were not biased against me. I also hung around the kafenia[10] talking to locals and so, made myself to some extent familiar with some of their thoughts and problems. During my short stay on the island, I realised that the majority of locals were frustrated about the potential erection of wind farms on Amorgos.

This frustration aroused my interest in understanding the problem in depth. After I discussed the problem with my doctorate supervisor, talked with colleagues about wind energy development in a general sense, and read scholarly literature about wind energy development on the Greek islands, I decided to do research on the case of wind energy development on Amorgos. Finally, I defined my case study as follows: Wind energy proposals induce a problematic situation that brings locals to judge the option of wind energy development. Thus, locals' judgment process constitutes the particular case to be analysed in the present study.

My need to understand this particular case raised the research question of how do locals of Amorgos judge the option of wind energy development on their island. The theoretical approaches of pragmatism and institutionalism helped me to address this question. Under the influence of these approaches, I revised the research question to arrive at the sub-questions

[10] Kafenia is the plural form of kafenio, the traditional Greek coffee house. Originally, only men used to go to kafenia to drink Turkish coffee or ouzo, to talk, and to play cards or backgammon. The kafenio used to be the social center of the village or borough. In the course of time, the tradition of kafenio has perished. Nowadays, young people prefer the modern coffee shops, while adult men and a very few women still go to the kafenio.

of how locals of Amorgos judge the option of wind energy development on their island, firstly, on the basis of their institutions, and secondly, influenced by their habits. By answering the research question, I aim to understand what brings Amorgians to resist wind energy development on their island.

Stake (1995: 4, 64) argues that the more we need to understand a particular case, the more we seek to grasp issues critical to the case, such as its historical and political context. The intrinsic interest in the in-depth understanding of a particular case requires case study researchers to rely on qualitative research methods that allow them to use multiple sources of evidence, such as documents, interviews and observations (Yin 1994: 8-13).

3.4 Qualitative research approach

Qualitative research focuses on understanding complex inter-relationships within the case by emphasising the uniqueness of contexts in order to understand the particularity of the case (Stake 1995: 37, 39). Qualitative research promotes understanding that is differentiated from explanation (von Wright 1971: 6, Flyvbjerg 2001: 33). The qualitative researcher intends to understand social action by considering chronologies — embodied for example in historical data — no less than causalities (Stake 1995: 39). Understanding is recreating in the mind of the qualitative researcher of the thoughts and feelings of the objects under study (von Wright 1971: 6). Finally, the qualitative researcher delves into the unique context of the particular case, letting the case unfold by itself, as far as possible (Creswell 2003: 181).

The present study applies a two-phase empirical approach. The first empirical phase prepared for the second empirical phase, which refers mainly to data collection through interviews and observations, even though elements of both phases may overlap.

3.5 First empirical phase

Initially, I visited the island of Amorgos in August 2000 to have a holiday, without having the slightest idea that Amorgos would be the field of my research ten years later. During this time, I visited most of the villages and became familiar with the natural environment of the island through hiking in the Amorgian mountains. This visit in combination with the following ones proved useful for the subsequent data collection. For example, I could easily follow conversations and narratives that involved names of villages and mountain localities. Moreover, locals appreciated my detailed knowledge of the Amorgian natural setting, thereby allowing us to get acquainted. In August, that is, at the peak of the tourist season,

Amorgos was crowded and locals were very busy with the provision of tourism services. Based on this experience and being generally aware of the Greek islands in summertime, I later avoided planning the fieldwork periods in the summer to enable locals to take the time to talk with me, for example, by giving an interview.

In September 2008, I visited the island for the second time. As already mentioned in the previous section, during this time I made myself familiar with the Amorgian social environment. For example, I talked with the mayor for private reasons, met municipal council members accidentally, and listened to locals talking about municipal matters. Thus, I got a broad and woolly idea of the administration of the municipality that, in conjunction with other information, such as the wealth of the monastery and increasing religious tourism, made me deliberate on such issues as power relations among locals. Moreover, I got to know a local who proved to be the key person concerning the data collection, because he knew almost everybody on the island. He introduced me to many locals and intervened to grant me access to audio material and legal documents during the second empirical phase. Moreover, he provided me with addresses and telephone numbers of locals, thereby allowing me to approach locals more easily and quickly. In the wake of my stay on Amorgos in September 2008, I decided to strive for a doctoral degree by doing research on the particular case of Amorgos.

I prepared my fieldwork by doing a literature review that comprised, basically, scientific articles and books as well as newspaper articles about wind energy development in Greece, and particularly, on the Greek islands. In addition, I conversed with scientists of the Technological Educational Institute of Piraeus, who study renewable energy applications on the Greek islands. Moreover, I talked to an employee of the wind energy corporation Gamesa as well as to a member of the Institute of Energy for South East Europe about the barriers to wind energy development in Greece. In May 2010, I presented my research at the research colloquium of the Division of Resource Economics. Finally, I reviewed the feedback I got from my colleagues at the colloquium and summarised the information I had obtained to prepare the second empirical phase.

Before starting the fieldwork, I reflected on my role as a qualitative researcher on the island of Amorgos. Creswell (2003: 182) argues that qualitative researchers reflect systematically on their role in the research and are sensitive to how their personal biography shapes the study. Stake (1995: 42) stresses that qualitative researchers avoid drawing attention to themselves in such a way as to see what would had happened if they had not been there.

They avoid intervening in the case's ordinary run of events, while recognising that qualitative case study research is subjective (Stake 1995: 134). This means that my social and political background and my experience of the world influence the way I collect and analyse data. My reality accounts for the theoretical approaches I choose and even for my intrinsic interest in the particular case of Amorgos. After all, acknowledging that the personal-self becomes inseparable from the researcher-self brings honesty to research (Creswell 2003:182).

Research findings are created rather through the interaction of the researcher and the people of the phenomenon under study than discovered through objective observation *as they really are* (italics in original) (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107). Qualitative researchers interact with the people being studied without intervening, while they try to conduct empathetic research, described by Stake (1995: 12) as follows:

> *We try not to disturb the ordinary activity of the case, not to test not even to interview, if we can get the information we want by discreet observation or examination of records. We try hard to understand how the people being studied see things.*

The subjectivity inherent in qualitative research is accompanied by my intention of being an impartial observer as well as an impartial analyst and author. This means, for instance, that as a qualitative researcher I tried to avoid expressing my opinion even when locals asked for it, and to remain unbiased by the political views of the foundation that funded my research. In other words, I tried to be impartial[11] without seeking to be objective.

[11] According to Sen (2009), impartiality means not leaving out the perspectives of anyone whose assessments are relevant (quoted in Caldas and Neves 2012: 11).

3.6 Second empirical phase

The second empirical phase includes one preparatory visit to the island and three fieldwork periods during which I collected data through observations, interviews, official documents, folk literature, newspapers, personal diaries, and audio-visual material.[12]

The preparatory visit lasted from 27th September until 5th October 2010. In this period, I aimed to sound out the situation, let locals know my research purpose and allow locals and myself to become acquainted. During the fieldwork, I found out who had something to say about the case and approached potential interviewees, such as municipal council members and locals involved in the tourism business. In addition, I gained access to minutes of the municipal council meeting that decided on the 2007 wind energy proposal, as well as to seven municipal documents that provided general information about the island, such as census and climatic data. Finally, I took diary notes and wrote down the data I had gathered through observations and documents.

Before entering the research field as an interviewer and observer, I reflected on the relation between myself and locals that emerged from our interaction during the preparatory visit and developed further during the data collection. The fact that I come from Greece, I am a native Greek speaker and my family comes from and partly lives on a Greek island means that I am able to understand Greek metaphors, jokes and popular sayings and I am very familiar with Greek insular environments. During the preparatory visit, I had managed to build trust with some locals to the extent required for us to have confidence in each other's reliability and credibility. By doing all this, I had set the stage for the first fieldwork period.

The first fieldwork period lasted from 15th February until 30th March 2011. Before entering the field I conducted two pre-test interviews with farmers in Attica to familiarise myself with the recorder and the interview questions. During the fieldwork period, I conducted 29 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with locals. I interviewed locals of different professions with a focus on the professions that shape the local economy and administration and from all the villages shown in Table 3-1.

[12] During this phase I attended conferences, summer schools and workshops, where I discussed the preliminary results of my research. In addition, I presented my research work in the form of research papers and oral presentations four times at the research colloquium of the Division of Resource Economics. The feedback I got from my colleagues at these colloquiums constitutes a substantial contribution to the research process.

Table 3-1: Interviews by profession and village

Interviewees	Number		Village	Number of interviews
farmers	2		Lagkada	3
shepherds	3		Tholaria	3
fishermen	1		Egiali	3
tourism entrepreneurs	6		Potamos	2
self-employed	3		Chora	4
homemakers	2		Katapola	5
municipal council members	5		Skeparnies	2
district council members	3		Vroutsi	2
monastery representatives	1		Arkesini	4
civil servants	3		Kolofana	1
Total	**29**			**29**

Source: own composition

The interviews lasted from one to three hours each and allowed the interviewees to propose their own insights into certain occurrences (Yin 1994: 84), and me to put further questions during and after the interviews. I developed the interview guideline (open-ended interview questions) (cf. Appendix A1) based on the research question (cf. Chapter 1), the theoretical framework (cf. Chapter 2) and the information gathered during the first empirical phase and the preparatory visit. In particular, the interview guideline focuses on institutions and habits, perceptions of wind farms, and experiences of both tourism and the municipality. I also made numerous direct and participant observations that were written down in the form of field diaries and field (observation) notebooks.

Diefenbach (2009: 882) argues that interviews can reveal ideas and deliver insights no other method can provide, but asking people is often not enough, because what people say or do not say is only part of the picture. Researchers select those interviewees, who best help them to understand the case (Stake 1995: 56). I conducted interviews aware of the following: Firstly, the meaning of the words rather than the exact words of the interviewees is important (Stake 1995: 66). Secondly, the selection of interviewees determines whose worldviews, opinions, and interests will be considered and whose will be ignored and excluded (Diefenbach 2009: 880). Stake (1995: 64-67) stresses that it would be good if we could get the information we need by observation alone, but we interview, because we often have little time and we also care about the comments the interviewees make.

Observations give researchers an internal perspective on the case and systematise their status as strangers at the same time (Flick 2009: 229). Yin (1994: 86-89) differentiates between direct and participant observations. Direct observations permit researchers to observe behaviours or environmental conditions without taking an active part in the situation under study (Yin 1994: 86). For example, I observed the housing conditions of the people I interviewed to discover the role of electricity in their everyday life, as well as the landscape characteristics of each village to understand village differences and sentiments regarding landscape. Participant observations permit researchers to participate actively in the situation under study (Yin 1994: 87) by making the situation not an object, but a dialogical partner (Flick 2009: 229). For example, I participated in the olive harvest to understand the ethical experience associated with farming, and in a municipal council meeting to observe the decision-making process. Participant observations enabled me also to ask locals who were not interviewees about issues included in the interview guideline.

In parallel with interviews and observations, I collected eleven administrative documents, ten newspapers, folk literature and photographs (cf. Appendix A6), and I also took photographs. In particular, I collected ten municipal announcements and the minutes of the municipal council meeting regarding the 2008 wind energy proposal as well as seven local and three regional newspapers that addressed events and problems on Amorgos and in the Cyclades. The collection of minutes was a time-consuming procedure, since only municipal employees have access to the municipal archive, which is supposed to be organised in written form. The municipal council president had to give the municipal employees permission to provide me with the minutes, some of which were half-transcribed from audiocassettes recorded at the relevant meetings. Historical data and photographs from folk literature sources and local magazines provided information about the Amorgian economy, landscape and culture. I also took photographs to receive an impression of local farming and infrastructural development (cf. Appendix A6).

The second fieldwork period lasted from 20th January until 24th February 2012. During this period, I conducted 29 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with the interviewees from the first period. I developed the interview guideline (open-ended interview questions) (cf. Appendix B1) based on the research question and the categories and themes produced by the data analysis of the first period (cf. Appendix A3, A5). In particular, the interview guideline focuses on the administrative reform introduced in 2000, the municipal council, the decision-making process, unwritten codes of conduct, and experiences of both development and

bureaucracy. I took photographs of infrastructural facilities (cf. Appendix B6), made direct and participant observations, and collected three official reports about monastic property and the 2009 wind energy proposal, six municipal announcements, five local newspapers and folk literature. As in the first period, the interviews lasted from one to three hours each and the observations were written down in the form of field diaries and field (observation) notebooks.

The third fieldwork period lasted from 1st October until 23rd November 2012. During this period I made direct and participant observations documented in the form of field diaries and field (observation) notebooks. The observations (cf. Appendix C) were based on the research question and the categories and themes produced by the data analysis of the second period (cf. Appendix B3, B5). In detail, they were focused on the municipal bureaucracy, financial crisis, degeneration, intuitions, and perceptions of neoliberalism. Moreover, I took photographs of the landscape around the monastery and abandoned terraces (cf. Appendix C3). I collected 13 administrative and 25 legal documents and two local newspapers. In particular, I collected the minutes of the municipal council meeting regarding the 2000 wind energy proposal and transcribed audiocassettes recorded at the 2012 municipal council meetings that dealt with the debate on the 2000 proposal. The municipality and a local law office provided me with administrative decisions and legal Acts regarding the 2000 proposal.

3.7 Data analysis

Data analysis is defined as a matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as to final compilations and essentially means taking something apart (Stake 1995: 71). The data analysis is grounded firstly on the intuitive aggregation of data and thus, the intuitive search for meaning that involves direct interpretation of data (Stake 1995: 74-77). This means that I interpreted parts of interviews and observations by intuition, usually, during the fieldwork, and these interpretations guided the field research and further data analysis.

Secondly, the analysis is grounded on the formal aggregation of categorical data (Stake 1995: 77) and particularly on Mayring's (2010: 59-109) qualitative summarising content analysis illustrated in Figure 3-2. Flick (2009: 309) argues that this technique of analysis includes the selection of those parts of the interviews that are relevant for answering the research question and the creation of categories by summarising the material through reduction of selected passages. The interpretation of data is grounded on these categories.



Figure 3-2: Summarising content analysis

Source: adapted from Mayring (2010: 68, 84)

In detail, I transcribed all interviews and analysed the material according to the following steps. Firstly, I defined analytic units according to the theoretical framework and the research question as well as categories revealed by the initial material perusal (cf. Table 3-2). Secondly, relevant parts of interviews were selected and partly paraphrased (cf. Appendix A2, B2) according to the analytic units and the initial categories. Thirdly, I skipped less relevant passages and passages with the same meaning (Flick 2009: 325), while I summarised the relevant meanings in the form of general topics (first reduction) (cf. Appendix A3, B3). Fourthly, similar general topics were bundled and summarised in the form of categories (second reduction) (cf. Appendix A3, B3) that were added to the initial categories. In the same way, I analysed all observations with the exception that relevant meanings were directly bundled and summarised in the form of themes (reduction) (cf. Appendix A5, B5, C2). Finally, I reviewed and bundled categories and themes to deliver general messages (cf. Appendix D) to be interpreted.

Table 3-2: Analytic units and initial categories

Analytic units		Sample of categories
institutions		experiences of tourism
habits		experiences of development
intuitions		administrative reform
perceptions of wind farms		degeneration
municipal bureaucracy		financial crisis
decision-making		perceptions of neoliberalism

Source: own composition

After and during the fieldwork periods, I triangulated data sources to revise my interpretations. Stake (1995: 113) argues that data source triangulation enables researchers to examine if the meanings attributed to interviews and observations are the same when found under different circumstances. Evidence from interviews, observations and documents carry meanings that I triangulated to confirm the accuracy of the research results and conclusions. In Table 3-3 I present codes that illustrate the data sources of the fieldwork periods.

Table 3-3: Presentation of data coding

Fieldwork period	Source of data	Code
first	interviews	L
second	interviews	S
first	observations	P
second	observations	T
third	observations	V
first	photos	PHa
second	photos	PHb
third	photos	PHc
first	audiocassettes	AD1
third	audiocassettes	AD2

Source: own composition

3.8 Ethical considerations during the fieldwork

Creswell (2003: 64) stresses that during data collection researchers need to respect the rights and dignity of the persons (participants) and the sites involved in the research. Data collection entails at least a small invasion of the sphere of personal privacy, and therefore

permissions are needed (Stake 1995: 57), which means that participants have to give their consent voluntarily (Flick 2009: 41, Creswell 2003: 202). During my fieldwork, I tried to respect locals' personal life, local ethics and the sites of the island I visited.

I had already become acquainted with some locals during my preparatory visit to the island, which only lasted ten days and thus did not allow me to meet the majority of the Amorgian population. My coming to Amorgos for the first fieldwork was something uncommon in the winter, and was soon spread by word of mouth. Therefore, the majority of locals had already become somewhat familiar with my presence and role as a researcher on the island already before I started the interviews. Thus, locals readily agreed to give an interview and were generally willing to talk about the wind energy issue.

I informed all interviewees as well as all municipal employees who were involved in the delivery of documents about the purpose of my research. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I realised that locals do not really talk with non-locals if they do not accept them in their social setting. When locals noticed that I respected their ethics they let me approach them. For example, locals started to accept me when they noticed that I respect the code of sitting in a circle in the kafenio. In addition, I respected locals' unwillingness to give me written permission to interview them. They rather articulated verbally their consent to be interviewed. Their unwillingness to sign a document was concerned with local ethics that I did not want to offend. Finally, I assured the interviewees that I would preserve their anonymity and decided to preserve the anonymity of all persons that provided information for the research.

4 The environment of action

4.1 The Greek context

4.1.1 Greek bureaucracy

In contrast to the impersonal character of the Weberian bureaucracy (cf. Subchapter 2.3), the Greek bureaucracy is based on personal relations. Papakostas (2001: 42) stresses that in Greece, politics[13] had thoroughly penetrated society since the 19th century, resulting in the failure of bureaucracy to get a foothold in the 20th century. Political parties came before bureaucracy and occupied the space between the state and social life, thereby prompting the state to treat people's concerns as political matters and not as bureaucratic cases (Papakostas 2001: 42). Officials were people coming from family and village networks, and shaped bureaucracy in line with kinship and local identities (Papakostas 2001: 48). Therefore, bureaucrats prevented citizens' matters from turning into impersonal administrative cases (Papakostas 2001: 48). In effect, the Greek bureaucracy is not accustomed to treating personal matters according to legal rules based on the average individual (Papakostas 2001: 43).

The Greek bureaucracy is characterised by the populist ideology that focuses on the antagonism between the "people" and the "establishment", the poor and the rich, the "masses" and the "enemy", regarded as the state or a foreign power (Mouzelis 1985: 334, Lyrintzis 1987: 671). Populism advocates egalitarianism, which according to Veremis (2008: 140) is associated with the struggle of all unprivileged individuals against the privileged establishment. In this sense, populism negates hierarchical polarities, that is, the distance between those at the top and those at the bottom of a particular hierarchy. Consequently, populism contravenes the hierarchical structure embedded in the Weberian bureaucracy.

Weber (1968: 963, 999-1002) points out that the bureaucratic machinery involves a hierarchical organisation of experts selected on meritocratic principles. This means that bureaucracy consists of groups of experts with different hierarchical positions (Weber 1968: 967, 1393). In this sense, Weberian bureaucracy legitimises the hierarchical super- and

[13] 'It is impossible to write about Greek life, whether in town or country, without saying something on the subject of politics; for they affect every profession, every trade, and almost every family to a degree unknown in other lands; they form the constant topic of conversation whenever two or three Greek men are gathered together; and one of the first questions which the visitor from Athens is expected to answer, whether in the medieval monastery or in the peasant's cottage, is 'How goes the Government?' An impartial account of the Greek political system, not only as it exists on paper, but as it really works, is, therefore, an essential prelude to any description of contemporary life in Greece' (Miller 1905: 21).

subordination that generates classes of privileged and unprivileged officials (Weber 1968: 984, 999). The expert labour system consists of experts who select future experts according to a notion of merit that contradicts populist ideology. This selection process breaks egalitarianism by separating and elevating a few among the many (Mavrogordatos 1997: 19). Within the Greek bureaucracy, selection of officials is based on criteria such as social position rather than on merit measured by assessment tests (Mavrogordatos 1997: 19). Such selection prevents a hierarchical gap between superior and inferior officials. Consequently, instead of experts the Greek bureaucracy consists of unprivileged officials employed to serve the equally unprivileged masses. In this respect, the populist character of the Greek bureaucracy abolishes merit that is regarded as a privilege by those lacking it (Mavrogordatos 1997: 19).

Since the late 1970s, Greek society has authorised the government (governing party) to instrumentalise the state by perceiving the government as a system devoted to the people and the state as an abstract enemy entity. In the 1980s, an amalgam of socialism and populism steered Greek politics towards clientelism (Sotiropoulos 1995). In 1981, Greece joined the EEC (European Economic Community), which required the Greek state to strengthen its bureaucracy to catch up with already advanced West European economies. Contrary to the EEC requirements, the Greek bureaucracy proved incompetent to steer economic development (Sotiropoulos 1995: 11).[14] The government passed legislation primarily aimed at distributing privileges and revenues to the people at the expense of Greece's Europeanisation (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 415, 418). To sum up, Greek political culture has been accompanied by clientelism that ignores bureaucracy and/or instrumentalises bureaucracy to serve patron-client relations.

In Greece, earlier established parliamentary politics overshadowed the evolution of the bureaucratic state, thereby laying the foundations for the 'clientelism that has been a central structural feature of Modern Greek politics since even before the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832)' (Mavrogordatos 1997: 1). Clientelism is an exchange relation – a strategy whereby the politicians (the patrons) try to gain and maintain power by distributing divisible benefits to the voters, and the voters (the clients) try to obtain selective access to state-administrated goods by granting their vote to the patrons (Piattoni 2001b: 195). In Greece, people (clients) used family and village ties to gain access to the public

[14] Sotiropoulos (1995: 12) points out that the tax raising capacity of the Greek state remained almost stagnant between 1980 and 1991. In addition, tax revenues from personal income as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) failed to increase in accordance with the European Union (EU) average rate (Sotiropoulos 1995: 12).

administration by appealing to political parties (patrons) that used the state apparatus to favour their voters (Piattoni 2001a: 21).

Roniger (2004: 369) stresses that clientelism is not confined to politics and proliferates wherever there is power to appoint and grant access to benefits, goods, services, influence, and honours. Boissevain (1966: 18-31) gives a broader definition of clientelism by pointing to the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. Patrons are persons who use their influence or social position to assist and protect other persons, who then become their clients, and, in return, provide certain services to their patrons (Boissevain 1966: 18).

Featherstone (2005) associates clientelism with political corruption, while Piattoni (2001a: 18) notes that clientelism is an inevitable characteristic of contemporary politics. On the one hand, the World Bank argues that clientelism transgresses the limits of legitimate political influence and violates meritocratic principles in civil service recruitment (Orac and Rinne 2000). On the other hand, the World Bank argues that a few political appointments based on clientelism are fully legitimate, since they act as a means for political leaders to fashion a circle of government policymakers and managers, who share a common agenda (Orac and Rinne 2000). Clientelism is just one of the historical practices that involves representation and promotion of interests and constitutes a practical, although usually undesirable, solution to democratic representation (Piattoni 2001a: 18).

The clientelist character of Greek bureaucracy allows a monumental network of beneficiaries to instrumentalise the public sector to favour its interests. Trade union officials use public administration to serve the interests of their relatives and their circles of friends and acquaintances, who, in return, vote for the parties that control the trades unions (Sotiropoulos 1995). Thus, trade unions work against meritocracy by adopting clientelist practices (Mavrogordatos 1997: 21). Sotiropoulos (1995: 8) stresses that the political party that controls the bureaucratic machinery infiltrates the state with party devotees and distributes to party clients favours such as initial hiring, quick promotion, and favourable transfers to better posts in the civil service. As a result, officials often obstruct administrative reforms that threaten the clientelist relations that govern the bureaucratic machinery (Sotiropoulos 2012: 13, 20).

In Greece, the bureaucratic organisation of social life implies that both the family and the village undertake the role of the state. González (1999: 27) stresses that it is first the duty of the family to take care of family members, while the state is obliged to intervene only as a second resort and in cases where the family fails. Moreover, distribution of cultivated land to

all peasants at the beginning of the 20th century weakened class divisions within the peasantry and strengthened village cohesion (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010: 85, Papakostas 2001: 47). The village population evolved into a relatively homogenous mass of fellow-villagers with low organisational capacity and strong local identity (Papakostas 2001: 47). In this regard, the village became a unit for interest aggregation in the cause of localism (Papakostas 2001: 47). Modernisation and urbanisation did not break the family and village networks, which reformed within the cities and thus still affect the way bureaucracy is organised in contemporary Greece (Piattoni 2001b: 198).

The personal and emotional elements that characterise family and village networks escape the rational organisation of action — and so, the Weberian bureaucracy — that is subject to legal-formalistic changes. Family and village networks are resistant to change, thereby hindering economic growth (Fukuyama 2002: 34). Family and village bonds foster small-scale business that can escape both state and private bureaucracy to a great extent. Trust among family members denotes lack of trust among strangers, who compared with family members need the legal rules of bureaucracy to sign business contracts (Fukuyama 2002: 28, 33). The family business does not grow easily into a large, impersonal and professionally managed business that depends on bureaucracy (Fukuyama 2002: 28, Weber 1968: 974). In this respect, the state bureaucracy cannot easily monitor the family business that, according to Fukuyama (2002: 28), may keep one set of books for the family and another for the tax collector. In the same vein, disorganised, atomised individuals cannot achieve the solidarity that fellow-villagers share, and that enables the village population to resist, for example, the importing of new technologies (Fukuyama 2002: 30). Harvey (2011: 40, 193) argues that such solidarities are built around values such as history, culture and memory, that which are often recalcitrant and resistant to the flow of capital defined as a process, in which money is perpetually sent in search of more money. The legal formalism of the Weberian bureaucracy plays the solidity of both family and village networks down in a bid to break the bonds involved in these networks in order to breed cooperation among strangers (Fukuyama 2002: 33).

Greek bureaucracy is grounded on personal and clientelist relations that advance family and village interests. Family and village networks rely on affective bonds that counteract Weberian bureaucratic inefficiency. As a result, in Greece, public service and private business are bureaucratically organised in such a way as to serve the family, the village and

the party. Consequently, Greek bureaucracy does not leave room for Greece's economic development as prescribed by the recent epoch of neoliberalism.

4.1.2 The relationship between neoliberalism and the Greek economy

The Greek economy has not become fully accustomed to the spirit of neoliberalism. In Greece, industrialisation did not really manage to gain a foothold (Louri and Minoglou 2002: 337), while Europeanisation took place rather on paper (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 418). Greek political culture has been marked by clientelism and populism, which directed the state towards bureaucratic inefficiency (Sotiropoulos 1995) and an inability to reform (Featherstone 2011). As a result, at the time when neoliberalism was on the rise in West European countries, Greek socialism was hostile to neoliberal practices such as market liberalisation (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 418) and privatisation of public assets, thereby laying the foundations for a belated entrance to the neoliberal era.

Petmesidou (1996: 100) characterises Greece as a country that neglected industrialisation and jumped from agrarian structures to a service economy. Greece's late and hesitant industrialisation (1922-1939 and 1965-1974)[15] and dependence on foreign capital directed the economy towards banking, commerce and shipping rather than manufacturing (Sotiropoulos 2004a: 16, Featherstone 2008: 11). Even at its industrialisation peak, Greece did not have a large industrial sector and did not enjoy the per capita income level of an advanced capitalist economy (Louri and Minoglou 2002: 342). In this regard, Greece has never fully completed the transition from an agricultural and mercantile-family economy to an advanced European economy (Louri and Minoglou 2002: 324, 343).

The populist ideology that has occupied the Greek political landscape since the early 1980s (Lyrintzis 1987), prevented Greece's modernisation from blindly imitating the Western capitalist trajectory (Mouzelis 1985: 340). Greek populist politics mobilised "the people" against state symbols such as the bureaucratic apparatus and foreign powers such as US imperialism and EU interventionism (Lyrintzis 1987: 672, Ioakimidis 2000: 76).

By virtue of its EU membership in 1981, Greece aimed at gaining a foothold in the Europeanisation process to catch up with advanced West European economies. Greece's accession to the EU was fiercely opposed by the then rising socialist party as well as the

[15] In the case of Greece, industrialisation as defined by a rise in the manufacturing share of GDP has been a 20th century phenomenon coming in two phases (1922-1938/39 and 1965-1974) neither of which marked a steep upward climb (Louri and Minoglou 2002: 331). The first year ever that the industrial share of GDP exceeded that of agriculture was 1968 (Louri and Minoglou 2002: 337). Louri and Minoglou (2002: 337) argue that this turning point was rather late by European standards and query whether Greece has ever really been fully industrialised.

relatively powerful communist party (Ioakimidis 2000: 76). Ioakimidis (2000: 76) stresses that Europeanisation was interpreted as modernisation and more precisely westernisation. People in Greece have benefited from EU financial aid such as agricultural subsidies, provided since the 1980s. However, this does not mean that Greece has been europeanised as it has been instructed to do in the aftermath of its accession to the EU. Neither were the Greek state and economy prepared to enter the EU nor were pre-accession policies linked to such a prospect. As Sotiropoulos (2004c: 274) points out, cognitive change[16] did not happen overnight just because of Greece's membership to the EU. State interventionism remains driven by clientelist motives (Ioakimidis 2000: 78). Thus, the Greek state has been unable to develop a legal system that strengthens business activities and supports clear property rights (Featherstone 2008: 19, Sotiropoulos 2004b: 415).

Privatisation and market liberalisation had been out of the question until the recent Greek financial crisis that erupted in 2009, triggering a broad socio-economic crisis in the subsequent years. State enterprises have opposed privatisation, fearing that a market more open to competition would abolish their monopolies, while the very few large corporations opposed labour market liberalisation that threatened their privileged position and market stability (Featherstone 2008: 27-28). In addition, a plethora of small-sized (primarily family-owned) servicing businesses emerged in the wake of the abandonment of the primary and secondary sector. These businesses were incapable of forcing the state to intervene in the market, because they lacked an influential political voice (Featherstone 2008: 26, 2011: 197). The state has enforced massive recruitment to the public sector (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 411) rather than creating a good business climate, capable, for instance, to promote manufacturing. Public sector employees have obtained much better social insurance, health and pension schemes than farmers and private sector employees (Sotiropoulos 2004b: 408). They have formed powerful trades unions (Sotiropoulos 2012: 12, 20) that still put up resistance to market liberalisation reforms and public sector cutbacks (Featherstone 2011: 195, 198). For example, public sector unions and union federations called strikes to oppose the economic reform measures adopted by the Greek state in a bid to deal with the financial crisis (Featherstone 2011: 206). In line with these measures, public sector posts and salaries as well as pensions were cut, and closed-shop professions were liberalised (Featherstone 2011: 206).

[16] Cognitive change refers to cognitive Europeanisation that is described as the impact of the EU on discourse (Sotiropoulos 2004c: 270).

Currently, people in Greece face an austerity drive implemented by the Greek state and imposed by the Troika (Mann 2012: 185). The Greek state has carried out reforms accompanied by massive cuts in wages and pensions, privatisation, unemployment and dismissal of civil servants. Austerity has blocked Greece's economic recovery and worsened its debt situation (Harvey 2011: 267). The austerity measures have widened the gap between poor and rich domestically, and the bail-out packages have depressed the status of Greece, particularly, within Europe. By virtue of its precarious state, the Greek society has reverted to traditional networks of solidarity such as neighbourship and kinship. The Greek economic trend towards neoliberalism 'has brought about social incoherence that instigates the revival of forms of social solidarity and even the revival of political forms such as nationalism and localism' (Harvey 2005: 80).

Since the early 1980s, Greece has developed a service economy that reconciles with the spirit of neoliberalism, yet discourages 'accumulation by dispossession such as privatisation of welfare provision (e.g. education, health care) and of public entities (e.g. universities, research laboratories)' (Harvey 2005: 160, 2011: 49). The Greek economic system has accentuated the centrality of the state in economic matters (Featherstone 2008: 10) resulting in the dependence of industry, business and labour on the state (Schmidt 2002: 116). In 2010, Greece found itself in dire financial straits in part through its own mismanagement, but even more because it lacked the industrial base required to build an economy invulnerable to credit collapse (Harvey 2011: 274). In the light of the financial crisis, Greece appears to be gradually departing from state interventionism to adopt 'the neoliberal policy pursued by advanced European economies since the 1970s' (Harvey 2011: 270, Mann 2012: 186). It remains to be seen if the Greek economy will continue to adjust to neoliberal policy in the new political circumstances that arose after the 2015 elections.

4.1.3 The Greek energy sector

4.1.3.1 Policy reforms on the way to Europeanisation

In 1950, under the provisions of Law 1458/1950 (Official Gazette 158/1950), the Greek state founded the Public Power Corporation (PPC) — a vertically integrated and entirely state-owned public company — to supply Greece with electricity (Iliadou 2009: 76). Law 1458/1950 (Official Gazette 158/1950) prohibited any private business initiative or action in the electricity sector, while the PPC enjoyed exclusive rights and privileges regarding the construction, functioning and exploitation of hydroelectric and thermal (lignite) power plants

and transmission and distribution networks (Iliadou 2009: 76). In 2001, with the enactment of Law 2773/1999 (Official Gazette 286/1999), the Greek state embarked on electricity market liberalisation to comply with European Union (EU) legislation (EU Directive 2003/54/EC), thereby promoting private investment and competition in the electricity sector (Iliadou 2009: 76).

Greece has the most carbon-intensive primary energy supply among International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries, because of its strong reliance on lignite and oil (International Energy Agency 2011). The lignite-based electricity supply and the maintenance of diesel-fuel power plants are very costly in financial, social and environmental terms, considering the cost of CO_2 permits, the corresponding electricity price increase and environmental pollution (Tsakiris 2010: 43). Therefore, Greece has to accelerate its Renewable Energy Sources (RES) development (Tsakiris 2010: 48). As part of the 2020 climate and energy package known as the "20/20/20" targets set by the European Commission (EC), Greece is obliged to increase its share of renewable energy to 18 percent by 2020 (Directive 2009/28/EC).

In the 1980s, the Greek state incorporated the development of RES in its policy guideline. In 1982, the PPC constructed the first wind farm in Europe (Kaldellis 2005: 597). In 1987, the Greek state started to pass legislation regarding electricity generation from wind farms (Tsakiris 2010: 42). In 1998, the PPC founded the PPC Renewables S.A. (PPCR), an entirely PPC owned subsidiary with the aim of promoting the expansion of renewable energies at the national level. In 2010, Greece proclaimed renewable energy development as an environmental and energy priority to reinforce the country's commitment to green development (Tsakiris 2010: 43).

With the enactment of Law 3851/2010 (Official Gazette 85/2010, article 2, 3), the Greek state shortened the licensing process, including an installation and operation license granted after the RES project has received the Environmental Terms Approval (ETA). The RES project has to get the approval of several authorities, including the archaeological authority, the Ministry of Defence and the municipality affected by the project in order to acquire the ETA. In particular, local governments decide on the issuing of environmental permits and the installation and operating licenses for electricity generation units from RES (Iliadou 2012: 78). Moreover, the realisation of wind energy projects depends on short-term contracts between the competent authorities and wind farm operators: The Greek Regulatory

Authority of Energy (RAE)[17] grants the wind farm operator the electricity production license for a period of 25 years, which may be extended for another period of 25 years (Tsirakopoulou 2012: 469). In addition, the wind farm operator requires the installation license that is valid for two years and may be extended for another two years (Maroulis 2013: 62). The ETA is granted for a period of ten years and may be renewed for another ten years (Tsirakopoulou 2012: 469). Moreover, the wind farm operator sells the electricity produced to the Greek Electricity Market Operator in the context of a twenty-year sales contract that may be extended for another period of 20 years (Maroulis 2013: 63). Finally, Law 3851/2010 (Official Gazette 85/2010, article 7) ensures financial benefits to household consumers in areas in which renewable energy power stations are installed.[18]

In the wake of the financial crisis, the Greek state had to transpose the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (MoU) into law (International Monetary Fund 2010).[19] With the enactment of Law 3845/2010 (Official Gazette 65/2010) and Law 4001/2011 (Official Gazette 179/2011), the Greek state was committed to challenging the monopolistic hold of the electricity market by the PPC, to further open up the energy market, and to take measures to promote competition (Kelemenis 2012: 492). The Greek state had to ensure that lignite reserves — representing around 40 percent of exploitable reserves in Greece — are made available to competitors of the PPC (European Union 2009). Moreover, under Law 4001/2011 (Official Gazette 179/2011), the Greek state assigned the ownership, operation and exploitation of the transmission grid to the Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO), and the operation, exploitation and maintenance of the distribution network to the Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator (HEDNO). These companies are entirely owned PPC subsidiaries, but perform independently from the PPC (Official Gazette 179/2011, Law 4001/2011), and in this sense, open the way for the privatisation of the Greek energy sector (Norton Rose Fullbright 2013).

17 The RAE is an independent, supervising authority on matters of energy sufficiency, market regulation and monopoly supervision. The RAE regulates the energy production of both public and private plants, and exercises price control in cooperation with the Minister of Energy, Environment and Climate Change (Tsakiris 2010: 10).

18 Every RES-electricity producer is subject to a special reciprocity charge (annual fee), specified by a joint decision of the Ministers of Finance and Development, and equal to two percent of the producer's electricity sales to the grid. This charge is collected by the Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) and is given to the local authority within the area in which the RES generation unit operates, for the purpose of realising local development projects (GAREP 2004: 4).

19 The European Central Bank and the European Commission in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund decided to agree on this memorandum to provide financial assistance to Greece.

4.1.3.2 The role of the Public Power Corporation

In Greece, state interventionism and political interests have hindered the Europeanisation of the electricity market. This means that the Greek electricity market has not been fully liberalised in spite of the aforementioned policy reforms imposed by the EU. The Greek electricity sector remains dominated by the state-controlled PPC and its subsidiaries, even though legal reforms and new entrants in the sector have gradually been weakening the PPC's position (OECD 2013: 197).

The following examples show the influential role of the PPC in the Greek energy sector: Firstly, the PPC determines indirectly the regulation of medium and low voltage supply tariffs that are subject to prior approval by the Minister of Environment, Energy and Climate Change and the RAE (Iliadou 2009: 83, Kelemenis 2012: 496). These tariffs are not adjusted to the fuel costs, and the tariff structure is not linked to consumer groups' marginal costs, resulting in cross-subsidisation between different types of consumers (Tsakiris 2011: 21, Kelemenis 2012: 493). Consequently, independent energy retail providers have lodged an appeal arguing that PPC tariffs entail their exclusion from the market due to the PPC's policy of cross subsidies (Kelemenis 2012: 496). Secondly, most of the Aegean islands meet their electricity demand through diesel power stations owned by the PPC. The electricity grid infrastructure of these islands usually hinders the operation of wind farms, which require the upgrading of the islands' grids. The PPC delayed such an upgrading, because it would encourage private wind energy investments on the Aegean islands, which, in turn, would threaten its monopoly (IRENA-GWEC 2012: 78).[20] Thirdly, the PPC maintains its exclusive right to extract lignite from surface mines and so retains its monopolistic hold on the cheap energy source of lignite (IRENA-GWEC 2012: 72).

Greek governing parties have made use of the PPC to promote their particular interests. In 1981, the governing party introduced a system of massive temporary employment in the PPC, and in 1983, it proceeded to hire almost 3000 permanent employees in the PPC after a forged oral examination (Mavrogordatos 1997: 16). In the 1990s, the governing party continued to distribute jobs in the PPC, either by controlling the entrance to its training schools or by offering temporary employment that led to permanent status (Mavrogordatos 1997: 16). As a result of clientelist politics, the number of PPC employees is higher than needed for covering its operation (Tsakiris 2011: 21).

[20] In Greece, the vast majority of the installed wind farms belonged to the PPC until 1998, while the private wind farm capacity started to expand as late as the 21st century (Kaldellis 2005: 597).

In Greece, trades unions and public opinion usually disapprove of policy measures that focus on reducing the size of the public sector and reforming the labour and pension systems (Iliadou 2009: 78). Therefore, the Greek state avoided initiating reforms that put PPC employees at a disadvantage, for example, by restricting appointments or by privatising the PPC. In that regard, the influential role of the PPC goes hand in hand with state interventionism reflected in the Greek constitution, which includes restrictions on private economic activities exemplified as follows:

> *Private economic initiative shall not be permitted to develop at the expense of freedom and human dignity, or to the detriment of the national economy (The Constitution of Greece, article 106, paragraph 2).*
>
> *The law may regulate the acquisition by purchase of enterprises or the compulsory participation therein of the state or other public agencies, in the event these enterprises are of the nature of a monopoly or are of vital importance to the development of sources of national wealth or are primarily intended to offer services to the community as a whole (The Constitution of Greece, article 106, paragraph 3).*

The Greek state avoided reforming the PPC until the electricity market was liberalised. Nowadays, the PPC remains state-controlled and grants financial benefits to various groups of consumers despite liberalisation. Policy reforms imposed special restrictions on the public sector, but Presidential Decree 360/1991 exempted the PPC from restrictions regarding personnel hiring and procurement of goods, services and works (Iliadou 2009: 80). In addition, the PPC trade union reacted against the electricity market liberalisation, which, in turn, elicited public dialogue about the loss of national sovereignty through the opening of markets (Tsakiris 2011: 21). Various social groups of consumers disapprove of the privatisation of the PPC for fear of losing privileges provided by the PPC. For example, the PPC provides reduced tariffs to agricultural activities that contribute to the primary crop and animal production (Public Power Corporation 2010). Moreover, the PPC offers special tariffs to families with more than three children and special discounts in electricity charges to earthquake victims, persons with a low income, the long-term unemployed, and disabled people, as well as people on life support (Iliadou 2009: 84, Public Power Corporation 2015). In the wake of the Greek financial crisis, the Troika imposed an austerity package that calls for the further privatisation of the PPC, which has been suspended by the current government. Finally, the Greek state remains the majority shareholder of the PPC (Iliadou

2009: 80), which retains its monopoly, thereby allowing state interventionism to shape the current energy politics, which fails to promote acceleration of RES.

4.2 The island of Amorgos

4.2.1 General characteristics

The island of Amorgos is located in the Cyclades, a group of Greek islands in the south Aegean Sea. It is a small mountainous island of 121 km^2 with 126 km coastline. In Figure 4-1 the island group of the Cyclades is marked in red and the arrow indicates the island of Amorgos. Eleven percent of the island is agricultural land, 73 percent is pasture land, six percent is village settlements and ten percent constitutes other areas (census 1991, Hellenic Statistical Authority 2012). The island of Amorgos has 1,973 inhabitants (census 2011, Hellenic Statistical Authority 2012) and is divided into six districts (cf. Table 4-1 and Figure 4-2), each of which typically constitutes a group of neighbouring villages. The district of Egiali is also known as called Pano Meria and the districts of Vroutsis and Arkesini together as Kato Meria.

Amorgos is characterised by steep slopes and very few flat areas (Margaris 2008: 17) and is considered as rough and rocky island. There are neither forests nor wetlands on the island. A devastating fire in 1835 burned the oak forests of north Amorgos (McGilchrist 2010), and the 1956 earthquake (with a magnitude of 7.8) and the amplitude of its tsunami damaged the Amorgian ecosystem (Okal et al. 2009: 1533). Currently, the natural vegetation consists mainly of shrubs, maquis and phrygana (thyme, oregano and amaranth) as well as scattered olive and almond trees. A high chain of steep mountainsides dominates the landscape and influences the microclimate by causing dense fog that often hinders road transport. The wild and foggy scenery together with a certain religious aura lend an almost mystical character to the landscape. Amorgos has a Mediterranean type climate with mild winters and hot and dry summers, and is sunny for almost the whole year. Most of the village settlements are defined as traditional and are characterised by architectural simplicity (Kovaios 1975: 135). The island has numerous archaeological sites and its northeast part has been designated as a Network of Nature Protected Areas (NATURA) 2000 site.

Figure 4-1: Map of Greece

Source: Wikipedia (2013)

Table 4-1: Districts of Amorgos

District	Main villages	Population
Egiali (Aegiali)	Egiali, Lagkada, Potamos, Agios Pavlos	514
Tholaria	Tholaria, Levrosos	189
Hora (Chora)	Hora, Kastelopetra	409
Katapola	Katapola, Rachidi, Xylokeratidi	595
Vroutsis	Vroutsis, Skeparnies, Kamari	87
Arkesini	Arkesini, Kalofana, Kalotaritissa	179

Source: own composition

Figure 4-2: Map of Amorgos

Source: Lonely Planet (2013)

Until the 1970s, districts were not interconnected (L3). The only way to go from one district to the other was by donkey, and one trip used to last at least three hours. Currently, the villages of Kato Meria are sparsely populated and isolated from the rest of the island, which considers that Kato Meria has missed modernisation in the sense of development of infrastructure (L23, S14). Locals distinguish between districts and even between villages of the same district in terms of mentality (P4, T7). Travelling from the north to the south, staying in almost all the villages and spending time with locals with different mentalities, I had the feeling that Amorgos is a place comprised of different islands.

Compared with other Greek regions, the island of Amorgos has only recently followed development paths towards modernisation such as road construction and electrification. Road construction started in the 1970s and was not completed until the 1990s. Currently, one asphalt road connects the north with the south part of the island, while a so-called road network is nothing of the sort. Rural roads and the network of pathways have been destroyed to a great extent as a result of the abandonment of agriculture (T1, V1). Amorgos is the only Cycladic island with two harbours. Public transport is absent in winter, while in summer there is scheduled bus traffic for tourism purposes. A private shipping company has a monopoly on the passenger service between Amorgos and Athens that becomes less frequent in the offseason. Electric devices such as fridges have been gradually introduced into

Amorgian households following the longstanding electrification, which started with the village of Chora in 1966 and was completed with Egiali in the 1990s. Owing to the recent electrification, domestic central heating has been of secondary importance. A lot of traditional houses and particularly, those in Kato Meria still use kerosene heaters (PHa4) or a kind of brazier filled with glowing coals transported from a fireplace located in or outside the house (P5, T10). Other households use electric radiators or halogen heaters, and only recently built houses have central heating or air-conditioners. Technology products such as computers and mobile phones are part of daily life especially that of young people, in north and central Amorgos, which compared to the south is characterised by greater economic prosperity as a result of tourism.

Amorgos lacks medical care, which has been regarded as a crucial issue since the early 1970s (Prasinos 1975: 117). The island has three so-called rural medical offices that lack medical personnel and equipment, and have generally a bad record as medical service centres, not only on Amorgos, but in the whole country. In case of a medical emergency, family members or neighbours transport patients to Chora, the only place with a heliport. If the weather is not stormy, a helicopter comes from the nearest island, Naxos, which has both a hospital and an airport to airlift patients to Athens if needed. The issue of medical care has become more crucial, because the current crisis has caused health budget cuts and has worsened the financial situation of the municipality of Amorgos (Smith 2012). Locals complain about the lack of medical care, while they address the issue with certain easiness, because they have grown accustomed to it over time.

Water shortages are one of the most important problems on the island. Small water supply systems provide most village settlements with water that is generally categorised as undrinkable. Potable water supply depends mainly on water transported from the mainland (by container shipment) (Margaris 2008: 30). Irrigation is based on ground water (i.e. salty water drillings) as well as the aforementioned water supply systems. Household water supply relies partly on the cistern system. Every traditional house has a cistern, where rain-water from the roof is collected and stored. If the cistern empties and the house is not automatically connected to a water supply system, water from the system (i.e. water tanks) is poured into the cistern through hose pipes. There are no personnel charged with the task of filling up the cisterns. The fastest way to refill your cistern is to walk around the village looking for the man who usually undertakes this task. Typically this man engages another man such as his son to do the job, and your cistern is refilled within two days. If you need water in the

meantime you ask the neighbours or you walk to the nearest source of water – if any – to fill the jerry cans that your household, like every Amorgian household, possesses for this purpose. Locals are familiar with the fact that if the water problem is not fixed within two days then it will be fixed within three or four days. This familiarity enables locals to interact at a leisurely pace. The cistern case shows the kind of slowness and easygoingness that characterise facets of life on Amorgos, where time cannot run out, because deadlines are usually not set.

4.2.2 The economy of Amorgos

Amorgians work in the primary, secondary and service economic sectors. Farming activities (agriculture, animal husbandry and beekeeping) constitute additional or marginal activities as far as income is concerned, while sheep- and goat-herding may guarantee a considerable income in Kato Meria. Fishing has declined in the last two decades and has become largely the field of activity of a few Egyptian immigrants. Few locals are self-employed in the secondary sector, which includes one olive press, ateliers, folk art shops and manufacturing of agricultural products such as herbs and the traditional drink raki. In the last three decades, the economy of Amorgos has become mainly a service economy based on low-impact tourism. Small-scale family tourism businesses such as rooms to let, taverns and souvenir shops are limited to a five-month tourist season and are the main source of income, particularly in Egiali, Katapola and Chora. Farming and tourism business support multiple-employment. Self-employment in groceries and minimarkets is usually a source of supplementary income, while public employment and pensions constitute significant income sources.

4.2.2.1 Farming

Farming was the main occupation of Amorgians from the 16th century until approximately the 1970s. In the 18th century, most Amorgians were landless, lived in mountain villages and cultivated the fields of the Monastery of Chozoviotissa, which owned most of the land on Amorgos (Mouzakis 1995: 131). At this time, Amorgians produced a small amount of hand-woven cloth exported to England (Sutton 1988: 192). In the early 19th century, cloth exports ended with the development of industrial textile production in England, and Amorgians started migrating to Athens, Asia Minor, Egypt and the nearby islands (Sutton 1988: 196). After the First World War, monastic properties were distributed to Amorgian peasants (Sutton 1988: 198), who practiced agriculture with the aim of family self-sufficiency

(Petanidou et al. 2008: 255). The system of heritable family land caused significant fragmentation, thereby favouring a subsistence agricultural economy (Sutton 1988: 201) that prevented locals from cultivating cash crops, with the exception of tobacco (Simos 1975: 75).

After the Second World War, agriculture started to decline, accompanied by external migration in the wake of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). Mountain villagers started to abandon agriculture in terraced fields and to move to coastal areas, where harbour settlements arose gradually (Sutton 1988: 202). Agricultural decline was followed by tourism development and contributed to the change from a productivist to a consumption landscape. Agriculture had played a central role in the Amorgian economy until the tourism boom of the 1990s. Currently, agriculture is localised on the slopes of Kato Meria and in the plains of Katapola and Egiali (Margaris 2008: 22).

Agricultural decline resulted in changes in land use. Agriculture was practiced in terraces and in combination with animal husbandry (Karanikolas et al. 2007: 14). Terraces are defined as horizontal man-made spaces created to permit or facilitate cultivation on sloping terrain (hills and mountains) and supported by dry stone walls (Petanidou et al. 2008: 251). Terraces sustained a variety of different land uses such as cultivation of cereals (primarily wheat), vegetables, pulses and fruit trees, viniculture, oleiculture, and grazing (Margaris 2008: 22, Petanidou et al. 2008: 251). Manure was used as a fertiliser and was provided by grazing animals, mainly sheep and goats as well as pack animals such as horses, donkeys and mules (Petanidou et al. 2008: 256). For example, after the harvesting of cereals, farmers used the harvested fields as pasture in order to improve soil fertility with sheep and goat manure (Karanikolas et al. 2007: 14). Animals were also used for agricultural activities such as ploughing as well as for the production of milk, cheese, meat, and wool. The terraces were abandoned with the conversion of arable land (i.e. cultivated terraces) to pasture-land, and a corresponding increase in the number of sheep and goats (PHa6, PHc2). This overall increase was supported by EU subsidies as well as by the lower amount of labour required by the free-range animal husbandry system that locals followed after the abandonment of cultivation in terraces (Karanikolas et al. 2007: 14, Petanidou et al. 2008: 259). This system is structured around abandoned terraces that herders use freely regardless of ownership (Petanidou et al. 2008: 259). In other words, there is an increase in the area of pasture-land linked to an increase of livestock production and to subsequent overgrazing.

Agriculture supports an off-the-record non-cash exchange of agricultural products. Due to agricultural decline and water shortages, existing agricultural activities are restricted to the cultivation of a few sorts of legumes, non-irrigated vegetables and a small number of vineyards as well as to oleiculture. In addition, almost every Amorgian family has a small vegetable garden. The limited agricultural production of a family covers, however, the nutritional requirements of the family household members (Karanikolas et al. 2007: 14). For instance, a family is engaged in oleiculture and produces olive oil for its own use, and for relatives living on or off the island. The family provides the remaining olive oil to circles of friends and acquaintances as well as to the local market that serves mainly tourists. Provision of olive oil and generally exchange of agricultural products occurs off-the-record and does not necessarily imply profit in monetary form, even in the case of the local market (V9).[21] As another example, a family produces wine and provides a tourism entrepreneur such as a tavern owner with wine. The brother of the tavern owner is a farmer and provides the family with meat or dairy products. In this way, farming goes along with an off-the-record non-cash exchange of products that supports the tourism business.

Currently, farming is not strictly a family issue as it used to be almost four centuries ago. Apart from few peasant families in Kato Meria, there is a considerable decrease in family farming. However, land and livestock remain in the possession of the Amorgian family and provide family members with agricultural products. For example, an Amorgian family may own land without being engaged in its cultivation. At the olive harvest, locals often work for Amorgian families that own olive trees, which for some reason their family members cannot harvest themselves (V6). In this case, the family (owners of the olive trees) and particularly the male family members are merely concerned with organising donkeys to transport the olives from the field to the olive press in case the harvesters do not own donkeys. The family does not pay the harvesters in money. The family members take one third of the produced oil, while harvesters take the rest as well as the wood from pruning (V9). The harvesters provide their families with oil and also supply the local market with the rest of the oil (by selling or bartering), usually, off the record. Similarly, an Amorgian family may own goats without being engaged in grazing. The family exchanges its goats for cheese and meat by giving the goats to a shepherd who herds the goats to feed his family and also produces cheese for the local market (S13, S18, S19). The Amorgian family continues to own land and

[21] Farmers who bargain in monetary terms within the local market can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

livestock, while engaging less and less with the actual farming, contributing to the decline of the peasant family.

The fact that the family owns land and/or livestock without being engaged in farming also benefits the family in monetary terms. In general, farmers enjoy agricultural subsidies and reduced taxes or turnover. Workers with a certain income are not entitled to register as farmers (Fintikakis 2014). People who own or lease cultivated land, livestock and/or beehives are authorised by law to register as farmers only if they actually work as farmers (European Commission 2011). In the Amorgian family, the husband is typically the wage-earner, while the wife officially owns the land or livestock so that she can declare farming as her occupation regardless of whether she is an active farmer. For example, the wife registers as a farmer, on the grounds that she owns sheep, which are actually tended, off the record, by a fellow-villager, while the husband works as public official at the municipality of Amorgos and, together with the wife, lets rooms to tourists.

Locals feel a need to remain familiar with farming in some way, because they experience feelings of uncertainty, devotion and nostalgia. Locals argue that the most important thing for survival is a shelter and a field rather than money. On the one hand, the practical knowledge ingrained in farming such as knowing how to make the dry stone walls of terraces gradually gets lost. On the other hand, locals either experience farming or are able to recall this experience, since they used to work with their parents in the field in their young days (S29). In addition, some tourism entrepreneurs used to be farmers themselves and some locals are both farmers and tourism entrepreneurs today. Tourism may decline or even collapse in the future, while re-cultivation of land can assure a livelihood (L20, S15). Locals have an emotional attachment to their land that reminds them of the bygone peasant life characterised by honesty and modesty compared with the current dependency on tourism (L11).

The traditional peasant Amorgian society has been transformed into a modern society. Locals have abandoned farming to a great extent, but still benefit from farming and value farm labour. Currently, farming activities go hand in hand with an off-the-record exchange economy. Contemporary Amorgian society looks for employment in the service sector and, particularly, in the tourism business that brings in easy money compared with farming (L29).

4.2.2.2 Tourism

Tourism development started in the early 1980s after the introduction of infrastructure such as the electrification of the village of Chora in 1966, the installation of running water in 1971, and the gradual construction of ports and roads up until the late 1990s (Georgalli 1991: 61). Tourism did not compete against agriculture, but constituted a concomitant feature of the land use change ensuing from the abandonment of tillage. Locals approached tourism with some scepticism at the very beginning of tourism development (L12). In the course of time, tourism businesses developed and the tourism economy flourished.

On Amorgos, tourism businesses are small-scale and family-run. Families own and run vacation apartments and rooms to let, small camping sites, small and medium-sized hotels, taverns, bars, souvenir shops and small-scale rental car companies. Big hotels and, generally, services and facilities for mass tourism, are missing, with the exception of one big hotel in the district of Egiali. However, this hotel, which is managed by a local family, has not brought about the impacts of mass tourism such as infrastructure for beach services that big hotels usually entail in the Cyclades. Almost every Amorgian family has a stake in small-scale tourism entrepreneurship by running a small business related somehow to tourism. Even farming families of the non-touristic Kato Meria supply their products according to the demand of the island tourist market. Typically, members of the nuclear family (parents and offspring) and some relatives assist in the family tourism business. Occasionally, unrelated locals as well as undocumented immigrants work as low-paid unregistered employees in the family tourism business (P6).

A small-scale family tourism business guarantees a significant income. It avoids employment contracts, labour regulations and health insurance charges. Tourism entrepreneurs try to avoid making out receipts, have built more vacation apartments than the law permits and/or under-report profits. Family income from a small-scale tourism business is direct and does not require any intermediate agent such as the municipality of Amorgos. Tourism business guarantees cash income, since it is based on money transactions between locals and tourists. Finally, small-scale tourism businesses provide a lucrative income for the majority of Amorgian families.

The fact that family members are engaged in the family tourism business for a period of five months each year results in multiple-employment in two different ways. The first way refers to the manifold sources of family income linked to the given supply of family labour. The

work provided by the family tourism business is distributed among family members (and relatives) in such a way that a great many of them also have an additional job. That is to say, they are employed as public officials or private employees or are engaged in the primary sector. For example, a family owns a field, a souvenir shop and a tavern. The mother works as a public official and runs the souvenir shop together with the daughter. The father works mainly as a farmer and is active in local politics. The son together with his wife and sister-in-law run the tavern and assist in the field. Family members are engaged in multiple-employment that implies diverse sources of family income.

The second way multiple-employment is encouraged refers to the time the short tourist season gives to locals to practice agriculture, or go fishing, or busy themselves with other things such as renovation of vacation apartments. For example, the olive harvest takes place in the non-touristic months of October and November. Economic activities in the off-season may serve the tourism economy as well. For instance, locals produce the traditional drink raki by distilling grape pomace in the off-season in small labs they have constructed, usually in their houses. Raki producers provide tourism entrepreneurs (e.g. taverns, bars and coffee shops) with raki for the tourist season. The production and provision of raki are in many cases undeclared. The vintner, the producer and the provider of raki, as well as the raki purchaser (e.g. tourism entrepreneur), may be one and the same person, whose family assists in the vineyard, the lab, the marketing and the tourism business. Employment in the off-season goes along with employment in the tourist season and ensures occupation all the year.

Tourism entails a kind of extremeness. In summer, the island is swarming with tourists and locals are overworked. For a short time, tourism causes problems such as noise annoyance and congested traffic, as well as a sudden massive information input that locals cannot easily handle. The ensuing discomfort is related to the differentness of tourists, and arouses a feeling of alienation. Locals are constantly on the go and become unavoidably part of the extreme social life that tourism brings in its wake. Locals work at high intensity in the tourist season, while the intensity of labour declines in the seven month off-season. In the aftermath of the tourist season, social life on the island is suddenly at its lowest ebb, and individual performance is low, because locals are exhausted from tourism. In this sense, life in the island goes from one extreme to the other; from the hectic quality of the tourist period to a kind of societal inertia (“depression”) that follows.

The extremes involved in tourism influence employment, because locals need to be engaged in something in order to alleviate their “depression”. Thus, they work in the off-season just

to be involved in something to get over the hectic quality of summer and get their lives going smoothly again. A great number of family tourism businesses are so profitable that family members do not really need to make money in the off-season. In other words, quite a few locals keep working during the off-season, but few work to make a profit then. By the end of November, after the olive harvest, locals seem to have coped with the hyperactivity of the tourist season. In the subsequent period until the beginning of the tourist season (in late April) locals have the opportunity to be in some kind of easy-going employment that does not bear directly upon the exhausting tourism business. They can also rest and prepare the ground for the very busy summertime. The hyperactivity of the tourist season is compensated for by easy-going employments which function as a precondition for the labour-intensive summertime.

4.2.3 The administration of Amorgos

The present section describes the administration and concomitant governance structure of the island of Amorgos before and after the administrative reform initiated by the Greek state in 1997. Governance structure such as bureaucracy is an organisational solution for making institutions effective (Hagedorn 2008: 360) and an effort to craft *order* (italics in original) (Williamson 2000: 599). Under the former administration of communes the governance structure was grounded on personal contact rather than bureaucratic formalities. The current administration of a municipality is supposed to function through bureaucracy. The following paragraphs give an overview on the recent administrative transition from communes to municipality that leads to the bureaucratisation of the administration.

4.2.3.1 The administration of communes

In the 20th century (1912-2000), the governance structure of Amorgos was based on the administration of communes. Each village was represented by its commune that was independent from the other communes of the island and administered by the commune council, elected by the village population. The head of the commune council was highly regarded by the vast majority of villagers, and conveyed village issues to the central state administration (S7). Typically, all commune council members came from and lived in the same village. In this sense, non-members and members of the commune council were fellow-villagers, who used to run across each other constantly and make small talk on a daily basis. Individual as well as village issues were discussed on the street and in the kafenio, the traditional coffee-house, which had become the commune council venue. This means that

commune council members met usually by chance in the kafenio and participated in coincidental discussions among fellow-villagers.

Under the system of communes, local governing bodies were highly dependent on central state mechanisms. Revenues and expenditures were guaranteed and regulated by the central state and did not support local governing bodies in their struggle to plan and implement communal interventions (Skamnakis 2011: 6). Thus, communes had to take charge of village matters by relying on self-organisation as well as self-enforcement mechanisms, meaning that each commune had its distinctive financial management and village social structure (S1). Under these circumstances, communes did not really share similar interests. Each village was characterised by family and neighbourhood networks that used to set the governance structure of the village (Gavalas 1975: 106). In this regard, the governance structure of Amorgos was based loosely on six self-governing communes (Simos 1975: 100).

4.2.3.2 The administration of the municipality

In 1997, the Greek government initiated an administrative reform (Law 2539/1997) entitled the "Kapodistrias Program" (Official Gazette 244/1997: 8789). This reform aimed at amalgamating communes by introducing the municipality as an administrative unit legitimised to take over communal tasks. This reform brought about a transition from 5,318 communes to approximately 1,100 municipalities at national level (Skamnakis 2011: 6). The transition was supposed to decentralise the governance structure at national level by authorising municipalities to deal with local issues more independently from the central state than communes did (Official Gazette 244/1997: 8834-8854). However, the central state retained control, particularly regarding municipal funding, and the maintenance of the Greek centralised governance structure limited the potentialities and efficacy of the municipality (Skamnakis 2011: 7).

On Amorgos, this reform was carried out in 2000 and created one municipality from six communes. According to Law 2539/1997, the central governing body is the municipal council, which is elected by the Amorgian population and consists of 13 locals (Official Gazette 1997: 8836). Municipal council members come predominantly from the touristic and most densely populated harbour villages. The municipal council convenes meetings in the town hall, centrally located in Chora. These meetings include debate on as well as decision-making about individual, village and island issues and are open to the public (P14). Head of

the municipal council is the mayor, who usually has the last word on administrative matters (municipal meetings minutes 2007, 2008, 2012, AD1).

The former commune councils changed into district councils comprised of three members (fellow-villagers) each. Each district has its district council with the exception of Pano Meria, which is divided into three district councils: the council of Egiali, the council of Tholaria and the council of Lagkada. The municipal council elects the members of district councils. The presidents of district councils are asked to participate and allowed to have a say in municipal council meetings (meetings minutes, P14). Each district council convenes assemblies in the so-called community hall that is usually the sole function room of each district. The assembly is a gathering of fellow-villagers with the objective of opinion- and decision-making – particularly but not exclusively – about village issues. The president of the district council conveys opinions and decisions of the assembly to the municipal council that is asked to take them into consideration (S25). In this respect, the performance and assertiveness of district councils depend on the municipal council.

The introduction of the municipal bureaucracy was accompanied by scheduled meetings and more written documents and public officials compared to the administration of communes. Municipal council meetings and district council assemblies have to be announced on paper and the announcements have to be nailed onto the information board of each village (Official Gazette 1997: 8842). Each district council is obliged to call at least one assembly yearly, and assemblies have to take place in the presence of the mayor or the municipal council president (Official Gazette 1997: 8842). The municipality is supposed to keep a record of the minutes of municipal council meetings on audiocassettes and in writing. Municipal council meetings take place in the town hall that is expected to replace the kafenio. The mayor has to set office hours to meet locals, in contrast to the head of the commune council, who met his fellow-villagers daily outside the context of the commune (P10).

The 2000 reform conveyed the idea (concept of governance) that the municipal apparatus is legitimised to deal with local affairs by rearranging the administration towards centralisation of governance. This means that villages represented by the former communes are highly dependent on the central municipal authority. The municipality is supposed to bring these villages together with the aim of governing the whole island, on the basis of its bureaucracy.

4.2.4 The energy situation on Amorgos

The island of Amorgos is not connected to the electricity grid of mainland Greece. Therefore, Amorgos meets its electricity demand by one small autonomous diesel power station owned by the PPC (Tsakiris 2010: 16). In general, diesel engines cover 90.7 percent of the consumption of the non-connected Aegean islands (Tsakiris 2010: 16). On Amorgos, the maximum energy consumption is 3.2 MW in summer and 1.6 MW in winter (Margaris 2008: 24), when electricity blackouts occur due to technical damage from bad weather.

Supplying electricity on non-connected islands like Amorgos is very costly, owing to the peak generation in summer and the cost of diesel fuels, which raises the average generating cost far above that of the mainland grid (Tsakiris 2010: 18). In particular, the increase in electricity consumption in summertime implies the increase of peak load demands. The additional capacity required to cover the peaks are obtained either by expensive generating facilities with low utilisation factors such as hydroelectric plants, or by electricity imports from neighbouring countries (Papadopoulos 2007: 113).

Consumers of non-connected islands do not bear the difference over average generating costs. Law 4001/2011 (Official Gazette 179/2011, article 52) established a unified price system by determining that consumers of non-connected islands are entitled to be supplied with electricity under the same tariffs and terms as those enjoyed by consumers in mainland Greece (Kelemenis 2012: 496). This means that the PPC supplies all areas of Greece with electricity at the same price. The unified price system does not promote cost-efficient electricity production by island generating facilities, resulting in additional costs to be covered by the PPC, raising national electricity prices (Tsakiris 2010: 18). Costly oil-based electricity generating along with the unified price system discourages private investors from entering the energy market of the non-connected islands (Iliadou 2009: 77). Thus, the PPC remains the sole electricity supplier of these islands, with the exception of Crete (Iliadou 2009: 77, Kelemenis 2012: 492).

The island of Amorgos is suited to wind energy development, given that it exhibits excellent wind potential (Kaldellis 2005: 400).[22] The isolated electricity grid of Amorgos impedes wind energy development, which requires the interconnection of all Cycladic islands, which would, in turn, enable the connection of Amorgos to the mainland grid. For example, the current electricity grid of Amorgos has to be upgraded from 6.6 kilovolts (kV) to 15.0 kV to

[22] See ‘The European Wind Atlas’ (1989) for further information.

absorb the wind energy electricity generated by one wind-power plant with a total capacity of 900 kilowatts (kW) (official document of the wind energy company Energotech S.A.). Due to the island's isolation from the grid, the local network lacks any external buffer system and therefore has to ensure adequate power supply at all times (Tsakiris 2010: 19). When incorporating highly fluctuating energy sources such as wind energy, the island grid can support a maximum penetration of 25 to 30 percent, because the lack of grid connections does not allow selling of electricity produced to other islands or to the mainland (Tsakiris 2010: 19). Consequently, wind farms operating in the electricity grid of Amorgos are prone to output limitations when wind supply periodically exceeds total load demand (Tsakiris 2010: 19). On this basis, delay of grid expansion brings wind energy development to a standstill on the island of Amorgos.

5 Local institutions and habits versus external large-scale development

In this chapter, I explain the way that nine institutions and six habits bring locals to resist wind energy development that goes along with large-scale development and external interventions. The institutions include the ethical code, unwritten agreements, familism, nepotism, villagism, political clientelism, religious clientelism, ethical clientelism, and the patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members (cf. Subchapter 5.1). The habits include the habit of contesting the existence and function of the state, the habit of mistrusting the municipal bureaucracy, the habit of judging outside the context of the municipality, the habit of avoiding joint action for municipal and business purposes, the habit of being hostile to both state symbols and symbols associated with the spirit of neoliberalism, and the habit of preserving the common identity (cf. Subchapter 5.2). I open each section of this chapter with addressing the historical roots of the institution or the habit analysed in the section.

5.1 Local institutions versus wind energy development

5.1.1 The ethical code

I define the ethical code as an institution that prescribes what is laudable and what is condemnable and what counts as good within Amorgian culture. Locals' common ethical experiences shape their ethical code, which pre-exists the tourism business. The present section shows that the ethical code attributes a certain ethical wrongdoing to both the tourism business and wind energy development. Locals' experience has shown that tourism business involves a greed for easy money that goes along with a decline in ethics. Based on their experience with tourism, locals have the presentiment of ethical wrongdoing in the case of wind energy development. Consequently, locals intuitively resist wind energy development, which is associated with the commodification of the Amorgian landscape through large-scale industrial development accompanied by a decline in ethics.

Most locals are afraid that development will spoil their identity (Vlavianos 1975: 139) by making them forget their origins, ethics and visions (L19, L26, L28, T3, T7, V2). For example, tourism development worried locals a long time ago (Vlavianos 1975: 139), because it goes along with competition, which triggers disputes. Tourism development went hand in hand with infrastructural development, thereby affecting ethics. For instance, in the wake of electrification previously manual olive pressing has been mechanised, thereby

allowing locals to spend time on tourism business (folk literature). As a result, the tourism economy flourished and oleiculture decreased, resulting in the decline of ethical experiences such as solidarity and gregariousness at the olive harvest. The flourishing tourism business increased the economic prosperity of the Amorgian population, which links tourism with easy money and greed for money, accompanied by certain uneasiness (L1, L11, L23). Tourism development intensified abandonment of agriculture, making the former farmers become rentiers by getting rich within a very short period (L29, P8, T12). Connell (1979: 74) argues that development is inevitable and incompatible with the Amorgian ethical code as follows:

> *No one would wish the laborious traditional life of villagers to be forced to continue in the age-old ways when there is an alternative. However, there is a paradox here between the validity of the ethics and customs of the old way of life and those of the new with the unease created by wealth and the desire it generates for more money with less work.*

The sudden economic prosperity gained by tourism business increased consumption of technological products such as television, mobile phones and computers in everyday life, resulting in social isolation. Borgmann (1984) suggests that technology disperses focal practices, because technology makes it easy to get results without any effort and focus (Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg 1991: 99). For instance, people can just switch on the compact disc player to listen to music, thereby missing the focal experience that people have when they get together to practice to play as a quartet (Dreyfus in Flyvbjerg 1991: 99). The abrupt introduction of technology into the Amorgian household contributed to a reduction of focal practices such as convivial gatherings (L2, T3). In this sense, tourism development resulted in locals' alienation from their culture.

However, locals still engage somewhat in focal practices that afford them the opportunity to interact according to the Amorgian ethical code. For instance, fellow-villagers gather occasionally in front of fruit shops or mini-markets, typically late in the day, to narrate and gossip (P13, V10). At such convivial gatherings, locals refer to their ethical values, such as togetherness. By joining such gatherings, I listened to locals talking about the courage and kindness of a fisherman, who transported an old sick man on his boat to the opposite island to get medical support, despite the bad weather (P13). I also listened to locals talking about a new village police officer, who arrested a man in the village square in front of his mother. This man runs a family tourism business and occasionally employs unrelated individuals based on verbal contracts, which allow him to ignore the labour laws and avoid taxes. The

whole village including the previous police officer knew about this employment well before the arrest. Villagers emphasised the shamelessness of the new police officer and stressed that there was no reason to arrest the man (P6).

The Amorgian ethical code justifies the shamelessness attributed to the new police officer. According to this ethical code, the arrest damages the family reputation by offending the family honour that is considered an essential part of the ethical life. At the same time, unregistered employment has become a common practice over time, to the benefit of family tourism businesses (Eleftherotypia 2013). The morals of outsiders such as policymakers, tax inspectors or scientific researchers represent universal moral principles that differ from the Amorgian ethical code. Universal moral principles typically imply that unregistered employment is morally improper. Therefore, outsiders might advocate the arrest regardless whether the Amorgian ethical code accepts unregistered employment and, thus, tax avoidance in order to safeguard both family honour and family tourism businesses.

The tourism economy involves internal contradictions that throw up ethical wrongdoing and cause unease. Firstly, the tourism economy is based on the small-scale family tourism business that brings family members together and preserves family well-being. At the same time, in the wake of tourism, ethical fulfilment embedded in the effort to cultivate land or keep animals to feed a family has become rather a conversational topic than a practical experience (P9, S27). In this sense, tourism disperses ethical fulfilment (L11, L14, S8, T8), while supporting family cohesion, regarded as one of the few remaining ethical experiences that, in turn, get lost due to tourism. Secondly, the ethical code involves experience of and respect for Amorgian culture. Through tourism, locals capitalise on the Amorgian landscape, which is marketed as an essential element of the Amorgian culture and also finds expression in the ethical code. Thus, locals attach themselves to the ethics of their culture by marketing the unmarketable ethical code and so, feel uneasy as they realise this contradiction.

Locals reflect on the existing decline of ethics intensified by tourism development, when they realise that the option of wind energy development involves Nussbaum's (2000: 1005) tragic question (cf. Section 2.2). This means that locals are supposed to choose between two alternatives that contain ethical wrongdoing. The first alternative refers to refusing wind energy development to maintain the lucrative tourism economy that causes ethical degeneration. The second alternative refers to accepting the wind energy business that also involves ethical degeneration (L6, L21, T8, V3). Wind energy development trades on the untradeable Amorgian landscape by paying financial compensation for wind farms on

Amorgos and offends the ethical code which sprang from life without industrial and technological development (S4, S27, V9).

Both alternatives treat the Amorgian landscape as a commodity, but in different ways. The first alternative markets the landscape to maintain family households. Locals (marketers) have an emotional attachment to the landscape (commodity) (L2, L3, L13, L22, V2) that prevents the marketer-commodity relationship from becoming impersonal and fully business-like. The second alternative markets the landscape to benefit the municipality as well as external wind energy investors. The municipality contradicts the ethical code, because it depersonalises interactions through bureaucracy. At the same time, the municipality becomes unreliable because it still administrates based on personal relationships (L10, L24, P16), which do, however, bring locals closer to the ethical code. In addition, locals treat external wind energy investors as uninterested in Amorgian life and alien to Amorgian culture (L26, L27). As a result, locals choose the first alternative, because they are familiar with the ethical wrongdoing experienced within tourism development and want to avoid a further decline of ethics caused by wind energy development.

The experience of ethical wrongdoing related to tourism triggers an intuitive response against wind energy development. The fact that locals experience ethical wrongdoing within the context of the tourism economy gives them a presentiment of ethical wrongdoing in the case of wind energy development, as the following statement shows:

> *Locals became rentiers by making easy money from tourism. They did not have the appropriate culture to cope with this sudden wealth. Wind farms will increase locals' rentier income. (L29)*

Locals' experience gives this presentiment the opportunity to come across, thereby stimulating the intuitive resistance to wind energy development.

The Amorgian population could also revive the agricultural economy, but the lucrative tourism economy does not leave much room for this alternative. The current socio-economic crisis makes agricultural land highly valued, in terms of a desire for self-sufficiency (V4). This, together with the fact that tourism has nearly reached its saturation point, encourages locals to revert gradually to agriculture (S29). However, locals still undervalue the revival of agricultural economy as an alternative development path, because the fabric of local institutions has created a well-established tourism economy that provides money without great effort.

5.1.2 Unwritten agreements

On Amorgos, unwritten agreements are verbal (oral) and unspoken (tacit) contracts that have structure labour relations, land transactions such as land leasing (S10), and exchange of goods and services 'at least since the 18th century' (Simos 1975: 95). For example, in the early 19th century small farmers borrowed at interest from the Monastery of Chozoviotissa and paid back the loans by making over part of their land, relying on oral contracts (Mouzakis 1995: 131). Moreover, in the early 20th century, unspoken contracts implied that locals paid the doctor in animals like a chicken, a goat or a rabbit (MacKenzie 2006: 76). Again, unwritten communal arrangements structured life in self-administrating settlements in the mid-20th century (Gavalas 1975: 106). Furthermore, in the 1960s, oral contracts regulated the windmill business. The mill-owner did not pay the mill-worker in money, but the mill-worker kept one-tenth of the produced flour for himself as a reward for his efforts (Gavalas 1975: 105).

Verbal contracts regarding land go hand in hand with a land registration that is clear to locals (P8) and unclear to outsiders such as bureaucratic agents, wind energy investors or supranational bodies like the European Commission. Locals are aware of who owns what (P8), but they cannot officially prove ownership to outsiders, because written documents do not usually exist. In cases where written documents do exist they provide outdated and unofficial evidence of land ownership (V11). Therefore, these documents are considered invalid within the municipal bureaucracy, which requires official documents in the proper form. In addition, contracting parties sometimes used to misrepresent their verbal contracts when putting them into writing, thereby causing discrepancies between the verbal contracts and the corresponding written documents. The municipal bureaucracy cannot rely upon verbal contracts and informal written documents.

Documentation of land ownership has customarily been based on the spoken word, which contrasts with the formal requirements of the municipal bureaucracy, resulting in confusion in interactions between locals and the municipality. For instance, the municipality planned to buy a field owned by a local for infrastructural development. The two parties negotiated off the record and agreed orally about the amount of money. The oral agreement proved to be insufficient, because the buying process required bureaucratic details such as field measurement data; these showed that the field was bigger than reported on paper (V11). The municipality represents the bureaucratic machinery that requires easily controllable property relations manifested in official documents, but locals, including municipal council members, are unfamiliar both with such property relations and municipal bureaucracy.

Interactions among locals usually avoid bureaucracy (S13, S19) and rely upon verbal and unspoken contracts, which support an exchange economy not evidenced in documents. For example, a herder, who does not own land, can make an oral agreement with a land-owner who does not make use of her or his land. The herder is allowed to graze animals in the fields of the land-owner for an agreed period and, in return, provides the land owner with dairy products or meat (S13, S23).[23] Likewise, a physiotherapist does not take money to treat an old man, but the old man's son — a craftsman — carries out repairs to the physiotherapist's house (S15). In the same vein, mutual help is an unspoken contract, particularly on south Amorgos. This means that fellow-villagers take mutual help for granted not only in case of emergency, but also in everyday situations (L23). When villagers get married or when a villager dies, fellow-villagers contribute to the ceremony. Furthermore, if a villager wants to fix up her or his house, fellow-villagers help in the renovation. In return for their assistance, the villager they helped will assist in the renovation of their houses or will help them in some other way when the need arises (L16). All these unwritten agreements constitute an off-the-record exchange of goods and services that cannot be monitored by outsiders.

Olive harvesting exemplifies the Amorgian exchange economy and is grounded on both verbal and unspoken contracts. In November 2012, olive harvesters invited me to participate in the olive harvest in the village of Egiali. According to verbal contracts between olive harvesters and owners of olive trees, harvesters are paid in olive oil as well as the wood from pruning (V9). The olive press owner and the harvesters agree orally about the actual billing of each pressing instead of writing the actual billing down (V7). In the course of harvest time, friends of harvesters joined our harvesting team. At the end of harvesting, the harvesters provided us with oil, although we never spoke about any kind of return for our participation (V9).

Unwritten agreements allow locals to escape legal formalism by maintaining an off-the-record exchange economy tacitly approved by the Amorgian population (T1). The example of olive harvesting shows that locals circumvent legal regulations by avoiding billing and employment contracts. Moreover, a family tourism business refuses to engage with bureaucratic procedures such as employment contracts and thus, escapes payroll costs and deductions for social insurance. Verbal and non-verbal communication among family members involves unwritten arrangements that structure the family tourism business and

[23] The herder may cultivate the provided land for animal feeding purposes but this is a less common practice.

supports off-the-record exchange not only between relatives, but also between unrelated locals. Amorgians do not question the tacit approval of unwritten agreements to avoid perturbing the economic order and damaging their reputation (P15).

Locals are accustomed to unwritten agreements and officially invalid documents and this impede wind energy development, which requires bureaucratic procedures such as written contracts between wind energy investors and the municipality. In addition, the siting of wind-power plants requires a system of land registration that is clear both to wind energy investors and bureaucratic agents such as the local forestry inspection office. Furthermore, wind energy investors approach the Amorgian population by means of written proposals that address bureaucratic mechanisms such as municipal council meetings. Finally, unwritten agreements are necessary for the coherence of the entire fabric of local institutions that counters wind energy development.

5.1.3 Familism

On Amorgos, the family unit steers familism, which I define as a system of codes of conduct that shapes family affairs by giving family members an advantage over external agents such as state authorities and transnational companies. The institution of familism not only structures interactions on contemporary Amorgos, but characterises the whole of Greek society.

Familism on Amorgos partly has its roots in the Greek triptych "fatherland, religion, family", which, according to Simos (1975: 71-103), has shaped Amorgian identity. This triptych originates in the Greek financial crisis of the late 19th century and finds expression in the attempt of Orthodox Christians to protect the Greek ethnos from modernisation at the beginning of the 20th century (Gazi 2013: 701). At that time, feminist ideas, Marxist concepts and scientific theories such as Darwinism threatened traditional family and religious values (Gazi 2013: 702). Orthodox Christianity responded to such threats by advocating morality and amalgamating Greek mores with the Greek language (Gazi 2009: 289). Hence, Greek patriotism evolved into a linguistic nationalism. Furthermore, Orthodox Christians regarded the ideal traditional family as the guardian of property against the threat of socialism (Gazi 2013: 704). As a result, the triptych "fatherland, religion, family" was associated with the concepts of language, morals and property. On Amorgos, these concepts have acquired new connotations reflecting cultural, ethical and family imperatives accordingly.

The Greek triptych "fatherland, religion, family" omitted the idea of the state, while it entrenched the dominance of the family unit. It incorporated the idea of nation (fatherland) associated with cultural attachment to the land of Greece (patriotism), whereas it ignored the idea of the bureaucratic state that requires belief in authority (*Obrigkeitsgläubigkeit*) linked to obedience to hierarchy. Family networks shaped bureaucracy by appointing relatives to positions in the civil service, and family became the only means for the social and financial support of all family members (Papakostas 2001: 46, Sotiropoulos 2004a: 20) (cf. Section 4.1.1). In this regard, the contemporary Amorgian family constitutes the main economic unit, which along with the anti-state political attitude strengthens locals' hostility towards the bureaucratic state.

On the island of Amorgos, family background signifies individual characteristics and determines locals' reputations. Family members are not only the members of the nuclear family, but also relatives with the same surname. Locals feel comfortable if they can associate individuals with families they know. For example, my apartment was in a northern village and therefore, I used to spend a lot of time in the north of the island. North Amorgians were aware that my family comes from another Aegean island. However, they asked me several times about my surname to figure out my family origins. My surname meant something to them, because a family with this surname used to live in the northern village of Tholaria. Hence, my surname brought me closer to a background that was familiar to them. Moreover, I used to go to a kafenio in the south of Amorgos. Once, a man entered the kafenio, acknowledged the regular guests and stood still when he saw me. Then, the astonished man asked me: Do we know each other? The regular guests explained him that I was a friend of a local, whose surname was known to him. He was relieved to hear this and subsequently started to ask about my friend's family, which locals considered respectable (P7). My friend was regarded as a well-mannered young man and his father was highly esteemed as a retired sailor. These examples show that Amorgian society tends to classify locals according to their family background.

Family reputation is related to the Amorgian ethical code and determines the performance of familism. Family reputation affects the prestige of each family member and vice versa. Given the fact that Amorgians attach importance to virtues such as honesty, decency, modesty, philotimo[24] and benevolence, a reputable family consists of virtuous individuals

[24] Philotimo means etymologically love of honor and is associated with greatness of soul or magnanimity. For example, philotimo denotes appreciation of and admiration for heritage and ancestors.

(L11, L8). Furthermore, a reputable family honours Amorgian culture, for example, by participating in local customs and traditions (V6, V9). In addition, family reputation depends on whether family members conform to local institutions. For example, locals regard a family as dishonourable if its family members violate verbal contracts (S10). Hence, locals prioritise conformity to local institutions in order to maintain the family reputation, which is associated with family well-being.

Familism provides financial security to family members, who feel committed to supporting each other (L5). Amorgian society imposes sanctions such as bad family reputation to locals who offend common decency by neglecting family commitments. A family tourism business grants family members economic interdependence (T11) reinforcing their drive to conform to familism so as to continue benefiting from the family tourism business. Moreover, family members experience solidarity, trust, and altruism that encourage them to back each other up in safeguarding the family tourism business by ignoring bureaucratic procedures such as accurate bookkeeping. In this sense, devotion to familism allows family members to ignore bureaucracy to preserve family tourism business (T12).

Familism encouraged family members to run the family tourism business by ignoring both state and private bureaucracy. The state requires state bureaucracy such as legal regulations and regulatory agencies to control a family tourism business that requires little private bureaucracy such as bookkeeping to manage its business affairs. State bureaucracy can control family businesses through inspection of accounting records (financial audit) that, on Amorgos, takes place infrequently and randomly. Tax audits of the Special Secretary of the Greek Financial and Economic Crime Unit (S.D.O.E.) revealed that Amorgos achieved the highest level (approximately 100 percent) of tax avoidance among the Aegean islands in summer 2013 (Eleftherotypia 2013). On the other hand, state bureaucracy cannot easily monitor the Amorgian tourism business, because of its small scale and family character that allow family members to both minimise and avoid private bureaucracy.

The small scale of the Amorgian family tourism business keeps its private bureaucracy at a minimum. The limited number of family workers makes the family business flexible in terms of direct communication and speedy decision-making. In other words, a few family members can manage the family business without the time-consuming processes of private bureaucracy, such as organising formal meetings and convening decision-making bodies. The small scale of the family tourism business allows family workers to resolve labour

disputes and management problems to the benefit of family cohesion and family business profitability, which both, in turn, support familism.

The family character of the small-scale Amorgian tourism business makes it harder for bureaucrats to control it. A few family members can unequivocally cooperate off the record to interfere in the accounting records. For instance, family members can keep account books with items that are unclear to bureaucrats and with missing data. As a result, state bureaucracy cannot easily recognise book-keeping errors or spot missing accounting data.

The ethical code maintains familism by strengthening the advantage of family over bureaucracy. The ethical code avoids bureaucracy in order to maintain family well-being, which depends on a family tourism business characterised by practices such as unregistered employment (P6) and avoidance of receipts (P11). The fact that locals criticise a new village police officer for arresting a tourist entrepreneur because of unregistered employment (cf. Section 5.1.1) shows that the ethical code supports familism as against bureaucracy, represented by the police officer. Familism cherishes family well-being above all, while it ignores, firstly, the state, regarded as unable to preserve the existing family economic situation (P11) and, secondly, wind energy companies associated with the spirit of neoliberalism, which will misuse the island to the detriment of family tourism businesses (L6, L28, T9, V2). Amorgian ethics venerates familism, which ignores bureaucracy in order to support family tourism businesses, themselves threatened by the commodification of the Amorgian landscape through wind energy development (L3, L5, L24, S3).

The Amorgian family tourism business contradicts the principle of meritocracy, which is typically associated with competition between employees, who usually are emotionally independent of each other. Meritocracy incorporates the idea that employees are rewarded according to their achievements, measured by criteria such as efficiency and proficiency. Large firms such as wind energy companies tend to check regularly whether their employees meet such criteria by using their private bureaucracy, such as personnel monitoring. In contrast, family ties allow family members to manage the small-scale family business by avoiding such criteria. The everyday, trust-based personal contact of family members at home and at work renders internal control mechanisms redundant. For example, the family business lacks the performance appraisal procedures essential to the entrepreneurial organisational tool of the 20th century known as human resource management. In this sense, meritocracy is concomitant with non-family labour relations and conditions, and can foster external large firms such as wind energy companies to the detriment of familism. Finally, the

family tourism business cannot per se internalise meritocracy, because the latter pays tribute to hierarchies resulting from competition and introduces a business culture that jeopardises the family tourism business as it exists now.

5.1.4 Nepotism

This section shows that mutual support between relatives goes beyond the tourism business and finds expression in all facets of island life. Mutual support between relatives involves giving preference to family members, that is, nepotism, which is based on the following assumptions: An individual is born into a given system of familism grounded on a preset network of relatives and therefore, finds her or himself having a series of obligations with these relatives (Boissevain 1966: 22). The family does not ask its members whether they are willing to participate in the system of nepotism. In other words, the position of relatives in this system is ascribed and not achieved by joining the system voluntarily (Boissevain 1966: 22). On this basis, mutual support between relatives on Amorgos is taken for granted, and occurs, usually, regardless of whether it ignores legal rules or not. Furthermore, Boissevain (1966: 21) assumes that there is a vague correlation between what is legal and what is ethical regarding mutual support between near relatives in Sicily. The same assumption holds true for relatives on Amorgos. The fact that bureaucrats like municipal employees disregard impartiality by favouring their relatives is improper de jure, but proper according to nepotism.

On Amorgos, and presumably in several other regions worldwide, relatives have an ethical obligation to favour each other.[25] Relatives exchange goods and services off the record based on unwritten agreements (S18), and this exchange intensifies family ties. Relatives employ relatives, since they expect loyalty, which obviates costs like personnel monitoring. Relatives usually vote for their relatives independently of their political ideologies and vocational skills (S9). Voters feel obliged to support their family network, while municipal council members are bound to favour their relatives, for example, by fostering road construction in the close proximity of land owned by their relatives (S21).

Amorgians participate inescapably in nepotism, because they are socialised within nepotism. This means that they are committed to family favouritism in everyday life, and this commitment is part of the ethical code. Nepotism may weaken the rule of law, which seems less important than safeguarding the family's well-being. Nepotism serves as a substitute for

[25] For example, I was supposed to work in the Ministry of Agriculture for a close relative of my family after my studies in agronomy, because this relative had political connections that could guarantee my recruitment to the ministry.

the welfare state and a means to protect family members from unemployment, which has considerably increased during the Greek debt crisis. On Amorgos, unemployment has not increased, but the crisis makes locals feel uneasy (S16, V4) because of its effects, as reflected in the following statement:

> *The crisis damages small businesses. Everybody talks about paying taxes, promoting meritocracy, becoming competitive. This is nonsense. This is the recipe for our exploitation and their profit. (T9)*

5.1.5 Villagism

I define villagism as a system of codes of conduct that structures interactions among fellow-villagers on behalf of the village or of neighbouring villages that share a common village identity. On Amorgos, the isolation of self-sufficient village settlements until the 1970s strengthened village identities and prevented the creation of a strong island identity (S17, S23). Consequently, contemporary Amorgos is comprised of villages that differ in cultural imperatives and economic interests (L21, 23, S29).

The following example elucidates the way villagism functions on Amorgos: The district of Egiali has the most tourism on the island. The misoperation of the sewage treatment facility in the harbour village had resulted in a smelly and polluted coastline, thereby jeopardising the attractiveness of north Amorgos to tourists. The improvement of the sewage treatment facility had been debated for a long time. Municipal budget deficits meant that the improvement could not be undertaken, because the reconstruction permit required costly and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. Consequently, villagers connived at evading bureaucracy in order to proceed with the reconstruction (P15, T1), enjoying the tacit consent of all northern villages as well as of the municipality. At the time of the reconstruction, the mayor of the island came from North Amorgos, which means that the constituency of his political union came generally from villages in the north (T1). Thus, north Amorgians expected the mayor to favour their villages. The mayor, together with those municipal council members who supported his political party, encouraged the reconstruction by directing the municipal council to avoid bureaucratic procedures. In particular, the municipal council avoided applying for the reconstruction permit and putting the reconstruction issue on the agenda of municipal council meetings. This tacit approval of unbureaucratic practices

is a manifestation of villagism that ultimately safeguards the family tourism businesses of north Amorgians.

Villagism finds expression in the attempt of fellow-villagers to conform to village opinion. Village opinion determines what is good or bad for village well-being as well as for the preservation of village identity (P4). Villagers who ignore village opinion, typically, fall in their fellow-villagers' esteem and therefore, tend to avoid conflicts which might damage their reputation within the village (P12). This means that villagers who approve of wind energy development tend, however, to conform to the village opinion that disapproves of such a development.

Village opinion influences decision-making at municipal level. For example, tourist entrepreneurs in the village of Katapola were divided in two opposing parties in dispute about the potential construction of a yachting marina in the village harbour. Supporters of the existing low-impact tourism quarrelled with proponents of the yachting marina, which would have encouraged more lucrative tourism. The district council of Katapola approached the yachting marina with scepticism, thereby prompting village opinion to disapprove of the construction. Most villagers of Katapola voted for the mayor's political party, because the president of the district council was related to the mayor (V4). On this basis, the mayor and those municipal council members who supported his political party persuaded the municipal council to reject the construction. Thus, the supporters of low-impact tourism managed to prevail over the proponents of the yachting marina, which might have endangered small-scale family tourism businesses.

Fellow-villagers have a sense of belonging to the village community by identifying with the village landscape, which relates to the village economy (S16). The tourism economy of northern and central villages is based on the commodification of a landscape hitherto untouched by industrialisation. The agricultural economy of southern villages is based on the use of a landscape hitherto untouched by both industrialisation and tourism. In this respect, the identity of northern and central villages conflicts with wind energy development, while the identity of southern villages conflicts with both wind energy and tourism development. Preservation of different village identities gives rise to conflicting village opinions. Supply of tourist services and facilities in northern villages reaches saturation point at the peak of the tourist season, resulting in the incapacity of northern villages to meet tourism demand. As a result, central villages attract additional tourism flows and southern villages become tourist destinations. This increasing tourism demand pressures southern villages into

adapting to tourism development (L23). In view of this pressure, southern villages come into conflict with northern villages in an effort to preserve their agricultural landscape from three main effects of tourism.

Firstly, tourism affects the landscape of south Amorgos, because tourists staying in northern and central villages usually travel all over the island. The non-touristic southern villages attract tourists, precisely, because of their non-touristic reputation, which is grounded on their agricultural landscape. However, the bathing beaches and archaeological sites on south Amorgos are supposed to be accessible by car. Thus, the tourism economy of northern and central villages is accompanied by road construction on south Amorgos.

Secondly, tourism development causes villagers of south Amorgos to reconcile themselves to unfamiliar circumstances. This means that the increasing tourist demand affords them new opportunities for tourism investment, thereby confusing them in the following way:

> *Now, south Amorgians are lost. They do not know which kind of way to choose: Tourism or farming? Things evolve rapidly. In the past, things were occurring more slowly. Kato Meria is losing its culture and its language. (T7)*

On Amorgos, tourism business implies getting rich very quickly, and it is this sudden wealth that arouses the feelings of unease (L11, T12). Locals relate high income from tourism to social isolation and general ethical degeneration (L19, L21, L23). Consequently, locals in villages in the south regard the opportunity to earn money by engaging in the tourism business as incompatible with their peasant identity, which brings them closer to their ethical code (L21, T7).

Thirdly, northern and central villages are the most populous villages of the island, meaning that these villages have the most voters, who typically vote for their fellow-villagers. This implies that most municipal council members comes from northern and central villages and are usually engaged in the tourism business, which determines not only the economy of these villages, but the whole Amorgian economy. Thus, most municipal council members tend to safeguard their economic interests by influencing municipal decision-making in favour of the tourist-oriented northern and central villages (L20, P14). On this basis, in municipal affairs, matters concerning southern villages dwindle in importance compared with those concerning northern and central villages, which keep the island economy going. In this respect, the majority of the municipal council cares less about the preservation of the agricultural landscape of southern villages. Consequently, whenever the issue of potential

wind energy development appears on the agenda, the municipal council can imagine such a development mainly on south Amorgos (L23, V8). Municipal council members from southern villages try to exercise influence over the municipal council to rule out such an option. At the same time, the municipal council takes into account that alternative tourism flourishes on Amorgos at least in part, because of the non-touristy as well as the non-industrial character of south Amorgos.

Villagism preserves the village identity, which is accompanied by the link between village landscape and village economy. Given that Amorgos consists of several villages with diverse identities there are distinct kinds of villagism for every single village. Villagism is reflected in the tacit consent among villagers in the case of the sewage treatment facility or in village opinion steered by practices of familism and nepotism in the case of the yachting marina. Moreover, villagism finds expression in the effort of the southern villages to preserve their peasant identity attributed to the particular cultural imperatives of south Amorgos. Villagism arouses a feeling of solidarity shared by fellow-villagers, and functions as a means of coping with the option of wind energy development, which challenges village identity.

5.1.6 Political clientelism

On Amorgos, political clientelism refers to the patron-client relationship between state agents such as the Public Power Corporation (PPC) branch or the municipality and locals (V5). Greek political parties have made use of state agents to procure employment for locals, who in return voted for those parties. Some locals have been employed in the civil service through their personal relationship with influential people or acquaintances (V5). Influential people are non-locals directly affiliated with political parties, and acquaintances are non-locals who act as intermediaries between influential people and locals. Patron-client relationships between the municipality and locals also involve mutual favouritism between municipal council members (patrons) and locals (clients) (L24, L28, S11), that is, between locals.

The PPC benefits locals as follows: The PPC branch employs around ten locals and this employment ensures a considerable number of Amorgian families a definite income given that familism and nepotism includes numerous relatives helping each other (L28). In addition, the PPC provides low electricity prices to its employees (T11) and offers special tariffs to farmers and families with more than three children (Iliadou 2009: 84) (cf. Subsection 4.1.3.2). Amorgians get a lot out of these tariffs, since some locals are farmers,

others are registered as farmers (cf. Subsection 4.2.2.1), and a lot of Amorgian families have more than three children. Moreover, the PPC grants reduced tariffs to all Amorgians, characterising them as vulnerable customers (Kelemenis 2012: 496).

In the case of wind farms on Amorgos, the PPC would have to upgrade the grid to absorb superfluous wind energy electricity. The PPC has no interest in upgrading the grid, since such an action might attract private investors, jeopardising its monopoly (cf. Section 4.2.4). Furthermore, the PPC branch would have to supply only about a third of the existing electricity demand of the island if wind farms were to supply Amorgos with electricity (conversations with energy experts, cf. Subchapter 3.5). This would mean that the PPC branch would have to reduce the electrical output of its power station, resulting in a reduction of jobs that could damage Amorgian economy. Consequently, wind energy development damages the patron-client relationship between PPC and locals by unsettling the function of the PPC as patron. In this regard, the PPC, the PPC branch employees and the entire Amorgian population have a vested interest in securing the PPC monopoly and resisting wind energy development.

Patron-client relationships between municipality and locals allow locals to maintain familism by making the municipality unreliable for two reasons. Firstly, locals mistrust state agents that abolish meritocracy to favour their constituency (S28, V5). This means that locals mistrust the municipality, which tends to treat them on the basis of mutual favouritism between municipal council members and locals (i.e. nepotism). Secondly, locals mistrust municipal council members who fail to favour their voters, for example, by neglecting their promise to promote road construction in the close proximity of land owned by their voters. Consequently, locals ignore the municipality and rely on familism to assure family livelihood (L7).

5.1.7 Religious clientelism

Religious clientelism refers to the patron-client relationship between local clergy (patron) and locals and the municipality, both acting as clients. The local clergy embodies local religious authorities including churches and chapels represented by priests as well as the Monastery of Chozoviotissa represented by monks, all belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church (GOC).

Amorgian religious clientelism is linked to the decisive role of the GOC in both the Greek political landscape and social life. The following factors explain this role: Firstly, the GOC

interferes in political affairs based on its economic power, which derives from its large fortune mainly in real estate. For example, the GOC has opposed reforms aimed at taxing church property (Sotiropoulos 2012: 21), and the clergy managed to claim privileges instituted for civil servants (Mavrogordatos 2003: 121) such as high lifelong income. Secondly, the GOC enjoys great popularity associated with religious fanaticism that characterises a considerable segment of Greek society. Religious fanaticism is associated with the fact that Greek people often perceive the GOC as their protection from westernisation and imperialism (Mavrogordatos 2003: 133). The state is aware of these factors and thus, seeks to remain in good standing with the GOC.

The Monastery of Chozoviotissa is an essential representative of the GOC primarily because of the land and very valuable archaeological items it owns (P3, S5, V12). The electrification of the monastery in 1966 constitutes an example of its powerful position: The monastery is located on the edge of the district of Chora (cf. Figure 4-2 in Section 4.2.1). Both the monastery and the village of Chora have been built in the traditional Cycladic architecture that is protected by law. Spatial development in areas with traditional buildings and settlements is strictly limited and has to follow guidelines concerning the Cycladic architectural style. Despite legal provisions, cable and overhead transmission lines as well as wooden electricity pylons accompanied the electrification not only of Chora, but also of all traditional settlements on the island. This means that electrification took place regardless of spatial planning rules, causing visual intrusiveness as well as anxiety about possible harmful effects of living near electricity pylons (L7, L22, PHa5, PHb2). In contrast, the monastery exerted its influence to avoid such chaotic electrification. Underground electric cables were laid, while electricity pylons are absent in close proximity to the monastery, which is now the only Amorgian built location without visible signs of electrification (P11, PHc1).

The popularity and influence of the monastery go along with its unprivileged and altruistic image. In 1952, the Greek state introduced forced land alienation to distribute monastic land to landless locals (Royal Decree 217/1952, Law 2185/1952). The monastery was entitled to a considerable amount of financial compensation for the compulsory expropriation of 7.4 hectares (ha) of monastic arable land and 6.9 ha of monastic pasture land (Royal Decree 217/1952, Law 2185/1952). The compensation issue has not become public, thereby giving the impression of a monastery exploited by the state. In the course of time, locals such as the former landless were afflicted with modern diseases such as cancer. Rumours started that God was punishing them for appropriating monastic land (P1, S5). These rumours indicate

pro-monastery attitudes that lose their validity if the monastery fails to fulfil its function as patron.

The Monastery of Chozoviotissa has maintained patron-client relationships with locals since the 18th century (Mouzakis 1995: 130). In the 19th century, the monastery gained wealth by enabling locals to remedy their precarious financial situation. In particular, the monastery granted credits at interest to small farmers, who were in financial distress, and who repaid the credits by providing the monastery with land or money (Mouzakis 1995: 131). In the 20th century, the monastery distributed part of its land to poor locals, whose religiosity and devotion to the monastery increased in the wake of the land distribution. In the last three decades, the monastery has exchanged land for services such as connectivity improvement and commodities such as agricultural products (S5).

On Amorgos, priests act as intermediaries between Greek political parties and locals. Thus, priests act at the same time as patrons of locals and as clients of political parties. Greek political parties (patrons) favour priests (clients), since they aim at being on good terms with the GOC. Priests (patrons) use their connections with political parties to assist locals (clients) as for instance, to facilitate a locals' public appointment (S28). In return, priests expect locals to provide certain services, such as the preservation of chapels, organising traditional religious ceremonies, and sponsoring churches and chapels (S28).

The monks of the monastery act as patrons in various different ways that strengthen the influential role of the monastery. The latter distributes land to locals on condition that they use the land only for farming (S13). In return, locals provide the monastery with minimal amounts of money or with few agricultural products. Monks and locals agree tacitly that the distributed land remains in the possession of the families that initially acquired the land (P16). In addition, monks connive at the fact that a few of these families have used the land to build houses and tourist apartments (S13). The monastery also allocates land to the municipality, which typically uses the land for the development of infrastructure.[26] Consequently, the monastery raises its reputation, which allows monks to exert influence to its benefit.

Monks can exercise influence over decisions of the municipal council to the benefit of the monastery. Generally, the monastery is in favour of the municipality promoting road construction in close vicinity to monastic property (S3, V4). Such a construction may also

[26] Such development includes inter alia construction of school buildings, sports fields and playgrounds. However, the municipality usually postpones development of infrastructure because of its budget deficits.

favour locals whose property is adjacent to monastic property (L3, S21). The municipal council decides on infrastructural planning, including issues of road construction (P14). Municipal council meetings are open to the public (P14). However, monks do not attend the meetings, because they conform to public opinion, which regards them as responsible only for religious matters, and therefore, ineligible for interfering openly in politics (S12). For the same reason, monks avoid personal contact with municipal council members (P5, P9, P16). As a result, monks use locals such as those who will also benefit from the road construction as their intermediaries to influence municipal council meetings indirectly (P14, AD2). These intermediaries will have a personal relationship with municipal council members or relatives and friends who have connections within the municipal council. Consequently, locals acting as intermediaries on behalf of the monastery influence municipal decision-making by means of political clientelism and nepotism.

The Monastery of Chozoviotissa is one of the main Amorgian tourist attractions, and thus, owes its function as patron largely to its paramount importance to tourism. The monastery attracts religious tourism that constitutes an inseparable part of the Amorgian tourism in general (S5, V12). Moreover, it is the only tourist attraction that serves the undeveloped year-round tourism, and a candidate site for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World heritage List (V1). In this sense, the monastery supports family tourism businesses and therefore, locals tend to maintain good relations with the monastery.

Conflicts between monks and locals due to potential wind energy development cannot easily arise, because religious clientelism serves the tourism economy. Construction of wind farms is accompanied by road construction that spoils the landscape and may facilitate building of tourist apartments far away from the current village settlements (L8, L17, S22). In this regard, road construction has unpredictable effects on low-impact tourism, and accordingly, on small-scale family tourism businesses as shown in the following examples:

> *Wind farms require big roads that will ruin the landscape. They will harm alternative tourism. I cannot easily go on foot to the Chapel of Theologos and so could ask for a road, but the beauty of Theologos is to walk or to go by donkey. Why do we have to build a road to go to Theologos? (S3)*

> *Some believe that Amorgos needs more roads; others think that the absence of roads attracts alternative tourism. Roads mean more cars, more parking areas and more petrol stations and this is not sustainable. (S19)*

Monks support construction of roads that lead to the monastery, which is currently accessible on foot and by donkey (V4, PHc1). At the same time, monks disapprove of installation of wind farms close to the monastery, because wind farms spoil the monastic landscape and jeopardise religious tourism (L19). If monks (patrons) approve wind energy development, they may achieve construction of roads that lead to the monastery, while they may disappoint locals (clients) who depend on religious and alternative tourism. This could damage the patron-client relationship between monks and locals that involves off-the-record exchange of goods and services that supports family well-being. Therefore, monks (patrons) oppose wind energy development, which might affect their clients (locals).

5.1.8 Ethical clientelism

Ethical clientelism refers to clientelist relations between locals who are not relatives and who favour each other, for example, through the off-the-record exchange of goods and services. Almost every local bears such a clientelist relation to another unrelated local. Amorgian ethics determine whether individual performance within this relationship is laudable or condemnable.

Ethical clientelism gives an egalitarian sense to clientelism, because it treats patrons and clients equally. For example, locals involved in the off-the-record exchange of goods and services are expected to stand by their unwritten agreements that regulate this exchange, maintaining their reputation by keeping their word (S10, S13). Their clientelist relationship and the type of their agreement are well known to local society. If locals break these agreements, they damage their reputations and also the reputation of their family. In other words, it is a matter of honour for both parties to keep to the agreement, in order to protect their financial and social status.

In the eyes of external observers such as bureaucrats (e.g. tax inspectors) or several scientific researchers clientelism per se appears as immoral, independent of the context and the parties involved. On the other hand, locals do not perceive clientelism per se as immoral. On Amorgos, clientelism becomes unethical if it unsettles the ordinary run of things, such as the operation of familism that is determined by the ethical code (L10, S10, V8). Unethical clientelist practices are those which counter existing local institutions and favour some locals to the detriment of others (P6, S10). For instance, locals regard clientelist relationships between municipal council members as improper if these relations threaten family tourism businesses maintained by familism (L1, L24).

5.1.9 The patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members

On Amorgos, the patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members has emerged only once, at the very beginning of the municipal administration. Such relationships may create a local élite detrimental to low-impact tourism, thereby inducing locals to resist wind energy development.

The only time a wind energy company obtained the approval of the municipal council for the installation of one wind-power plant on south Amorgos was in 2000, when the wind energy company bribed municipal council members (V8). Succeeding municipal councils obstructed the construction of this plant by legal means, but without informing the local population about the issue. This happened because a municipal council member held his position as council member despite taking a bribe. Thus, he supported the obstruction of the construction to prevent the issue from reaching the public for fear that locals might get at the truth (AD2). The case became public in 2012, at the time when the wind energy company proceeded with the construction (V8). Subsequently, the municipality brought the investors before the court and impeded the construction again.

Wind energy investors acted as patrons, promoting their project by favouring some municipal council members, who acted as clients by profiting from influencing other council members for the benefit of the investors. This patron-client relationship results in the consolidation of political and economic power in the hands of very few locals (favoured municipal council members) who make up a local élite. Locals prevent the creation of a local élite — meaning a political élite with economic power — for the following reasons:

Firstly, locals feel anxious about the potential effects of economic prosperity on the ethical code. They are afraid that a local élite would intensify ethical degeneration, because their experience has shown that easy money from tourism goes along with ethical degeneration (L19, L21, L22, L27). Secondly, a local élite strengthens the hierarchy imposed by the municipality for bureaucratic purposes. The municipal bureaucracy constitutes a construct of hierarchy per se, because it entails a hierarchical tree, which designates one local as mayor, others as municipal council members and others as presidents of district councils. As against this, the family tourism business treats municipal council members as locals devoted to the tourism economy and not as politicians committed to a hierarchy of authority. Thirdly, locals are afraid that a local élite might encourage large-scale investments such as big hotels, yachting marinas and wind farms (L12, P16), and might influence municipal council

meetings to support such investments (V4, V8). This means that a local élite might trigger wind energy development that would threaten low-impact tourism and accordingly small-scale family tourism businesses.

5.2 Local habits versus wind energy development

5.2.1 Contesting the existence and function of the state

The habit of contesting the state characterises Greek society as a whole and finds expression in the refusal of the state in its entirety, and not only of the government (Kalyvas 2010: 354). Anti-statism in Greece has its roots in longstanding political disorder owing to successive authoritarian regimes that date back to the 15th century, when the Ottomans captured Athens in 1458. Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832, but the political disorder continued with the Greco-Turkish War, also known as the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1919-1922), and lasted until 1974, when Greece recovered its political stability after the Greek Military Junta of 1967-1974. The Metaxas Dictatorship (1936-1940), the occupation of Greece by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (1941-1944), and the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) account for the political disorder of the period 1922-1967. The Greek dictatorial regimes constituted right-wing/conservative regimes with fascist tendencies, which preached the Greek-Christian ideal through anti-communist and anti-parliamentary polemics[27] (Sarandis 1993: 161, Danopoulos 1983: 501). In general, all the authoritarian regimes that characterise the Greek political history have brought most of Greek society to treat the state as an enemy.

Political disorder at national level influenced Amorgian society. Amorgians adopted an anti-state attitude in a variety of ways that correspond to different political epochs. Firstly, Amorgians resisted the state imposed by the Ottoman Empire (Simos 1975: 98). Secondly, the Metaxas dictatorship represented an oppressive state that provoked anti-state sentiments shared by Greek leftists. During this dictatorship, Greek leftists took refuge on Amorgos and mainly in Chora, already characterised by a left-wing political culture (Palaiologopoulos 2005: 17). Thirdly, Amorgos was a place of exile during the Greek Civil War (Pettifer 2000) as well as during the Greek Military Junta (Kouloukountis 2012). Amorgians sympathised with the left-wing ideology of the exiled partisans, who were mainly communist political

[27] The nationalism of the Greek dictatorial regimes (Greek Military Junta and Metaxas Dictatorship) found expression in the Greek-Christian ideal. According to this ideal, the Greeks are the inheritors of the world's most perfect civilisation and the only ones who enjoy God's favour (Danopoulos 1983: 491). To propagate their nationalism the Greek dictatorial regimes regarded communism and parliamentarism as evils concomitant with class struggle and individualism (Sarandis 1993: 149, 161).

prisoners. The left-wing ideology of that time (1946-1974) regarded the state as an oppressive regime (Panourgiá 2009) and thus, engendered an anti-state attitude that still characterises Amorgian society (P12).

The political turmoil of the 20th century did not leave room for development on the small remote island of Amorgos. Locals thought of development as secondary education, electrification and a telecommunications network (Stratoudakis 1975: 48). The central state failed to support the development of communes, which had to rely on self-governing mechanisms (cf. Subsection 4.2.3.1). In the aftermath of the Greek Military Junta, locals complained that the Greek state prevented development on Amorgos by treating it as merely a place of exile (Stratoudakis 1975: 48, Sigalas 1975: 176).

The failure of the state to foster development strengthened the anti-state attitude, resulting in further lack of trust between locals and the state. Thus, locals question the very existence of the state by remonstrating against the fact that some Amorgian land is the property of the state (L18). In particular, they argue that the whole Amorgian land belongs to the Amorgian population and not to the state. Locals scorn the Greek state which still fails to address local issues such as lack of public healthcare (P2, S2) as well as water shortages exemplified as follows:

> *A delegate ordered a coffee in a kafenio in a southern Amorgian village. The kafenio owner offered the delegate a cup of coffee powder with sugar. As the delegate expressed surprise, the kafenio owner answered: You have to bring the water. (P12)*

Thus, locals have formed the habit of contesting the state, since it has remained indifferent to their needs and interests for more than 60 years.

Locals' habit of contesting the state finds expression in their tendency to contest state entities and agents such as legislation, bureaucracy and officialdom, both on Amorgos and in general. Accordingly, locals avoid paying taxes, neglect municipal directives and disregard police officers (P6, P11, P14, T2, T14). Locals accept their contestation of state entities and agents, since they regard it as reasonable (P11). This means that locals back each other by not reporting each other to the police or to tax inspectors. Amorgian society shames locals who act as informers. Such a shameful act damages the reputation of informers and impugns their family honour. Moreover, locals may exclude informers from public matters and business affairs. Thus, locals who undermine the contestation of bureaucracy by acting as informers also damage their own family businesses. In this way, the tendency to contest the

state strengthens familism that supports family tourism businesses by gaining an advantage over the state.

5.2.2 Mistrusting the municipal bureaucracy

Locals have formed the habit of mistrusting the municipal bureaucracy. This habit results from locals' tendency to trust the administrative system of communes. Communes made use of very few bureaucratic procedures, because they were based on personal daily interactions among fellow-villagers (S2, S5, S25), strengthened by the remoteness of the small Amorgian villages. Lack of bureaucracy discouraged authority relationships. A hierarchical structure within the context of administrative affairs is connoted with persons being represented as "above" or "below" within the administrative hierarchy. Fellow-villagers did not consider members of the commune council as representatives from above and the kafenio constituted a casual meeting place. The strength of personal relationships through daily, face-to-face, off-the-record contact did not leave room for the emergence of authority relations among fellow-villagers (folk literature). The commune council did not have the qualities of a council of elders. However, fellow-villagers attributed the qualities of elders to the head of the commune council, who was somehow regarded as a wise person appointed to administrate village affairs (S5, S7). For example, he would be asked to intervene in conflicts or to deal with central state authorities (folk literature). In this sense, the village population did not assign commune council members to hierarchical levels. The administration of communes treated non-members and members of the commune council as fellow-villagers without internalising authority relations.

The administrative reform introduced in 2000 (cf. Subsection 4.2.3.2) transferred power from the communes to the municipality, thereby reducing the level of trust between locals and the administrative authority. The administration of the municipality is supposed to introduce authority relations by drawing a distinction, firstly, between municipal council members and the rest of locals, and secondly, between members of the municipal council meeting, as follows:

Locals are supposed to trust municipal council members, who are not usually their fellow-villagers or their relatives. Locals and municipal council members do not have the daily personal contact that commune council members had with their fellow-villagers some of whom were also their family members (S2, S5). In addition, the municipality involves a low level of trust between members of the municipal council meeting, given that they come from

different villages and are not close relatives, in contrast to members of the commune council meeting, who were fellow-villagers and often relatives. For example, the municipal council assigns district council members of districts with little tourism to the bottom of the hierarchical tree embedded in the municipal administration, because of the economically uninfluential role of these districts (AD2, P14).

Locals are used to trusting the system of communes, although this was alien to the Weberian bureaucracy imposed by the municipality system. As a result, they tend to mistrust the municipality, which is supposed to formalise and depersonalise interactions by introducing authority relations that disregard daily personal contact between family members as well as between fellow-villagers. Trusting relatives and fellow-villagers together with mistrusting the municipality means that locals expect municipal council members to favour their relatives and fellow-villagers. Consequently, in the case of wind energy development, locals suspect that the municipality would distribute municipal revenues from wind farms to the advantage of municipal council members, meaning to the benefit of their relatives and fellow-villagers (L7, L10, L24, L28).

This tendency to mistrust the municipal bureaucracy prevents wind energy companies from investing on Amorgos. A wind energy project needs to obtain the approval of the municipality in order to get the Environmental Terms Approval (ETA) that grants the installation and operation license (cf. Subsection 4.1.3.1). Thus, the wind energy company applies to the municipal council to obtain its approval, and the municipality convenes a meeting to decide on the proposal. The wind energy company constitutes an external private investor that bears no relationship to the local population (L9, L20). Thus, the municipality has to proceed bureaucratically to act as intermediary between locals and the wind energy company. However, locals are unwilling to authorise the municipality to act as intermediary, as they do not trust it (L3, L10, L15).

As locals have experienced the municipal council as unreliable, they intuitively resist municipal involvement, particularly, in large-scale development issues. The patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members (cf. Section 5.1.9) intensifies locals' tendency to mistrust the municipal bureaucracy. This relationship has made locals hostile to wind energy development and has also shaken their already low confidence in the municipal council. Locals also mistrust the municipal bureaucracy, because the municipal council has neglected its promise to deal with problems such as water shortages and lack of medical care (P2, P12, S2, S17). In this regard, locals intuitively try to

prevent the municipal bureaucracy from dealing with the wind energy issue, because of their "bad" experience with the municipal council.

5.2.3 Making judgments outside the context of the municipality

5.2.3.1 Unanticipated discussion

Locals have acquired the habit of avoiding socialising with other locals within the framework of the municipality. They rather tend to meet and chat much in the same way as they did at the time of administration by communes. At that time, the shoemaker's shop, the barbershop and the kafenio were the places for discussing politics and gossiping (Gavalas 1975: 109). Casual meetings in the kafenio enabled villagers to talk about and decide on issues, thus avoiding bureaucracy. Under administration by communes, the governance structure was extraneous to decision-making practices characterised by legal formalism, and was principally grounded on personal (face-to-face) daily meetings that used to take place off the record.

Nowadays, locals habitually discuss both private and public matters on the street, in the church, in kafenia, in taverns and corner shops as well as in courtyards (P13). For example, during my lunch in a tavern, I happened to overhear the conversation of two locals sitting at the next table. They were arguing that the municipal council should generally exclude green energy issues from the agenda. Another local came over and joined the conversation. Subsequently, two more locals joined the group, which went on to discuss local politics (V10). The group round the table neither planned to meet in the tavern nor intended to discuss a particular issue. In the same vein, locals meet in kafenia with the intention of socialising, which can accidentally evolve into discussion about a particular issue. In this respect, locals reflect on and discuss local issues at unplanned gatherings that take place outside the context of the municipality.

Socialising outside the context of the municipality lays the groundwork for off-the-record judgment that sways public opinion and affects municipal council meetings. The official character of the municipality contrasts with the familiar atmosphere of places like kafenia and taverns, where locals discuss freely and make their judgements unconstrained by bureaucracy (P5, P9, P15, V10). In such places, locals feel comfortable talking and arguing, while being aware that their discussions influence municipal council meetings. Municipal council members are also locals who go to kafenia and taverns, and who happen to meet other locals on the street, in the supermarket or in the bakery. Off-the-record conversations

between locals and municipal council members determine the arguments of the latter at municipal council meetings. By avoiding municipal formalities, locals tend to influence municipal decision-making processes by off-the-record judgment.

Off-the-record judgment disregards the municipal council meeting as a decision-making body. Thus, the municipal decision-making process turns into an incidental occurrence. Moreover, the municipal council meeting becomes irrelevant if its agenda includes the issue of wind energy development (V10). Locals tend to discuss and judge wind energy proposals without explicitly arranging meetings for this purpose (S26). Administrative law lies dawn that locals have to go through municipal bureaucracy such as municipal decision-making processes and district council meetings, but these in fact occur just for the sake of appearances, or do not occur at all, as the following statement implies:

> *Amorgians do not decide. They just do not decide, because you need to make twenty decisions before you can eventually decide. A lot of bureaucracy, time-consuming processes, many intermediaries and somebody must be bribed during the process. Therefore, they do not decide. (T2)*

In 2008, for instance, a wind energy company made a proposal for the installation of 57 wind- power plants on Amorgos (municipal meeting minutes 15/134/2008). On this occasion, all village populations started to talk off the record about the proposal, but only one district council called an assembly to discuss the proposal (S26). The option of wind farms along the mountain ridge created confusion and thus, attracted a lot of attention (L3, L14, S26). The municipal council convened a meeting to deal with this option and eventually decided to reject the proposal without giving reasons in writing (municipal meeting minutes 16/146/2008). Most discussion by locals regarding the proposal occurred informally in places like kafenia and courtyards before the municipal council meeting (S20, S26). In other words, the meeting participants had already judged the proposal before the meeting, while being aware that their judgment might influence decision-making towards rejection of the proposal.

In general, locals tend to avoid, ignore or boycott the decision-making process of the municipal council meeting when it comes to the wind energy issue (T2). This happens in three different ways: Firstly, municipal council members may exclude the wind energy topic from the agenda of the municipal council meeting, which instead focuses on personal and hence, family problems and interests (AD1). Secondly, the municipal council may include the topic on the agenda, but supersedes discussion about it during the meeting (AD1).

Thirdly, the municipal council may postpone decision-making relating to the wind energy issue (municipal meeting minutes 15/134/2008). Wind energy investors set a deadline, which gives the municipal council limited time to decide on wind energy proposals. Thus, postponement of decision-making intensifies the pressure of the deadline. Consequently, the municipal council discusses the wind energy proposal quickly and at the last moment, and makes a hasty decision to refuse wind energy development on Amorgos.

5.2.3.2 Unspoken communication

The habit of making judgments outside the context of the municipality finds expression not only in unanticipated discussions, but also in unspoken communication. This means that locals tend to share their personal sentiments regarding local issues without actually talking about these issues. Locals come across each other almost every day. Therefore, many locals know each other quite well, while some locals assume that they know each other quite well based on gossip, orally transmitted stories and memory of past events, including discussions (P3, P6). In both cases, each local believes that she or he knows the sentiments of the others, particularly regarding local issues. Consequently, locals' unspoken sharing of personal sentiments obviates the need for discussion.

Unspoken communication regarding the wind energy issue generates judgments that influence municipal decision-making. In the aftermath of a wind energy proposal, locals, including municipal council members, do not wait for the municipal council meeting to learn of each other's sentiments regarding the proposal (P3, S19). Most locals know in advance who approves and who disapproves of the installation of wind farms on Amorgos. Locals assume they know these personal sentiments and, accordingly, the outcome of the meeting before the meeting takes place, without talking about them. They do not have to talk about the wind energy issue, since they know or assume opinions related to the issue based on past unanticipated discussions. Finally, locals often avoid putting forward their opinions in order to avoid raising controversies and causing disorder, particularly concerning issues irrelevant or dangerous to family tourism businesses (P4, P14). On these grounds, municipal council members skim over the wind energy issue by arranging meetings just to show that they comply with the municipal formalities.

5.2.4 Avoiding joint action for municipal and business purposes

Locals have formed the habit of avoiding joint action as far as municipal and business affairs are concerned. This habit originates in the social organisation of self-sufficient, self-

administrating villages of the pre-Christian era (Marangou 1975: 57). From the third century BC (before Christ) until the beginning of the 20th century Amorgos was separated into three competing city-states (Marangou 1975: 62). Likewise, the 1914 administrative reform divided the island into six communes characterised by competition that triggered localism between villages (Simos 1975: 79-82). For example, development of the village of Katapola usually lagged behind that of the village of Chora, resulting in competition between Katapola and Chora (Kovaios 1975: 137). Competition strengthened localism, which hindered the emergence of a common vision and prevented a corporate feeling from evolving, thereby laying the groundwork for unwillingness to act jointly (L29, S6, S7). The 2000 administrative reform failed to abolish localism, which still precludes locals from thinking of Amorgos as an economic entity performing under the provisions of the municipality (L29). Thus, locals prefer to work on their own initiative than together, as the following quotation shows:

> *In case of fire, if you are alone, you go to all lengths to pull your butt out of the fire. If you are five people, someone faints because of the smoke, someone does not bother about the fire, someone cares only about how to save her or his own skin and only one person makes every effort to quench the fire. (S27)*

Municipal affairs require joint action since locals are supposed to come together to discuss and negotiate at municipal council meetings (P14, municipal meeting minutes 16/172/2011, 15/136/2012, AD2). However, locals tend to avoid acting jointly with respect to issues arranged by the municipality for the following reasons. Firstly, it is questionable whether various issues per se, and municipal involvement by itself, have favourable effects on family tourism businesses (L15, L25, S9, S18). Secondly, a corporate sense apt for stimulating joint action at the municipal level has not gained a foothold in Amorgian society. Consequently, the tendency to avoid joint action at the municipal level makes locals treat municipal affairs as dispensable.

Locals also tend to avoid joint action concerning business affairs, in two different ways. Firstly, they avoid encouraging external business activities such as wind energy development that requires joint action at the municipal level (S22, T2). Secondly, they avoid engaging in private joint businesses such as dairy cooperatives or wind farm associations (T4). In other words, locals avoid joint action steered by the municipality to the benefit of external investors, while they avoid coming together on their own initiative for business purposes.

Locals have failed to act jointly to launch joint businesses. For example, the 'Union of Amorgians' is a local association of non-entrepreneurial character concerned with local matters. In 1975, a Greek private investor offered the union the exploitation of the bauxite mine that operated on Amorgos from 1932 until 1940 (Metallinos 1975: 182). The offer afforded the union the opportunity to become a joint business, but the union members hesitated to act jointly for this purpose. Instead, they refused the offer on the pretext that the conversion of the union into a business enterprise constituted a tricky subject (Metallinos 1975: 188). Eventually, the union evaded the issue by calling for individuals to accept the offer (Metallinos 1975: 188).

Locals have also failed to sustain cooperatives, which collapsed mainly because cooperative members were unable to make collective decisions (T4). Almost all Amorgian agricultural cooperatives went bankrupt towards the end of the 20th century (T4). State intervention (e.g. Greek cooperative law) and political clientelism led to cooperative members' opportunistic behaviour, which has characterized Greek agricultural cooperatives since the 1930s and has resulted in organisational inefficiencies including indebtedness (Iliopoulos and Valentinov 2012: 16). Additionally, most Amorgian tourism associations went downhill, because they had been used for advancing personal interests rather than for promoting Amorgos as a tourist destination (S24). Cooperatives failed, because locals tend to avoid joint action when it comes to economic activities. Based on this tendency, joint action with the objective of wind energy development has always been out of the question.

The tendency to avoid joint action for municipal and business purposes comes along with the need to maintain family well-being. From the pre-Christian era until the 1960s Amorgian families used to live self-sufficiently in scattered village settlements up on the mountains (L4, S17). These settlements lacked hierarchical structures, thereby shaping a kind of classless unbureaucratic society (Marangou 1975: 57). In the wake of the decline of agriculture, locals moved from the mountains to the coast, where they engaged in family tourism businesses to foster family well-being (cf. Section 4.2.2 and 5.1.3). Neither tourism nor the municipal bureaucracy have stimulated locals to make combined efforts, for example, to reconstruct the network of hiking paths that attracts alternative tourism. Instead, the partial reconstruction has been a matter of individual initiative (V1). The need to maintain family well-being makes locals avoid joint business and drives them toward family-run business.

5.2.5 Being hostile to symbols associated with the state and the spirit of neoliberalism

Locals tend to be hostile to a conglomeration of industrial and technological innovations, which symbolise both state enterprises and external large-scale enterprises associated with the neoliberal economic logic. This hostility both gives rise to and arises out of locals' tendency to counter élites, hierarchies and authorities. Locals talk about Greeks' supernatural inclination to contradict authority in general (L26). Anti-authoritarian sentiments originate in the populism that has characterised the Greek politics of the late 20th century and has brought locals to perceive themselves as unprivileged in contrast to whatever they regard as privileged (cf. Section 4.1.1). Populism has directed locals against symbols associated with the Greek state and foreign powers.

On Amorgos, populism has manifested as both anti-statism and patriotism. Anti-statism concerns with the antagonism between locals and the state. Since the 1970s, locals feel disadvantaged due to the state indifference to local issues, thereby becoming hostile to the state and its symbols (L2, L7, P12, S2). Patriotism concerns with the antagonism between locals, self-identified as patriots, and a foreign power that threatens Greece. Amorgos embodies national sentiments that protect the nation from enemies such as England that seeks to keep Greece down for fear that Greeks may conquer the world (Anerousis 1975: 133). Amorgos defends the Aegean Sea from Turkish imperialism (Sigalas 1975: 176). In this sense, populism has found expression in an offender-victim relationship that labels state and foreign powers as offenders and Amorgians as their victims.

Locals intuitively resist state businesses on Amorgos based on their "bad" experience of state enterprises (L2, L7, L22). This experience shapes locals' habitual hostility not only to state enterprises, but also to external private companies that seek to invest on Amorgos. Locals regard such companies as manifestations of the spirit of neoliberalism that, like state enterprises, seek to profit by manipulating the island population (L6, L21). Locals associate such companies with North European states criticised for becoming nanny states, telling their citizens how they should breathe (L26). They distinguish themselves from the West that is primarily concerned with an unreflective production of knowledge (S6), and aims at exploiting their island through the wind energy business to help Greece cope with its current socio-economic crisis (V2).

The current crisis sharpens locals' already negative sentiments regarding external private companies, thereby intensifying resistance to wind energy development. In fear of financial insecurity, locals may fall into despair, which could force them to tolerate wind farms in order to have a share in the concomitant municipal revenues, without considering the

associated effects (V3). At the same time, locals cast doubt on whether these revenues will benefit them, because they mistrust the municipality and so, expect that the municipality will distribute them in line with nepotism and clientelism. They are also afraid that they may have to accept wind energy development as an inevitable aftermath of the crisis in the same way as they accepted electricity and telecommunications as inevitable paths towards modernisation (S26). Awareness of this scenario makes them feel uncomfortable and frustrated. Thus, the possibility of having to accept wind farms at any cost in the future makes locals hostile to wind energy proposals in the present.

Locals associate wind energy development with infrastructural development, which has adversely affected life on Amorgos. State enterprises fostered development on Amorgos that proved detrimental to the well-being of the local population (L7, L22). The Public Power Corporation (PPC) and the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) still exploit the island regardless of environmental degradation. Affected by their "bad" experience with the PPC and the OTE locals expect wind energy companies to invest without considering the effects of their investment:

> *Wind farms can have a negative impact on our life like the telecommunications antenna. What happens if the wind-power plants malfunction? And what happens after the end of their lifespan? The company may go bankrupt because of the crisis and so the plants will remain. They will be a memento for our children. (L2)*

The PPC disregarded legal provisions concerning the Cycladic architectural style, meaning that the PPC supplied Amorgos with electricity irrespective of spatial planning (L22). Thereby, electrification caused visual intrusiveness as well as anxiety owing to possible harmful effects of living near electricity pylons (L7, L22). In addition, the then state-owned OTE illegally installed a high-gain transmitting antenna near Chora — the most heavily populated village — in close proximity to the high school. This antenna threatened the health of pupils as well as locals living nearby. The OTE installed the antenna not only to draw down its benefits directly but also to serve military interests in the Aegean Sea. Locals continued to protest until the municipality transferred the antenna to a remoter district, almost 20 years after its installation (L22, PHa1, PHa2).

By the 1960s, locals had already internalised the idea that electricity and telecommunications constitute a kind of development that they could not afford to miss (L4, P8). This happened partly because the circumstances of that time promoted infrastructural development as absolutely necessary. Nowadays, locals feel used in the name of development and regret the

way state enterprises fostered infrastructural development, regardless of the regulatory framework. Thus, locals are afraid that external investors like wind energy companies may circumvent the law to realise wind energy projects, thereby affecting their life in much the same damaging way as state enterprises have done (L2, L13). Locals resist wind energy development intuitively, based on their "bad" experience with the infrastructural development promoted by state enterprises.

Locals regard wind energy companies as external private companies that make profit under the pretext that they are protecting the environment. Locals argue that wind energy companies disrespect them by suddenly pretending to care about the Amorgian natural environment (L28, V3). Besides environmental protection, wind energy companies argue that they will bring financial advantages for the municipality of Amorgos. Such companies advocate the neoliberal economic logic that implies that consumers must consume without questioning their drive for consumption, as indicated in the following statement:

> *They want to sell us the fairy tale of green development. We have to consume this technology because they have produced too much of it. (L21)*

Consumers' contemporary unbridled consumption is accompanied by the commodification of everything. In this respect, the stock of commodities such as wind-power plants has to be sold out anyway, regardless of any negative side-effects of wind farms or any possible new technologies which might replace wind-power plants (L6, L9, S9).[28] Finally, locals question the need for wind farms per se, while they feel offended by the apparent interest of wind energy companies.

The antagonism between symbols associated with the spirit of neoliberalism and Amorgian society is reflected in the clash between the interests of wind energy companies and the anxiety of locals resulting from the current Greek socio-economic crisis. Locals argue that wind energy companies want to exploit the island under the guise of sustainable development, as the following statement shows:

> *Wind energy companies will misuse the island to favour the interests of very few capitalists who want people to believe that wind farms are necessary to save the planet. You hear constantly about climate change and disasters, and you are constantly afraid. Therefore, you have to consume constantly to overcome your anxiety. (T8)*

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[28] In the same vein, the pharmaceutical market produces masses of medicines that have to be sold regardless of their health impact (L6). The pharmaceutical industry usually only withdraws health-damaging medicines from the market after they have been on the market for a very long time (L6).

Amorgian society blames symbols associated with the spirit of neoliberalism for Greece's current crisis, which they connect with the dire state of the municipal finances as well as to locals' feeling of frustration (V3, V2). Locals feel under stress, because they have suddenly realised that meritocracy and privatisation have increased in the wake of the crisis (T9). The Greek socio-economic crisis goes along with neoliberal politics that enables transnational companies like the Veolia Environment S.A. to invest on Amorgos through its subsidiary Eolfi Wind Hellas S.A. (municipal meeting minutes 15/134/2008). As a result, locals resist wind energy development, which is associated with the political economic thinking of neoliberalism (cf. Subchapter 2.4).

5.2.6 Preserving the common identity

Locals have a common identity that I define as locals' collective definition of themselves based on common experiences and influenced by the Amorgian landscape. This collective self-definition which has dominated the region for generations is embodied in its landscape (Greider and Garkovich 1994: 4). In this respect, the Amorgian landscape represents locals' common identity. This landscape symbolises a shared collective memory that goes hand in hand with Amorgian culture and makes locals feel rooted in Amorgos. Locals' collective memory refers to perceptions and experiences that convey a sense of home as well as a sense of continuity (L2, L22, V2). In this regard, the common identity represents locals' roots, ethics and visions.

In the late 1960s, this common identity started fading, owing to landscape alteration (Sigalas 1975: 175). This potential loss of common identity upset locals, who felt a need to preserve the collective memory (Kovaios 1975: 136). The Amorgian landscape has been spoiled by both abandonment of agriculture and free-ranging animal husbandry (cf. Subsection 4.2.2.1). The dry stonewalls that used to support terraces have broken down owing to the abandonment of terrace cultivation and the free-range husbandry system, resulting in soil erosion that increases the danger of flooding. The wind-mills that used to grind grain into flour have been abandoned and remain out of repair (PHa3). The network of paved paths that used to connect village settlements, terraced fields and fishing ports have been abandoned, apart from the main paths, which, currently, locals try to preserve owing to their importance for alternative tourism. Locals spoiled their landscape by acting passively. This means that locals let their landscape deteriorate by not actively influencing it (L1, L25). As a result, the landscape has become rugged and barren, thereby failing to correspond to locals' collective memory. The abandonment of agriculture and the concomitant landscape spoliation caused a

trauma that was associated with the fear of loss of the common identity (L2, S16, T7). Consequently, locals started to get into the habit of preserving the common identity by opposing whatever intruded into the Amorgian landscape.

Locals tended to resist development paths towards modernisation such as infrastructural development, which began subsequent to the transition from agriculture to tourism. In the early 1970s, locals rejected the construction of a road from the Monastery of Chozoviotissa to the chapel of Profitis Ilias, because it might spoil the majesty and numinous quality of the rocky landscape (Oikonomidis 1975: 173, V4). In the early 1990s, when the asphalt road in the northern village of Potamos was under construction, a villager destroyed parts of the construction during the night, arguing that such development spoils the Amorgian environment and adversely affects society. The next morning he was appealing against the imminent modernisation, while holding a gun to the construction crew (T3). In the late 1990s, a shepherd prevented the operation of the telecommunications antenna in the southern village of Arkesini, because the antenna was near his house and his goats. The shepherd told the telecommunications company that, if it did not remove the antenna, he would destroy it to prevent the company from ruining his village and his life (T3).

The tourism economy made locals treat the common identity with indifference. Locals started to feel confused and unable to define themselves (L19, L29), because tourism offended Amorgian ethics and slightly altered the landscape by fostering modernisation, reflected in consumption of technology products, road construction, and development of coastal villages (S19, S22). Road construction went along with the abandonment of donkeys as a means of transportation. Electrical pylons accompanied the electrification of the whole island and high-gain transmitting antennas that served telecommunication and military purposes were installed. The increasing construction of vacation apartments from the 1990s until the first signs of the Greek financial crisis in 2010 has been anarchic, particularly in the first years of tourism development, and has usually not reflected the architecture of traditional Amorgian dwellings (Kovaios 1975: 136, Sigalas 1975: 175). Expansion of village settlements occurred particularly in the harbour villages, and is generally regarded as a deleterious intervention in the Amorgian landscape.

Tourism relied on the commodification of the rugged and barren landscape that is still perceived as unspoiled by large-scale development (L11, L24). Therefore, tourism made locals keep the landscape almost untouched by both industrialisation and technologization. The tourism business resulted in sudden wealth accompanied by ethical degeneration (L1,

L11, L21, L23). Locals became detached from their peasant roots by treating their landscape merely as a commodity through focusing on how to get more money with less work (L29). In this sense, locals re-experienced the abovementioned trauma and this strengthened their habit of preserving the common identity.

In the wake of recognising the gradual disappearance of the common identity, a few locals start to incorporate both culture and farming into their everyday life. In this respect, they revert to religious life and remain devoted to village customs and traditions (P1, S15, S27, T7). In addition, smallholding for self-sufficiency has gradually gained a foothold (S17). Some locals maintain vegetable gardens and have started to cultivate herbs and grow local plant species. Furthermore, locals participate in the olive harvest to experience togetherness, solidarity and temperance in order to preserve their collective memory (V5, V6, V7, V9).

Wind energy development lends an industrial character to the Amorgian landscape, thereby upsetting the collective memory by preventing locals from recognising themselves in their living environment. In this sense, wind energy development threatens the common identity that locals have tried to preserve since the abandonment of agriculture. Industrial symbols such as wind-power plants contradict feelings of cosiness and familiarity still ingrained in the Amorgian landscape. Industrial symbols such as passenger ferries may intrude into the landscape repeatedly, but they provide the basis for tourism and only appear temporarily. Similarly, tourism requires the existing road network that has become an essential element of local affairs compared with the resistance to road construction which occurred before tourism. Locals perceive both ferries and roads as necessary evils, in contrast to wind-power plants, which are associated with the spirit of neoliberalism detrimental to the Amorgian economy and blamed for the current Greek crisis.

5.3 Synopsis

The institutions and habits I have analysed originate in the political and economic history of both Greece and Amorgos and turn locals' judgment against wind energy development. These institutions and habits maintain the low-impact tourism economy that proves incompatible with wind energy development.

Amorgian institutions generally contradict large-scale development and particularly wind energy development in the following way: The option of wind energy development evokes feelings of ethical wrongdoing, because it threatens the ethical code that locals have already damaged to some extent by marketing the unmarketable Amorgian landscape through

tourism. Locals prefer the ethical wrongdoing related to tourism to the ethical wrongdoing associated with wind energy development. Unwritten agreements support the off-the-record exchange economy in contrast to the bureaucratic procedures required for wind energy development. Amorgian economy is based on small-scale family tourism business supported by familism, which eschews bureaucracy and ignores meritocracy in contrast to large businesses like wind energy companies. Locals refuse to accept financial compensation for the operation of wind farms, because they suspect that the municipality would distribute revenues from wind farms in line with the nepotism which influences decision-making to the benefit of family networks. Fellow-villagers preserve their village identity based on villagism that prevents large-scale development such as construction of wind farms in the village area. The PPC owes its influential role to political clientelism, which makes locals oppose wind energy development in order to secure employment at the PPC and to enjoy privileges granted by the PPC. Ethical clientelism supports the off-the-record exchange economy that goes along with the low-impact tourism economy, which is further maintained by religious clientelism. The patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members would create a local élite by vesting very few locals with economic power. Locals disapprove of this kind of clientelism, which might direct the municipality toward large-scale development such as wind farms.

Locals have formed habits that prevent external interventions as follows: The municipality constitutes an external agent not willingly chosen by locals but rather imposed by the state, which is treated as an external enemy. Wind energy companies represent external privileged agents blamed for the current Greek socio-economic crisis. Locals tend to avoid state bureaucracy, because they habitually perceive the state as inappropriate for determining their present and future life. Avoidance of state bureaucracy supports small-scale family tourism businesses and impedes wind energy development, which requires bureaucratic procedures between state authorities and wind energy investors. The municipality fails to enable wind energy investors to approach locals, who have formed the habit of mistrusting the municipal bureaucracy and of judging wind energy proposals by avoiding municipal involvement. The habit of avoiding joint action for municipal and business purposes prevents locals from working together to make decisions at the municipal council meeting or to run wind energy businesses on their own initiative. Locals have formed the habit of preserving the common identity, which is threatened by industrial and technological development, reflected in wind farms that would spoil the Amorgian landscape and, accordingly, Amorgian ethics. Locals

habitually question the economic logic of external wind energy companies, which are incapable of sharing the collective memory and therefore, have no place in local affairs.

Locals have acquired experiences that influence the exercise of their habits by prioritising material welfare over ethical fulfilment and by shaking their confidence in the municipality and in external investors. Locals have experienced ethical wrongdoing resulting from tourism development and are afraid that wind energy development involves further ethical wrongdoing. They have experienced the patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members. They had a traumatic experience when following development paths towards modernisation, such as road construction and electrification that damaged the common identity. State enterprises promoted large-scale development on the island without considering their impact on its natural and social environment. Based on these experiences, locals decline interacting with the municipal bureaucracy, avoid re-experiencing that trauma, and intuitively refuse to accept wind energy development.

6 Discussion

In this chapter, I discuss four topics in relation to the theoretical framework, the research results and the analytical framework. Firstly, I reflect on the definition of institutions by introducing the theoretical approach of pre-formal institutions into the literature on institutional economics (cf. Subchapter 6.1.). Secondly, I reflect on the relationship between the fabric of pre-formal institutions and the current reform politics, in the light of the Greek socio-economic crisis (cf. Subchapter 6.2). Thirdly, I discuss the adequacy of the Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework for research analysis (cf. Subchapter 6.3), and fourthly, I address the implications of the concept of habit for the discipline of economics, which has diverged from the other social sciences (cf. Subchapter 6.4).

6.1 The theoretical approach of pre-formal institutions

The institutions I have analysed, with the exception of the patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members, are unwritten institutions with deep historical roots (cf. Subchapter 5.1). Kasdagli (2004) argues that unwritten institutions traditionally regulate life in pre-industrial societies and are hardly subject to change. In the Cyclades, unwritten institutions usually go hand in hand with a lack of legal rules and have structured interactions since at least the 16th century, exemplified as follows: Parties appointed arbitrators among their own people to settle disputes according to their customs (Kasdagli 2004: 262). The institution of dowry determined family affairs and was preserved by the administrative authorities even though it was not written down (Kasdagli 2004: 269).[29] Unwritten institutions had various applications depending on the specific case and the particular context of the island (Kasdagli 2004: 266).

Administration by communes determined the governance structure of Amorgos from 1912 until 2000. The administrative reform introduced in 2000 aimed to bureaucratise the governance structure by introducing legal formalities that depersonalise interactions (cf. Section 4.2.3). The municipality has to examine wind energy proposals written in an expert language intended for bureaucrats. However, the municipality lacked and still lacks bureaucrats committed to impersonal and functional purposes. Municipal affairs rely upon the deeply rooted unwritten institutions that have structured interactions outside the

[29] In Greece, the provision of dowry such as a house or a piece of land is still a critical factor for the successful conclusion of women's marriages (Just 2008: 181). On Amorgos, the provision of dowry has become less important over time, but it still proves crucial for both women's and men's marriages.

framework of any bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. Interactions among locals are still shaped by personal relationships reflected in family and village networks and alien to bureaucratisation, which aims at efficiency and universality (cf. Subchapter 2.3).

On this basis, I argue that pre-formal institutions structure interactions on contemporary Amorgos. I define pre-formal institutions as systems of established codes of conduct that pre-exist the drive for bureaucratisation and structure interactions without focusing on legal formalities.[30] The drive for bureaucratisation finds expression in the juridification of social life, which has intensified in the wake of neoliberalism (cf. Subchapter 2.4). In this sense, pre-formal institutions pre-exist the spirit of neoliberalism and continue to operate today within the frame created by neoliberalism.

The literature on institutional economics (North 1991: 97, Williamson 2000: 597, Vatn 2005: 8) refers to the distinction between formal and informal institutions. Bromley (2006: 22) describes informal institutions as the norms, habits, standard practices, customs, traditions and conventions that provide important boundaries to and parameters for human action. I extend the definition of institutions by introducing an approach based on pre-formal institutions instead of using the approach based on informal institutions. The latter is not concerned with the rise of neoliberalism, which has brought about a new kind of economic thinking that institutional economics has not addressed so far. Neoliberalism attaches the utmost importance to the legal formal framework in a way that disrupts or jeopardises unwritten institutions (cf. Subchapter 2.4). The pre-formal institution approach brings the factor of time into the definition of institutions by treating the intensification of bureaucracy brought about by neoliberalism as a watershed in the performance of institutions.

In the economic literature (Feige 1990, 1997, Schneider et al. 2010), informal institutions usually carry a negative connotation. They are associated with an underground, illegal or shadow economy and considered detrimental to economic development. I diverge from this blanket and normative assumption by introducing an approach based on pre-formal institutions that operate alongside legal formalities that are neither better nor worse than pre-formal institutions. In this regard, the pre-formal institution approach does not prescribe what kind of economic development society should follow, and so can help researchers and readers to better understand paths of economic development nowadays characterised by the spirit of neoliberalism.

[30] I defined institutions as systems of established codes of conduct that structure social action and interaction (cf. Section 2.2.1).

6.2 The fabric of pre-formal institutions in the context of the current reform politics

In this subchapter, I argue that the current Greek socio-economic crisis has unsettled the fabric of pre-formal institutions, which, however, Greek society still uses to cope with the reform politics, which several authors (Harvey 2011, Lazzarato 2011, Hadjimichalis 2014) relate to the spirit of neoliberalism.

On Amorgos, pre-formal institutions operate interdependently, as in the following examples: Religious clientelism is based on unwritten agreements that go along with ethical clientelism. The ethical code maintains nepotism, which supports familism, which safeguards small-scale family tourism businesses. The tourism economy partly relies on religious tourism, which supports religious clientelism. At the same time, the tourism economy leaves room for multiple-employment, which supports an off-the-record exchange economy based on verbal contracts. Therefore, instead of regarding pre-formal institutions individually, I refer to the fabric of pre-formal institutions that operates to the benefit of the Amorgian economy, which is at the same time influenced by the spirit of neoliberalism.

It would be an oversimplification to say that processes such as privatisation, marketization and liberalisation are solely products of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, I have shown that the political economic thinking attributed to neoliberalism accounts for financial crises, thereby accelerating such processes (cf. Subchapter 2.4). Hodgson (2009: 1207) argues that liberalised financial markets unleashed the debt-boom that contributed to the international financial crisis of 2008. This has destabilised the Greek socio-political landscape and has triggered a deep socio-economic crisis with unpredictable repercussions on Greek society. In the light of this crisis, the Greek state has adopted reform measures towards, for example, the privatisation and liberalisation of the Greek electricity market.[31] In the case of wind energy development, municipalities serve as bureaucratic intermediaries between locals and external private wind energy investors, who market the landscape within the context of the Greek electricity market and the global renewable energy market. The Greek state needs bureaucracy to guarantee clear property rights and to enforce written contracts to implement the aforementioned measures and encourage large-scale investments such as wind energy projects.

[31] This example is based on the lecture of Prof. Costis Hadjimichalis (Debt Crisis and Land Dispossession in Greece as part of the global "land fever") at the 'Think&Drink-Colloquium' that took place in June 2015 at the Department of Social Sciences of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

The fabric of pre-formal institutions makes the Amorgian economy inimical to the current reform politics that brings a conflict between two monopolies into play. The fabric of pre-formal institutions supports competition between small Cycladic islands, while the reform politics supports competition between wind energy companies. The island of Amorgos competes with other Aegean islands to monopolise the market of alternative tourism in the Cyclades. The monopoly advantage of Amorgos depends on the extent to which the fabric of pre-formal institutions manages to protect the unique landscape, associated with values such as home, heritage and memory. Wind energy companies compete with each other to monopolise the energy market by trading in the Amorgian landscape, which is already traded in the market of alternative tourism on which small-scale family tourism businesses rely. Tradability implies that no landscape can be so unique or so special as to be entirely outside the monetary calculus (Harvey 2012: 92). Wind energy development increases landscape tradability. The more easily tradable the landscape becomes, the less unique it appears, and so the less it provides a basis for monopoly rent (Harvey 2012: 92). The wind energy monopoly conflicts with the alternative tourism monopoly, which manages to dominate, because the fabric of pre-formal institutions remains stable, and so makes it harder for the Greek state to implement reform measures to cope with the crisis.

Contemporary Greek society remains familiar with pre-formal institutions, while it remains to be seen whether the current reforms will take effect. Piattoni (2001b: 210-211) points out that in times of uncertainty, the state's capacity to protect and promote individual and collective interests decreases, and citizens turn to political clientelism, within which individual politicians function as patrons. However, in contemporary Greece citizens do not consider politicians and political parties as patrons. The Greek crisis causes uncertainty and devitalises the political clientelism, which presupposes the state capacity to instrumentalise state agents. The Greek state is forced to carry out reforms that prevent political parties from instrumentalising state agents. As a result, the Greek state is obliged to render state agents powerless. This means that if Greek society is moving towards maintaining its familiar pre-formal institutions, then it may look for patron-client relationships outside the framework of state agents.

As a condition of the bailout packages, which it needs to cope with the current crisis, the Greek state is obliged to reduce state intervention and privatise state-owned enterprises. Thus, the bailout packages promote the advancement of bureaucracy towards meritocracy and the reduction of public appointments. The austerity measures weaken the patron function

of the state represented by the PPC and the municipality and so, locals lose their confidence in political clientelism. Moreover, the crisis brings about underpayment and unemployment of civil servants. Accordingly, locals turn to multiple-employment that supports off-the-record economic activities (cf. Subsection 4.2.2.2). Consequently, locals turn to pre-formal institutions such as nepotism and religious clientelism to protect their households from the economic implications of dwindling political clientelism.

One response to the crisis is the revival of interest in religion and ethics and of political forms such as fascism, nationalism and localism (Harvey 2005: 80). The family is called upon to remedy the situation and the church to provide emotional support and material assistance. The crisis revives the triptych "fatherland, religion, family" (cf. Section 5.1.3) that strengthens pre-formal institutions, apart from political clientelism. This means that family and village networks increasingly seek to maintain off-the-record interactions difficult for bureaucracy to control and incompatible with reforms aimed at helping Greece to stay in the Eurozone.

To recap, the Greek state has adopted austerity measures and policy reforms that increase financial distress and unsettle the fabric of pre-formal institutions in two different ways: Firstly, policy reforms diminish political clientelism, and, secondly, they increase the risk of other forms of clientelism, such as the patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members. In this regard, the fabric of pre-formal institutions is currently on the rocks. At the same time, the fabric of pre-formal institutions remains stable, because interactions still rest upon personal relationships (networks) capable of counteracting reform politics that promotes, for example, wind energy development.

The fabric of pre-formal institutions owes its stability to the habits I have analysed (cf. Subchapter 5.2). The world changes but habits are difficult to change (Dewey 1922: 108, Hodgson 1998: 185). Contemporary society undergoes changes such as the rise of market individualism, which presupposes belief in a minimal state, individual private property and competitive free markets (Hodgson 2009: 1214). The habits I have analysed originated in earlier times and continue to perform in relation to contemporary circumstances. The Greek crisis causes uncertainty, which induces locals to retain the habits that give them more security. Retaining habits is a manifestation of yearning for security in a society marked by a continuous reduction in binding traditions and dissolution of collective structures (Lindbladh and Lyttkens 2002: 462). Locals, for example, retain the habit of preserving the common identity that is threatened by wind energy development (cf. Section 5.2.6). Retaining this

habit means maintaining the pre-formal institution of the ethical code, since the common identity is reflected in Amorgian ethics.

6.3 Adequacy of the Institutions-Habits-Intuitions framework for research analysis

Dewey and Hodgson stress that studying institutions is synonymous with studying habits and vice versa (cf. Section 2.2.1). The literature on institutional economics includes frameworks (Ostrom et al. 1994: 37, 2007: 15182, Hagedorn 2008: 360) that do not incorporate habits into the analysis of institutions. The literature on evolutionary economics[32] does include frameworks (Maréchal 2009:79, Brette et al. 2014) that focus on habits to understand human conduct but without comprehensively linking habits with institutions and human experience. On these grounds and for my research purposes, I developed a new analytical framework called Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework (cf. Subchapter 2.5) that derives from the theoretical approaches presented in Chapter 2 and consists of three analytical levels:

- The interaction between people's experience and their environment of action shapes their institutions, habits and intuitions.
- The synergy of these institutions, habits and intuitions influences the way people judge situations.
- People judge situations based on calculation, reflection and intuitive response, at the same time and to a variable extent.

The research results (cf. Chapter 5) show that the Greek bureaucracy and semi-neoliberal economy together with the Amorgian municipal bureaucracy and low-impact tourism economy are determinants of the environment of action, which is framed by both the present and the past. The time before and after the Greek debt crisis as well as the time before and after the transition from farming to tourism and from communes to municipality characterise the experience that shapes locals' habits. The problematic situation caused by the option of wind energy development stimulates locals to deliberate on what is best to do in terms of particular habits based on pre-formal institutions. Locals undergo a judgment process induced by their deliberation. The judgment process involves the synergy of three ways of choosing between two alternatives, namely, accepting or refusing wind energy development, and is presented as follows:

[32] Evolutionary economics represents a scientific field inspired by evolutionary biology.

Firstly, the calculation of future profits and losses refers to the cost-benefit analysis of accepting wind energy development and does not question such a development per se. This means that locals calculate the financial compensation for accepting wind farms in relation to the effects of wind energy development on the small-scale family tourism business. Secondly, reflection on the wind energy issue causes locals to question wind energy development per se. This means that locals reflect on the quality of the alternatives offered by posing Nussbaum's (2000) tragic question (cf. Section 2.2.2). Thirdly, locals judge by intuition, that is to say, they spontaneously choose the alternative of refusing wind energy development based on their past experiences. Otherwise put, locals resist wind energy development based on calculation, reflection, and intuition, all at the same time.

In addition, the research results show that the institution of nepotism maintains the habit of mistrusting the municipal bureaucracy. The patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members supports the habit of being hostile to symbols associated with the state and the spirit of neoliberalism. The habit of avoiding joint action for municipal and business purposes causes locals to maintain the small-scale family tourism business supported by the institution of familism. Judging outside the municipal context requires personal contact, involving unwritten agreements such as verbal contracts, which, in turn, support ethical clientelism.

Thus, the research results correspond to the three analytical levels of the IHI framework and corroborate the interdependence of institutions and habits. The IHI framework differs from frameworks hitherto included in the literature on institutional and evolutionary economics by incorporating habits and extending the link between institutions and habits. Thus, the IHI framework not only proves to be adequate for my research purposes, but serves further as a framework for research analysis.

6.4 Implications of the concept of habit for the discipline of economics

Since the 1960s, the various social sciences have diverged and have separately aimed at predicting human behaviour (Whitford 2002). Mainstream economics has failed to understand economies, because it has focused on the calculus of price and the quantitative assessment of risks (Ayres 1944, Hodgson 2009). Most mainstream economists have used mathematical models to predict future outcomes that are unpredictable in contemporary financial markets, because they are uncertain rather than risky (Hodgson 2009: 1214). Mathematical models reduce the discipline of economics to the cult of metrication. Coase

(1997) argues that existing economics bears little relation to what actually happens in the real world. Mainstream economists do not engage with real-world complexity, because they seek to understand economies without considering the historical contexts of societies (Hodgson 2009). On these grounds, the proper understanding of economies requires a dialogue between economics and other disciplines, such as history and psychology (Hodgson 2009: 1218).

I applied Hodgson's approach to institutional economics, which attaches particular importance to the concept of habit, because habits are crucial for analysing the institutions that shape economies.[33] I discovered particular habits that influence the way locals judge the option of wind energy development without specifying, from the beginning, the kind of habits to be analysed.[34] Given that historical circumstances account for the formation of habits (Camic 1986), I addressed the historical context of Amorgian society — considered as a microcosm of Greek society — to enable me to analyse these particular habits, as the following examples show:

The habits of mistrusting the municipal bureaucracy and judging outside the context of the municipality have their roots in the administration by communes, which shaped the governance structure of Amorgos in the 20th century (1912-2000). The habit of being hostile to symbols associated with the state and the spirit of neoliberalism originates in the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century as well as in Greek populist politics since the 1980s that caused locals to treat state agents and foreign powers as enemies. The habit of preserving the common identity has its roots in the decline of agriculture, which started after the Second World War and continued with infrastructural development from 1966 and tourism development from the 1980s.

To understand habits I delved into the discipline of history, which allowed me to incorporate socio-psychological elements into my analysis and contributed to my understanding of Amorgian economy.

In this regard, I suggest that the institutional economics approach can apply the concept of habit to narrow the gap between the discipline of economics and the real world by bringing economics closer to other social sciences. This implies that mathematical models are

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33 Hodgson (2004: 652) defines habit as the propensity to behave in a particular way in a particular class of situations (cf. Section 2.2.1).

34 Previous research on habits has focused, from the beginning, on particular habits, such as habits of consumption and of transportation (Verplanken and Wood 2006, Maréchal 2009, Brette et al. 2014).

relevant too, but not sufficient for, the study of economies. The application of the concept of habit cannot give certainty to economics, as after all, no social science can provide that. The application of the concept of habit can rather bring economists to turn the discipline of economics into what Whitford (2002: 347, 355) calls a social science that can do more than simply predict behaviour, can describe and prescribe human action in a world of uncertainty, and can help explain the social world and improve lives.

7 Conclusion

This study set out to investigate how locals on the Aegean island of Amorgos judge the option of wind energy development on the island, given the fact that locals have repeatedly rejected wind energy proposals. Amorgos exhibits excellent wind potential and currently meets its electricity demand through one diesel power station owned by the state-controlled company Public Power Corporation. The case of Amorgos has not attracted scholarly interest so far, although several scholars have stressed the need for research on wind energy acceptability on the Aegean islands.

The vast majority of the scholarly literature on the social aspects of wind energy development addresses local acceptability of wind farms on the normative assumption that opposition to wind farms is illegitimate (Aitken 2010: 1840). On this basis, scholars have overlooked the reasons for resistance to wind energy development. Furthermore, previous research, with very few exceptions such as Woods (2003), dealt with the local acceptability of wind farms without delving into the local context and without considering the operation of institutions and habits of local populations. On the other hand, scientific research on wind energy acceptability lacks to a great extent the qualitative research approaches suited to illuminating the local context.

Against this background, I investigated the particular case of the island of Amorgos by using qualitative research methods that included mainly semi-structured interviews and participant observation (cf. Chapter 3). I developed a new analytical framework called Institutions - Habits - Intuitions (IHI) framework to analyse the collected data (cf. Subchapter 2.5). The IHI framework derives from the theoretical approaches of pragmatism, institutional economics, and phenomenology (cf. Subchapter 2.2). According to this framework, the synergy of institutions, habits and intuitions initiates deliberation, a judgment process which involves calculation, reflection and intuitive response, all at the same time. This synergy depends on the particular environment of action, interacting with the experiences of people living in this environment.

In addition, I applied theoretical approaches to bureaucracy (cf. Subchapter 2.3) and neoliberalism (cf. Subchapter 2.4) to delve into the Amorgian environment considered as a microcosm of the Greek environment. Greek bureaucracy relies upon family and village networks that favour patron-client relationships. Clientelism, together with populism, has shaped politics and has forced the state into bureaucratic inefficiency (cf. Section 4.1.1).

This means that the Greek bureaucracy lacks commitment to the impersonal and functional purposes served by legal formalism that, in turn, accompanies the depersonalisation of interactions and juridification of social life. At the same time, the Greek economy failed to catch up with advanced Western European economies, because state interventionism excluded neoliberal politics that promotes privatisation and market liberalisation (cf. Section 4.1.2). As a result, Greece lacked the industrial sector required to build an economy invulnerable to credit collapse (Harvey 2011: 274). Currently, the Greek state is forced to adopt policies to create a good business climate based on strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade (cf. Subchapter 2.4), to cope with the socio-economic crisis.

7.1 Key insights

Under the aforementioned circumstances, the option of wind energy development causes a problematic situation that shocks the ordinary run of things on the island of Amorgos by disrupting local institutions and habits. As a result, locals refuse wind energy proposals through a combination of calculation, reflection and intuition. This means that locals estimate costs and benefits that would result from the realisation of wind energy projects on Amorgos, reflect on wind energy development per se and their relation to this kind of development path, and respond intuitively (i.e. spontaneously) to this option based on their past experience.

Towards the end of the 20th century, traditional peasant Amorgian society was transformed into a modern society, which largely abandoned farming and looked for employment in tourism business, which was accompanied by infrastructural development. Currently, the economy of Amorgos is mainly based on low-impact tourism, which depends on the commodification of the Amorgian landscape, hitherto untouched by industrial development. The Amorgian tourism economy is characterised by small-scale family tourism businesses, resulting in multiple-employment that supports an off-the-record exchange economy shaped by personal relationships (cf. Section 4.2.2). Moreover, small-scale family tourism businesses eschew bureaucracy by minimising bookkeeping and dispensing with employment contracts. Avoidance of bureaucracy also characterises the municipality of Amorgos. In 2000, the Greek state adopted an administrative policy in a bid to bureaucratise local administration. On Amorgos, this policy brought about the transition from six communes to one municipality supposed to function according to legal formalities such as official (written) documents and administrative procedures such as decision-making

processes (cf. Section 4.2.3). However, the municipality of Amorgos has not yet internalised legal-formalism. Family businesses and the municipality avoid bureaucracy by finding support in particular local institutions and habits tied up with intuitive responses to the option of wind energy development. Key insights derived from the analysis of these institutions and habits are presented in what follows.

Local institutions versus wind energy development

The institution of the ethical code (cf. Section 5.1.1) attributes ethical wrongdoing to tourism development that went along with ethical degeneration, manifested in the decline of such ethical experiences as conviviality and solidarity. At the same time, the ethical code attributes ethical wrongdoing to wind energy development, which would trade on the untradeable Amorgian landscape by paying financial compensation for wind farms. Locals oppose wind farms to avoid a further decline of ethics, in the hope of protecting the ethical code, which embodies a life without industrial and technological development. The ethical code prescribes the character of interactions that become condemnable if they interfere with the operation of local institutions.

The off-the-record exchange economy rests upon verbal and unspoken contracts that reflect the institution of unwritten agreements (cf. Section 5.1.2), which makes economic activities difficult for the state bureaucracy to control. Verbal contracts account for a land registration system clear to locals but unclear to wind energy investors and bureaucratic agents. Thus, unwritten agreements impede wind farm construction, which requires clear land registration, and wind farm operation, which requires written contracts between wind energy investors and the municipality.

The institutions of familism (cf. Section 5.1.3) and nepotism (cf. Section 5.1.4) give family members and, accordingly, the family business, an advantage over any kind of external agent. Moreover, the institution of villagism (cf. Section 5.1.5) counters any development path that challenges the village identity, itself linked to the village economy. The family business and the municipal council ignore meritocratic principles, thereby treating municipal council members as locals devoted to the tourism economy and not as politicians committed to an authority hierarchy. In this regard, municipal council meetings favour family and village networks, which are interested in leaving the landscape untouched by wind farms, which jeopardise the tourism economy of northern and central villages as well as the agricultural economy of southern villages.

The institution of political clientelism (cf. Section 5.1.6.) causes locals (clients) to reject wind energy investment in order to secure employment at the Public Power Corporation (patron) and enjoy privileges granted by this company, which holds a monopoly over the electricity supply of Amorgos. The institution of religious clientelism (cf. Section 5.1.7) refers to the off-the-record exchange of products and services between monks (patrons) and locals (clients) that causes both parties to protect religious tourism and the landscape against wind farms and the concomitant road construction. Clientelist relations between locals form the institution of ethical clientelism (cf. Section 5.1.8), which makes use of unwritten agreements to support business and administrative affairs.

Local habits versus wind energy development

The failure of the Greek state to remedy local problems such as water shortages strengthened the pre-existing anti-state attitude and made locals form the habit of contesting the state (cf. Section 5.2.1) represented by legislation, officialdom and bureaucracy. In this sense, locals act and interact without focusing on legal formalism, while they are also engaged in off-the-record economic activities that allow them to run a lucrative family tourism business. The anti-state attitude originates partly in populism, which labels symbols of power as offenders, and locals as victims. Locals are habitually hostile to external large-scale enterprises (cf. Section 5.2.5) such as wind energy companies that seek to profit under the pretext of environmental protection. They reject wind energy projects promoted by such symbols, which are blamed for the current Greek crisis, which has created uncertainty, anxiety, and indignation.

Administration by the communes was based on daily personal contact among fellow-villagers, who gathered incidentally on the street, in kafenia and taverns, where they discussed and judged unconstrained by bureaucratic procedures. Locals trusted administration by the communes, while they tend to mistrust the municipal bureaucracy (cf. Section 5.2.2), which is meant to introduce authority relations, resulting in impersonal interactions. On these grounds, locals suspect that the municipality would distribute revenues from wind farms to the benefit of the relatives and fellow-villagers of municipal council members, in line with nepotism and villagism. As it is seen as unreliable, the municipality cannot function as an intermediary between locals and wind energy investors. Moreover, locals have formed the habit of judging local issues off the record, outside the context of the municipality (cf. Section 5.2.3), thereby avoiding, ignoring or boycotting municipal decision-making regarding wind energy proposals.

Localism, like the bygone self-sufficient economy, prevented locals from experiencing a corporate sentiment suitable for supporting joint action for municipal and business purposes. In other words, locals have formed the habit of avoiding joint action when it comes to municipal and business matters (cf. Section 5.2.4). Consequently, locals tend to avoid both working together at municipal council meetings and investing in wind farms on their own initiative.

Abandonment of agriculture went along with landscape spoliation, and this caused a trauma associated with fear of loss of the common identity. Locals re-experienced this trauma in the wake of tourism development, which offended Amorgian ethics and ruined the landscape by fostering infrastructural development. On that account, locals have formed the habit of preserving the common identity (cf. Section 5.2.6), which is threatened by wind farms, which lend an industrial character to the landscape and threaten the feelings of cosiness and familiarity still ingrained in the Amorgian landscape.

Intuitive responses to wind energy development

Locals once experienced a patron-client relationship between wind energy investors (patrons) and municipal council members (clients) at the very beginning of the municipal administration (cf. Section 5.1.9). Locals are afraid that this kind of clientelism is likely to create a local political élite with economic power. Such an élite can jeopardise small-scale family tourism businesses by promoting large-scale investments such as wind farms. Moreover, infrastructural development went ahead regardless of its impact on the physical and social environment. Road building did not follow the construction plan, and state enterprises installed electricity pylons and high-gain antennas irrespective of spatial planning and noxious effects (cf. Section 5.2.5). The municipality failed to deal successfully with local problems, and as already mentioned the tourism economy is associated with traumatic experiences such as a decline of ethics that results in loss of the common identity. Based on these experiences, locals respond spontaneously to the option of wind energy development. This means that they reject municipal involvement and oppose large-scale development promoted by external agents intuitively.

7.2 Research contributions and limitations

The present study makes theoretical as well as practically relevant contributions and exhibits limitations that open up future research possibilities. In what follows, I present research

contributions and limitations in light of my theoretical and methodological approach as well as of the research results.

Concerning the research contributions, the institutions analysed in the fifth chapter, with the exception of the patron-client relationship between wind energy investors and municipal council members, have their roots in the historical circumstances of both the island of Amorgos and the country of Greece. Based on this institutional analysis, I extended the definition of institutions by incorporating pre-formal institutions into the literature of institutional economics. I define pre-formal institutions as systems of established codes of conduct that pre-exist the drive for bureaucratisation and structure interactions without focusing on legal formalities (cf. Subchapter 6.1). The pre-formal institutions approach treats the legal-formalistic structure of interactions brought about by neoliberalism as a watershed in the operation of institutions.

The research results revealed that in the case of Amorgos, administrative and energy policy reforms have not encouraged the realisation of wind energy projects, which require an efficient bureaucracy generally missing in Greece. In addition, the current reform (austerity) politics unsettles the fabric of pre-formal institutions by diminishing political clientelism and increasing the risk of other forms of clientelism. At the same time, the reform measures strengthen the fabric of pre-formal institutions, which remains stable owing to particular entrenched habits, which give locals security in times of uncertainty (cf. Subchapter 6.2). In this respect, the present study showed how local institutions are at odds with contemporary Greek politics.

For the purpose of my research analysis, I developed the IHI framework that proved to be an adequate analytical framework for further research analysis (cf. Subchapter 6.3). The IHI framework incorporates habits that allowed for an in-depth investigation of the Amorgian economy and governance structure, and the holistic view of the Amorgian context. Following the analysis of habits, the present study showed that institutional economics can apply the concept of habit to the understanding of economies and societies, implying that the cult of metrication imposed by mainstream economics is not sufficient to understand what happens in the real world (cf. Subchapter 6.4).

Along with these contributions, the present study displays limitations that advance scientific knowledge, and that find expression in the boundaries drawn by qualitative research methods. Science is predestinated to explain only a small proportion of the complexity of the real world, which involves more than causalities. Understanding resistance to wind energy

development on the island of Amorgos required in-depth investigation of the local context to grasp the complexity of this social phenomenon. In this regard, I delved into the particular context of Amorgos applying a research methodology that included long fieldwork periods and a range of techniques such as face-to-face interviews, participant observations and personal diaries. This methodology allowed me to detect institutions and habits and come to a deep understanding of the case of Amorgos. However, I acknowledge that a scientific research can delve only into some facets of the real world's complexity.

Critical reflection is also needed concerning my role as a qualitative researcher and especially, the relationship of trust between me as interviewer and locals as interviewees that determined the data quality. Few locals were sceptical about my German university affiliation or suspected me of promoting wind energy projects on behalf of German agents.[35] The fact that I come from Greece, I am a native Greek speaker and my family comes from a Greek island minimised this scepticism. In addition, the above-mentioned methodology, and particularly, my active participation in locals' everyday life and my involvement in and respect of their ethics enabled me to obtain their confidence.

Further, the pluralism of academic disciplines that characterises the theoretical basis of this study allowed me neither to concentrate on nor to delve into a specific discipline. The theoretical framework rests upon the scientific fields of social psychology and institutional economics represented by the schools of thought of pragmatism and institutionalism accordingly. At the same time, the general character of the research question provided me with the opportunity to apply theoretical approaches of different academic disciplines, including politics and sociology. This interdisciplinary approach came up during the research and allowed me to understand the case of Amorgos in depth.

7.3 Recommendations for further research

I suggest that scientific knowledge can contribute to the creation of a sustainable future if it takes account of local societies. Wind farms are not a panacea, but can be a means of shaping a sustainable future. Contemporary politics claims that the scale of environmental crisis calls for a global response to follow the universalistic rhetoric of sustainable development (Harvey 2005, Harris 2011). Wind energy investments can bring about unsustainable living conditions if they fail to consider local characteristics, following policies that rely upon the application of universal principles.

[35] I did not work on behalf of any German public or private company during my research (cf. Subchapter 3.5).

On these grounds, further research is necessary to put emphasis on case studies with the intention of learning lessons from both supporters and opponents of wind farms. To understand wind energy acceptability requires more qualitative research that addresses the operation of institutions and the habits of local populations. In this regard, the relationship between local institutions and national policies is of particular importance. Finally, I recommend doing research that abandons the utilitarian assumption that man is a priori an investor, and I also underline the need for additional research, firstly, on the Greek case, and secondly, on the compatibility of the current Greek reality and the reform politics adopted in the wake of the crisis.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Data analysis – 1st fieldwork period

A1: Interview guideline (1st period)

Interview guideline of the first fieldwork period
1. Can you describe a regular day?
2. What is the first thing you see every time you leave your house?
3. Do you have a favourite location on Amorgos?
4. What comes to your mind when you look at the hills?
5. What are your memories of the Amorgian landscape?
6. Do you go to the kafenio or to the tavern?
7. What kind of things do you discuss with your fellow-villagers?
8. Do you think that tourism has changed the Amorgian landscape?
9. How was your life on the island without electricity?
10. Did locals resist the electrification of the island?
11. What comes to your mind when you see the electricity pylons of the PPC?
12. What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of wind-power plants?
13. Do you think wind farms fit the Amorgian landscape?
14. How do you feel about wind farms on Amorgos?
15. Do you think that wind farms could affect your way of living?
16. Do you think wind farms could affect your everyday activities?
17. What do you think of land ownership on Amorgos?
18. Would you provide your land for the installation of wind-power plants?
19. How would you feel about wind-power plants on the neighbouring land?
20. How would you feel about wind-power plants on municipal land?
21. Do you think wind farms could affect the island economy?
22. Do you think you could benefit from wind farms on Amorgos?
23. Do you think wind farms could be to your disadvantage?
24. What do you think about any economic benefits wind farms would bring to the municipality?
25. What is your experience of the municipality?
26. Do you trust the municipality?
27. Do you trust local people?
28. Do you think corruption could influence wind energy development on Amorgos?

A2: Selection of interviews (1st period)

L1

- We abandoned agriculture and spoiled the landscape. The goats have destroyed all the terraces. We have more goats than people.
- Tourism brought greed with it.
- They do not care about the common good. Personal interests govern the island.

L2

- Locals alienated from nature because they abandoned agriculture. They forget their culture and their origins.
- Wind farms can have a negative impact on our life like the telecommunications antenna. What happens if the wind-power plants malfunction? And what happens after the end of their lifespan? The company might go bankrupt because of the crisis and then the plants will remain. They will be a memento for our children.

L3

- Locals resisted the construction of roads in the 1970s. I want a road to gain access to my fields. Somebody else does not want this road because it will destroy his field.
- The company wanted to put 57 wind-power plants, with a view to increasing the number of plants from 57 to 100. Another island rejected a similar proposal. Wind farms will ruin the landscape.

L4

- Electricity meant development and became necessary.
- The good old days without electricity.
- You need land and not wind farms to be self-sufficient.

L5

- Sometimes I long for the time without electricity.
- Tourism here is important for supporting your family. Tourists do not come to see wind farms.

L6

- We are supposed to believe the development story that corporations tell us in order to profit.
- I cannot identify with wind farms.

- They want to make Amorgos a place of green industry to sell their stock, like the pharmaceutical industry.

L7

- We want to protect the character of Amorgos.
- The electricity pylons spoil the landscape.
- Municipal council members advance the interests of their families. Everybody looks after his own family first.

L8

- The beauty of Amorgos is the simplicity of its landscape.
- Wind farms go along with roads and cement.

L9

- The wind energy company has no idea what Amorgos and our lives are like.
- We still do not know the impact of wind farms on human life.

L10

- I do not want to see wind-power plants when I look at the hills.
- The municipality may circumvent the law so that only few locals profit.

L11

- Before tourism locals were honest and modest and not greedy for money.
- Wind farms do not fit the Amorgian landscape.
- They have produced too many wind-power plants and we have to bear the costs.

L12

- Locals are not really open-minded. They do not want wind farms, as they do not want big hotels. They do not want to become like Santorini.
- In the beginning tourists were anarchists, hippies and free campers. Locals threw them out of the island. There was a gap between two different cultures but as time went by they got used to tourism.

L13

- I want the land for farming. I cannot think of wind farms as heritage of my children.

- This proposal was about 57 wind-power plants while Amorgos hardly needs three. Locals are not against wind energy but they opposed the proposal. You cannot put in so many plants in order to transport electricity to Athens.

L14

- They wanted to put these huge things on the whole island. Wind farms will change the character of the island.
- We cannot replace the wind mills and the cultivation of terraces with wind farms.

L15

- Why should tourists come if we have wind farms to show them?
- When it comes to large-scale development few locals would take the money as happened before.

L16

- We discuss everything in the kafenio.
- The municipality does not have money because locals do not pay charges.
- We help each other in the village. If you want to renovate your house we will help you and you will help us the next time, perhaps in a different way.

L17

- Wind farms may reduce land values. We have to decide what kind of tourism we want. Development by constructing roads or by protecting the NATURA areas.
- The municipality is unable to cope with wind energy proposals.

L18

- PPC employees may lose their jobs.
- Since when does the land belong to the municipality? Municipal land belongs to the Amorgians.

L19

- Tourism makes locals forget who they are.
- Development is a good thing but it does not have to go beyond what is reasonable. You cannot put wind-power plants close to the monastery or nearby the village.

L20

- Farming is important for the family self-sufficiency.
- Locals are not attached to wind-power plants.
- The voice of the southern villages is not influential because they do not have tourism.

L21

- The south of Amorgos is not yet debauched by tourism.
- They want to sell us the fairy-tale of green development. We have to consume this technology because they have produced too much of it.
- Sometimes the municipality does not care about our needs. The municipality will benefit but not the people.

L22

- People were more gregarious and more humane before tourism.
- Humans are not superior to nature. If I accept this, I cannot support wind farms. Respect your nature. After all, you are only its guest.
- Electrification occurred beyond all measure. The overhead electrical lines still spoil the landscape. They removed the telecommunications antenna after twenty years.

L23

- Locals have forgotten their ethics and have become greedy for easy money.
- The north does not really care for the south. They want to put the wind-power plants in the South.
- In the southern villages locals care for each other. We are not yet debauched by tourism but we need more development to go ahead. Tourists come but they do not stay. People leave Kato Meria.

L24

- Wind farms will damage the network of hiking paths and they do not create jobs on Amorgos.
- Locals who own road construction companies favour wind energy development.
- Very few municipal council members will benefit from wind farms through predatory practices.

L25

- The landscape changed because locals abandoned agriculture.
- The municipality supports renewable energies but not at locals' cost. I know that oil is becoming scarce and I am interested in other energy sources. We are looking for ways to produce biodiesel from the taverns' waste oils.

L26

- Wind farms will disrupt the simplicity of life on the island.

- Locals bear no relation to wind energy technology and wind energy companies bear no relation to the local culture.
- Locals like to feel independent and dislike authority. I do not want to live in other European states that tell their citizens how to breathe.

L27

- Wind farms symbolise an elite. I do not want elites on the island.
- Wind farms fit other locations in other countries but they are out of harmony with the Amorgian landscape.

L28

- The unspoiled Amorgian landscape is part of my identity. If we accept wind farms then we will violently change the identity of our island. The PPC secures jobs and supports around ten families and that is saying a lot for Amorgos. The island is small.
- I believe that the initial idea of renewable energies was not to take advantage of people in the name of private profit.
- Kinships rule here. It is like in the whole country during the last decades.

L29

- Locals became rentiers by making easy money from tourism. They did not have the appropriate culture to get along with this sudden wealth. Wind farms will increase locals' dependence on rentier income.
- Locals have no vision and are detached from their ethics.
- Each village has had its localism for ages and now the municipality wants suddenly to bring these villages together.

A3: Reduction of interviews (1st period)

General topics through first reduction (1st period)	Number of interview
Landscape degradation through abandonment of agriculture	L1, L25
Landscape degradation through wind energy	L2, L3, L8, L10, L11, L17, L19, L23
Landscape translated as local identity	L6, L7, L8, L28
Land for farming and not for wind farms	L4, L13, L20
Wind energy threatens tourism	L5, L14, L15, L25
Wind energy threatens ethics	L14, L20, L26, L27, L29
Wind energy benefits very few locals	L24, L29
Importance of family	L1, L5, L7, L13, L20, L28
Importance of self-sufficiency/independence	L4, L13, L20, L26
Importance of the village	L16, L23, L29
Alienation from nature and ethics	L2, L11, L14, L21, L20, L23, L29
Degeneration through tourism	L11, L19, L21, L22, L29
Bad experience with the state (OTE and PPC)	L2, L7, L22
Bad experience of large-scale development	L2, L3, L7, L15, L22
Untrustworthy municipality	L7, L10, L15, L17, L28
Denial of the municipality	L7, L16, L21, L24, L26
The municipality fails to administrate	L29
Avoidance of legal rules	L10, L15, L16, L24
Locals versus external corporations and foreign powers	L6, L9, L11, L13, L21, L26, L27, L28
Locals versus large-scale development	L12, L13, L14, L15, L18, L19, L27
PPC employment versus wind energy	L18, L28
North versus south Amorgos	L20, L21, L23
North rather than south Amorgos influences the municipality	L20
Clientelist relations and personal interests favour wind energy	L24

Categories through second reduction (1st period)
Wind energy threatens economy and ethics
Dysfunction of the municipal bureaucracy
Criticism of wind energy companies Locals oppose external neoliberal actors
Tourism causes decline of ethics Tourism spoils local identity
Southern villages preserve ethics Northern villages influence the municipality
Family and clientelist relations influence the municipality Family and village ties characterise interactions
Tendency to self-sufficiency/independence Tendency to preserve local identity Tendency to ignore the municipality Tendency to avoid the law
Bad experience with the state
Bad experience of large-scale development

A4: Observations – Selection (1st period)

P1 (15-02-11)

- 'In 1952, the state distributed monastic land to landless locals. When a few of the former landless were afflicted with cancer, rumours arose that God was punishing them for appropriating monastic land. People here are very religious'.

P2 (16-02-11)

- Locals have complained for years that the island needs a doctor.

P3 (17-02-11)

- 'The monastery owns the best fields. These are the fertile fields in valleys near the coast'.
- 'Everybody knows everybody and talks about everybody. Amorgos is a small island and almost all locals are distant relatives'.

P4 (19-02-11)

- Very few locals favoured wind energy development but they did not raise their voice because of village opinion. Village opinion seems to be more important in the southern rather than the northern villages.
- 'Municipal council members use their position to promote the construction of roads. This harms alternative tourism'.

P5 (20-02-11)

- In the kafenio fellow-villagers were sitting around a brazier and were talking about the previous mayor and the new local government.
- Locals are frustrated with the way money has changed their lives.
- Locals are registered as farmers to enjoy low taxation and receive subsidies.

P6 (21-02-11)

- The new policeman wants locals to fasten their seat belts, though they never did that before. 'The new policeman cannot just come and change how things run on the island'. A new village policeman arrested a man in the village square in front of his mother, because his employee was unregistered. Everybody knew that. 'The new policeman is shameless. You cannot arrest the man in front of his mother and for that reason'.

P7 (22-02-11)

- A man entered the kafenio and stood still when he saw me. Then, he asked me, quite astonished if we know each other.
- The regular guests explained to him that I was a friend of a local. He was relieved to hear this and started to ask about my friend's family.

P8 (26-02-11)

- 'Amorgians are good people. During the last few years everything happened very fast. Electricity, tourism, the port in Egiali'.
- Everybody owns a small piece of land. There is no land registry. Everybody knows who owns what.

P9 (27-02-11)

- The kafenio had a woodstove for heating. Locals talked about water scarcity and agricultural activities. They were underlining their respect for the man who makes an effort to cultivate his land.

P10 (01-03-11)

- The municipality does not have particular office hours.
- 'I do not like office hours. Everybody who wants to comes when he can. I am a working class man'.

P11 (05-03-11)

- The monastery is the only place on Amorgos without electric pylons.
- Locals say that they all do this and that to avoid taxation. Everybody knows and tolerates this.

P12 (07-03-11)

- Fellow-villagers damage their reputation by triggering village disharmony.
- 'Once a minister came and ordered a coffee. He offered him a cup of coffee powder with sugar and when the minister expressed astonishment he told him to bring the water himself'.

P13 (15-03-11)

- Fellow-villagers gathered again in front of the mini market early in the evening. The weather was really bad but the fisherman transported the sick old man to Naxos.

P14 (16-03-11)

- The municipal council meeting was crowded. Not all the microphones worked and so I was not able to hear all the municipal council members. After two hours an atmosphere of resentment had spread in the room. Political controversies, personal conflicts and allegations against municipal council members. Five members dominated the discussion. The main agenda item was the infrastructure planning (e.g. road construction). The other agenda items were of less interest. District council members did not really raise their voice. Representatives of Kato Meria talked briefly.

P15 (19-03-11)

- In Egiali, locals have reconstructed the sewage treatment facility because the coastline stinks as a result of its misoperation. They have talked about this reconstruction for years. They got the tacit permission of the municipality, which cannot formally approve the reconstruction because that would require a high degree of bureaucracy. The reconstruction enjoys the tacit consent of the whole village.

P16 (23-03-11)

- 'Investors want to build big hotels on Amorgos but locals sabotage them'.
- The monastery promises the good fields to its acquaintances. Monks and priests influence decision-making without participating at meetings in the town hall or in the kafenio.
- The monastery provided land in the valley to the municipality to build the school. Up to now they have only built the basketball court.

A5: Observations – Reduction (1st period)

Themes through reduction (1st period)	Number of observation
Resistance to large-scale development	P4, P16
Untrustworthy municipality	P4, P16
The influential role of the monastery	P1, P3, P4, P16
Family and village ties characterise interactions	P7, P4, P7, P12
Tendency to avoid the law Tendency to avoid bureaucracy	P5, P6, P14, P15 P10, P14, P15
Bad experience with the state	P2, P12

A6: Photos (1st period)

Photo 1(a): Giannis Despotidis, 2008 (protest against the telecommunications antenna)

Photo 2(a): Giannis Despotidis, 2008 (protest against the telecommunications antenna)

Photo 3(a): Maria Proestou, February 2011, village of Chora (abandoned wind mills)

Photo 4(a): Maria Proestou, February 2011, village of Lagkada (kerosene heater)

Photo 5(a): Maria Proestou, March 2011, village of Chora (electricity pylon)

Photo 6(a): Maria Proestou, March 2011 (abandoned terraces near the village of Katapola)

Appendix B: Data analysis – 2nd fieldwork period

B1: Interview guideline (2nd period)

Interview guideline of the second fieldwork period
1. How do locals interact in their everyday life?
2. How do locals decide on island issues?
3. How did locals decide on island issues in former times?
4. What do you think about the shift from communes to municipality?
5. What do you think about differences between villages?
6. Do you think differences between villages influence decision-making?
7. What comes to your mind when you think about the municipal council?
8. Do locals participate in municipal council meetings?
9. Do you participate in municipal council meetings?
10. Are you satisfied with the way the municipal council makes decisions?
11. Do you think that interests influence the municipal council?
12. What influences the decision-making process?
13. What other factors can influence a municipal council meeting?
14. Do you think locals discuss island issues?
15. Do locals wait for municipal council meetings to discuss island issues?
16. Do locals discuss island issues outside municipal council meetings?
17. When did locals start talking about wind farms?
18. Do locals discuss wind farms today?
19. Did locals participate in municipal council meetings dealing with wind energy proposals?
20. How did district councils deal with wind energy proposals?
21. How important is technology to your life?
22. What is locals' relation to technology?
23. Have you ever thought what will happen with the energy issue in the future?
24. Do you think that locals are still characterised by the Greek syndrome of occupation[36]?
25. Do oral agreements shape property relations?
26. What about written agreements and legal contracts on Amorgos?
27. Did locals resist tourism development?
28. What do you think about locals' acceptance of tourism?

[36] The Greek syndrome of occupation is an expression used to show the tendency of Greek people to save their property from the Nazi regime and to accumulate food and other goods to survive.

B2: Selection of interviews (2nd period)

S1

- Communes could deal with their problems but they did not have financial resources. Now, the municipality cannot manage to deal with the problems of the whole island.
- They invited us to go to Ios to participate in a conference about renewables. They presented us with a proposal for 116 wind-power plants and we were all against it.

S2

- The municipality is better than the communes but the district councils are powerless. They depend entirely on the municipality. Villagers know better than the municipality what happens in their village.
- We need a doctor but the state is not interested in our needs because we are a small island. We are completely isolated. The health issue is really tragic. Patients are transported to Naxos by boat.

S3

- The mayor and the leader of the opposite political party are the ones who actually make decisions.
- I participated in some discussions in the kafenia by accident. Some locals supported the proposal but the majority opposed it.
- Wind farms require big roads that will ruin the landscape. They will harm alternative tourism. I cannot easily go on foot to the Chapel of Theologos and so could ask for a road, but the beauty of Theologos is to walk or to go by donkey. Why do we have to build a road to go to Theologos?

S4

- Personal conflicts determine municipal council meetings. I do not participate because it is ineffectual.
- People come closer around the brazier. This is a sign of togetherness and not the television or the heating. I do not mind living without oil.

S5

- Locals pass their land back to the monastery and the municipality directs Amorgos' advertising towards religious tourism.

- The monastery has deals with a couple of locals. They helped to renovate the walls because they rent its land.
- The mayor cannot deal with all villages. In contrast, the president of the commune knew exactly what the problem was. The commune possessed more power, it was more effective.

S6

- Locals still used braziers in 1998. The use of oil is very recent, so they do not yet depend on oil.
- I do not think there will be lower electricity prices through wind energy development.
- I have rejected proposals to cooperate. Have you heard the saying 'let my threshing-floor be small, but let it be all my own'?
- The western society produces without deliberating and an unreflective production of knowledge dominates.

S7

- Personal interests shape the meetings.
- The president of the commune had more power in contrast to the president of the district.
- Individualism always exists, but when there is a general problem, locals wake up.
- Cooperation is a good thing but only at the beginning. As time passes conflicts replace enthusiasm.

S8

- Locals have money now and they just consume. However, the crisis is gradually making them live modestly again and this is not so difficult because the epoch of braziers is quite recent.
- The municipality decides about issues concerning the whole island. Communes were more powerful. The municipality is not capable of taking account of all the villages.
- The municipality lacks qualified civil servants.

S9

- They have to replace these monsters with another technology that is not so monstrous.
- Amorgos is not Mykonos. Alternative tourism and wind-power plants are incompatible.
- Election of members must be based on meritocracy and not kinship interests.

S10

- You want to have your house and your fields to assure the livelihood of your family. This is the Greek system.

- It is a contract to give your word. If the field is already promised to somebody else I will not intervene. It is very important to keep your word.

S11

- In kafenia locals overthrow governments and make decisions. In kafenia they talk about everything.
- Locals do not participate and allow a few municipal council members to decide.
- Economic and personal interests influence the municipal council meeting.
- There is localism and you can see it between Katapola and Egiali.

S12

- I do not go to the meetings because it is a waste of time.
- The monastery is supposed to deal with religious matters and not with politics.
- People in Egiali are more open-minded than people in Kato Meria because of tourism. They have different mentalities.

S13

- I rent land in exchange for meat or cheese. This exchange is an ancient method. Nobody has yet asked for a written agreement.
- The monastery provides locals with land. They have to use the land for farming, but they have used it to build houses and tourist apartments.

S14

- There are conflicts between villages as far as infrastructure is concerned. Why does the municipality construct a biological wastewater treatment in Katapola and not in Egiali, and why does it construct roads in Chora and not in Arkesini?
- I think that wind-power plants look good. The so-called ecologists rejected the 2008 proposal. Amorgians are generally environmentally aware.

S15

- Locals are very religious. Society is still characterised by superstition.
- In this country, the relationship between church and state has always been problematic.
- Locals asked me why I do not build some tourist apartments. What will happen if we do not have tourism?
- The father of the electrician was here the other day. He did not pay. His son will repair some things in the house. This is how it works here.

S16

- Abandonment of terraces has resulted in free-range animal husbandry that ruins the landscape. You see that in Egiali. In Kato Meria things are different.
- Now, they are used to electricity. Tourism is based on electricity.
- They are afraid of wind-power plants. Currently, locals are stressed in general because of the crisis. Cuts in salaries. You have to pay phone bills, mobile bills, electricity bills. You cannot just be a farmer.

S17

- Local society used to be self-sufficient. Therefore, they are used to accumulating land and other things. I do not think this is bad. Land is important. In Athens, people talk about gardening because of the crisis.
- Locals started talking about the issue after the 2008 proposal. They do not talk about it now.
- Water scarcity has increased and therefore, production has decreased for the last few years with the exception of olive trees.

S18

- Land has become valuable because of the crisis. You do not care about money because money may lose in value.
- Oral agreements are made between locals who are close. My father-in-law gives us oil and we give him cheese.
- Wind-power plants do not fit the landscape aesthetics. Everybody fears that wind-power plants will harm tourism.

S19

- Everybody has his own opinion about what is good for the island and what kind of development should take place. Some believe that Amorgos needs more roads; others think that the absence of roads attracts alternative tourism. Roads mean more cars, more parking areas and more petrol stations, and this is not eco-friendly.
- They give me goods in exchange for my work. They have never tried to cheat me.

S20

- Personal economic interests influence decision-making. Meetings' discussions are not fruitful because there is no dialogue and so, locals do not participate in meetings.
- The issue was extensively discussed in the kafenia before the meeting. The opponents were afraid that the proposal was a swindle of the company to receive the subsidies.

S21

- Basically, economic interests influence the municipal council. Kinships dominate. If you want a road to gain access to your field and your relative is a council member you might be lucky.
- Locals prefer to discuss things in the kafenio.
- Locals make both oral and written agreements. When it comes to matters of public concern I want written documents.

S22

- They build houses without building license. They construct roads and leave the construction waste behind. Roads are not necessarily beneficial to Amorgos.
- We have to organise so many committees. One committee for this issue, one committee for the other issue. There is no point in that. We increase bureaucracy rather than minimise it.

S23

- A community spirit does not really characterise Amorgians.
- Formal agreements require time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. You may rent fields in exchange for olive oil or meat, and this rests on oral agreements.
- You do not need documents in the case of adverse possession. If they do not know you they will ask for documents.

S24

- The mayor's opinion is what counts in the end but he has to consider his party comrades and the people.
- This is the only tourism association that works. It tries to react immediately if something happens. The other day the beach was full of garbage. We made some phone calls and went to take out the garbage. However, we cannot do all the hard work alone.

S25

- The monastery is highly respected.
- Now locals have to let the president of the district know the problem, and then he has to communicate it to the district council, the district council to the municipality, and the municipality to the municipal council.

S26

- People were talking about it everywhere. One district council called an assembly.

- A wind energy proposal might be a tempting offer because the municipality is out of money. In this case, the municipality may accept proposals without considering planning issues.

S27

- Locals are very religious. They work on 1st May but they do not work on holy days of obligation.
- They ask why we do not cooperate. Because we have this mentality. Because in case of fire, if you are alone, you go to all lengths to pull your butt out of the fire. If you are five people, someone faints because of the smoke, someone does not bother about the fire, someone cares only about how to save her or his own skin and only one person makes a real effort to quench the fire.
- Farming is a struggle but it rewards you financially and ethically for your effort.

S28

- The priest had connections with the government in Athens and could mediate in my case.
- We care for the chapels and attend the liturgy. The church is a place of gregariousness.
- There is solidarity and coherence in contrast with other countries, where you do not even know your neighbour.

S29

- Locals have not forgotten agriculture. Tourism is a recent phenomenon and locals still remember how to cultivate the ground.
- Localism is not the same as diversity. This is the beauty of Amorgos. There are five different mentalities since antiquity.
- Currently, the municipality is in dire straits. There is stagnation and we lack perspectives and goals.

B3: Reduction of interviews (2nd period)

General topics through first reduction (2nd period)	Number of interview
Municipality incapable of administrating	S1, S2, S8, S24
Effectiveness of communes	S5, S8
Powerless district councils	S2, S7
Bad experience with the state	S2
Discussion outside the municipality	S3, S4, S20, S21
Influential role of the mayor	S3, S24
Influential role of the monastery	S5, S13, S15, S25, S28
Landscape degradation through roads	S3
Wind energy associated with roads	S3
Meetings influenced by kinship and economic interests	S4, S7, S9, S11, S20, S21
No economic benefits through wind energy	S6
No fear of living without electricity	S6, S8, S29
Refusal to cooperate	S6, S7, S23, S27
Cooperation for tourism reasons	S24
Criticism of western society	S6, S28
Reduction of consumption through the crisis	S8, S17
Wind energy threatens tourism	S9, S18
Accumulation of property for family self-sufficiency	S10, S17
Importance of oral and tacit agreements between locals	S5, S10, S13, S15, S19, S23
Written agreements within the municipality	S21
Municipality increases bureaucracy	S22, S25
Cultural and economic differences between villages	S11, S12, S14, S16, S29
Avoidance of law	S13, S22
Avoidance of formalities	S22
Road construction versus alternative tourism	S19
Refusal of roads	S22
Fear of company's deception	S20
Fear of accepting wind energy due to crisis	S26

Categories through second reduction (2nd period)
Wind energy threatens economy
Dysfunction of municipal bureaucracy Bad experience of municipal bureaucracy
Criticism of western society Distrust of external companies
Differences between villages
Oral agreements between locals Written agreements when bureaucracy necessary
Kinship relations influence decision-making Clientelist relations influence decision-making
Tendency to family self-sufficiency Tendency to disregard the municipality Tendency to avoid cooperation Tendency to avoid legal formalism
Anxiety caused by the crisis Fear of accepting wind energy due to the crisis
Refusal of large-scale development (road construction)

B4: Observations – Selection (2nd period)

T1 (23-01-12)

- The reconstruction of hiking paths was stopped owing to budget cuts. Three locals try to reconstruct the paths on their own initiative.
- We talked about the issue of the sewage treatment facility. 'The municipality tacitly approved the reconstruction and nobody asked to see the planning permission or the police approval. The village police turned a blind eye. Otherwise, it would have taken a long time to get the permission through the bureaucracy. And the majority of the council comes from the North'.

T2 (24-01-12)

- 'Amorgians do not decide. They just do not decide, because you need to make twenty decisions before you can eventually decide. A lot of bureaucracy, time-consuming processes, many intermediaries and somebody must be bribed during the process. Therefore, they do not decide'.
- 'Things on Amorgos are gradually getting worse.'

T3 (27-01-12)

- 'They will give us some money and then we will become more isolated. We will forget our culture and our mores'.
- 'In Kato Meria, a shepherd warned the company that he would destroy the antenna if they put it near his goats and another man in Potamos threatened road-workers with a gun to prevent the road construction'.

T4 (29-01-12)

- 'The tourist association is in a mess. Agricultural associations fell apart because of personal interests and miscommunication. They do not cooperate'.

T5 (30-01-12)

- The owner of the mini market was away. The clients opened the checkout counter, paid and took the change by themselves.

T6 (31-01-12)

- 'Locals are worried and anxious because of the crisis. There is uncertainty concerning the future, and they have families'.

T7 (02-02-12)

- ‘Fellow-villagers care for each other’.
- ‘Now, south Amorgians are lost. They do not know which kind of way to choose: Tourism or farming? Things evolve rapidly. In the past, things were occurring more slowly. Kato Meria is losing its culture and its language’.

T8 (03-02-12)

- ‘Wind energy companies will misuse the island to favour the interests of a very few capitalists who want people to believe that wind farms are necessary to save the planet. You hear constantly about climate change and disasters, and you are constantly afraid. Therefore, you have to consume constantly to overcome your anxiety’.

T9 (06-02-12)

- ‘The crisis damages small businesses. Everybody talks about paying taxes, promoting meritocracy, becoming competitive. This is nonsense. This is the recipe for our exploitation and their profit’.
- Municipal council members come from different villages and the most touristic villages are overrepresented.

T10 (07-02-12)

- ‘We talk like this because we are seated around the brazier. If we had heaters we would not come closer, to warm ourselves around the brazier’.

T11 (11-02-12)

- Tourist apartments, cafes, taverns, neighbourhood stores and mini markets, are all family businesses.
- PPC employees pay lower electricity prices.

T12 (20-02-12)

- ‘These businesses are officially designated cafes and bars for bureaucratic and financial convenience, but they offer food’.
- Suddenly locals have so much money, without being prepared for this sudden wealth.

B5: Observations – Reduction (2nd period)

Themes through reduction (2nd period)	Number of observation
Tendency to avoid bureaucracy	T1, T2, T12
Tendency not to cooperate	T1, T4
Cooperation for tourism reasons	T1
Avoidance of decision-making	T2
Degeneration and disorder	T7, T12
Anxiety caused by the crisis	T2, T6, T9
Wind energy threatens ethics	T3
Village opinion shapes interactions	T5, T7
Family business supports the tourism economy	T11
Locals oppose external neoliberal rhetoric	T8, T9
Bad experience with large-scale development	T3

B6: Photos (2nd period)

Photo 1(b): Maria Proestou, February 2012, south Amorgos (telecommunications antenna)



Photo 2(b): Maria Proestou, February 2012, village of Chora (pylons and antenna)

Appendix C: Data analysis – 3rd fieldwork period

C1: Observations – Selection (3rd period)

V1 (12-10-12)

- A tourist entrepreneur called for voluntary collective action to reconstruct the hiking paths. Amorgos is a candidate site for the UNESCO List because of the uniqueness of the monastery. Hiking paths near the monastery, near churches and chapels have to be in a good state to fulfil some of the criteria.

V2 (15-10-12)

- Locals feel threatened because of the crisis. They are sceptical towards development paths promoted by 'external investors who want to exploit the island'.
- Locals cannot identify with a landscape dominated by wind-power plants. 'I cannot imagine myself leaving for somewhere else. I was born here and I am attached to this place'.

V3 (20-10-12)

- Wind energy investors want to take advantage of the current financial distress. Locals are afraid that they will accept wind farms to relieve the municipality, which is almost bankrupt.

V4 (22-10-12)

- 'We rejected the marina because it would have destroyed tourism. The political party influenced the mayor and the council was with us. If we accept wind farms, then why do we not also accept the marina and the port in Kato Meria, and the road to the monastery'?
- 'Amorgos does not have unemployment but the crisis makes us feel uneasy'. Now, locals appreciate owing land that allows them to farm in case the situation gets worse.

V5 (26-10-12)

- In the 80s and 90s, the PPC has employed locals using clientelist practices.
- 'At the olive harvest we are all together. In former times, we used to sing and dance during the harvesting'.

V6 (5-11-12)

- Locals appreciate my participation in the olive harvest.

- My harvesting team made pauses to eat and chat. ‘Amorgos had 32 olive presses and now there is only one’. Harvesting teams exchanged opinions about the quality and production of oil this year.

V7 (8-11-12)

- My harvesting team agreed with the olive press owner about the pressing price.
- The olive press was crowded. People from all villages met and talked about the harvest and the crisis.

V8 (12-11-12)

- The harvesting team was stressed out because of the 2000 proposal. The 2000 municipal council had approved a project of photovoltaic installations and one wind-power plant in Kato Meria. The company had bribed one member. The succeeding municipal council stopped the project. Now, the company is proceeding with the construction.
- The current municipality took the company to court and stopped the construction.

V9 (15-11-12)

- Wood and oil will be distributed among the harvesters. Quantities depend more or less on the number of days a harvester has worked. My harvesting team gave me oil in exchange for my work. We did not have an agreement.
- On the occasion of the olive harvest locals talked about the ethical fulfilment embedded in the effort to cultivate land.
- In the kafenio, locals referred to the 2000 municipal council as dishonest, and talked about the crisis.

V10 (16-11-12)

- Locals came across the tavern and joined the conversation. ‘Now is not the time to talk about green energy issues. The municipality has to deal with more crucial issues’.

V11 (19-11-12)

- The municipality wanted to buy a field to construct the new sewage treatment facility. The field owner and the municipality agreed the price, but written documents showed that the field was smaller than the parties had agreed.

V12 (22-11-12)

- The monastery was open to the public for three days because of the celebration of Holy Mary day. Gold coins, gold figures and ancient bronzes were to be seen in the museum.

C2: Observations – Reduction (3rd period)

Themes through reduction (3rd period)	Number of observation
Cooperation for tourism reasons	V1
Influential role of the monastery	V2, V12
Clientelist relations between locals and PPC	V4, V5
Anxiety caused by the crisis	V2, V3, V4, V7, V10
Fear of accepting wind energy due to the crisis	V3
Wind energy companies as symbols of the crisis	V2, V3
Oral and tacit agreements shape interactions	V7, V9, V11
Wind farms threatens identity	V2
Bad experience with the municipal system	V8, V9
Bad experience with wind energy companies	V8
Experience of ethics through agriculture	V5, V6, V7, V9
Discussion outside the municipality	V9, V10
Resistance to large-scale development	V4

C3: Photos (3rd period)

Photo 1(c): Maria Proestou, October 2012 (The Monastery of Chozoviotissa)

Photo 2(c): Maria Proestou, November 2012 (free-range farming around abandoned terraces)

Appendix D: Final review of interviews and observations

General messages
Wind farms threaten pre-formal codes of conduct that support tourism
Wind energy development goes along with ethical wrongdoing already caused by tourism
The 2000 reform caused centralisation of the administration that intensified bureaucracy
Bureaucracy is incompatible with pre-formal codes of conduct
Wind energy development requires municipal bureaucracy that locals tend to avoid
Locals resist wind farms intuitively based on their experience with large-scale development
Locals tend to avoid cooperation that upsets family tourism businesses
Ethics proves to be the last resort within the financial crisis
External symbols of power promote wind farms that represent neoliberalism